Narrative:

My trainee and I plugged into sector 90 which was combined with sector 47. We were handed an eleven page document about a ten-day major military exercise that was currently underway. We were not; nor were the specialty briefed on the operation at any time whatsoever. We were briefed on the current airborne aircraft and which aircraft to expect. The flm (front line manager) attempted to assist us in the deciphering of the exercise; but had limited knowledge because he had only been briefed 30 minutes prior. We were told to expect an aircraft to orbit east of the fhu airspace at FL200 under either the call sign or in the orbit area; the associated paperwork was vague; and gave no specific call sign for said aircraft. We were told this particular aircraft would not be marsa with any aircraft for tombstone MOA. We received a departure message for aircraft X a C130 requesting to work in the tombstone MOA. Aircraft X is a typical call sign which we work in our specialty. There was no reference to the military mission; the orbit area or any reference to the call sign. My trainee cleared aircraft X into the tombstone MOA FL200 and below. Several minutes elapsed and I observed aircraft X circling northbound in the vicinity of cie VOR. I asked aircraft X what he was doing. He stated that he had not received clearance from the controlling agency to operate in the tombstone MOA. I informed aircraft X that we were the controlling agency for tombstone and he had received clearance. I then assisted aircraft X with a radar vector into the tombstone MOA. My trainee then informed aircraft X that he was in the confines of tombstone and cleared the aircraft FL200 and below; which aircraft X read back. I then discussed with the d-side trainer and the flm on how to clear the mission aircraft should he come out; and what steps would need to be accomplished. We all agreed that aircraft X or any tombstone MOA participants would be restricted for the mission. My trainee and I were relieved; and briefed the relieving controller on what little knowledge we had of the mission; the participating aircraft; and whether or not which aircraft would be marsa. My trainee and I went on break. When we returned from break; we were informed that sector 47 had been split off and other military aircraft were put into tombstone MOA with aircraft X. We were subsequently informed that aircraft X was indeed the aircraft that was participating in the military mission and was not marsa with any other aircraft. In my opinion this entire unsafe situation was due to a lack of briefing about this mission; and its specifics. The entire air traffic specialty was set up to fail. I have even been informed that using/coordinating agencies were not told of this mission either. In order for military operations to be successful in the national airspace system; complete and thorough briefings need to be accomplished prior to their execution. Air traffic controllers should not be handed 11 page documents on the fly and be made to figure out mission intricacies. Air traffic controllers should not be placed in a position as a military arbitrator to determine which aircraft are marsa with one another. The 7110.65 states that controllers neither invoke nor deny marsa. I strongly recommend that offices receiving requests for military operations thoroughly investigate and detail exactly what the mission requirements are and thoroughly brief air traffic controllers their role; and the requirements of the mission.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ZAB Controller conducting OJT described a very confused military exercise that was reportedly woefully absent of proper briefings. This resulted in questionable separation standard applications.

Narrative: My trainee and I plugged into Sector 90 which was combined with Sector 47. We were handed an eleven page document about a ten-day major military exercise that was currently underway. We were not; nor were the specialty briefed on the operation at any time whatsoever. We were briefed on the current airborne aircraft and which aircraft to expect. The FLM (Front Line Manager) attempted to assist us in the deciphering of the exercise; but had limited knowledge because he had only been briefed 30 minutes prior. We were told to expect an aircraft to orbit east of the FHU airspace at FL200 under either the call sign or in the orbit area; the associated paperwork was vague; and gave no specific call sign for said aircraft. We were told this particular aircraft would not be MARSA with any aircraft for Tombstone MOA. We received a departure message for Aircraft X a C130 requesting to work in the Tombstone MOA. Aircraft X is a typical call sign which we work in our specialty. There was no reference to the military mission; the orbit area or any reference to the call sign. My trainee cleared Aircraft X into the Tombstone MOA FL200 and below. Several minutes elapsed and I observed Aircraft X circling northbound in the vicinity of CIE VOR. I asked Aircraft X what he was doing. He stated that he had not received clearance from the controlling agency to operate in the Tombstone MOA. I informed Aircraft X that we were the controlling agency for Tombstone and he had received clearance. I then assisted Aircraft X with a RADAR vector into the Tombstone MOA. My trainee then informed Aircraft X that he was in the confines of Tombstone and cleared the aircraft FL200 and below; which Aircraft X read back. I then discussed with the D-Side trainer and the FLM on how to clear the mission aircraft should he come out; and what steps would need to be accomplished. We all agreed that Aircraft X or any Tombstone MOA participants would be restricted for the mission. My trainee and I were relieved; and briefed the Relieving Controller on what little knowledge we had of the mission; the participating aircraft; and whether or not which aircraft would be MARSA. My trainee and I went on break. When we returned from break; we were informed that Sector 47 had been split off and other military aircraft were put into Tombstone MOA with Aircraft X. We were subsequently informed that Aircraft X was indeed the aircraft that was participating in the military mission and was not MARSA with any other aircraft. In my opinion this entire unsafe situation was due to a lack of briefing about this mission; and its specifics. The entire air traffic specialty was set up to fail. I have even been informed that using/coordinating agencies were not told of this mission either. In order for military operations to be successful in the National Airspace System; complete and thorough briefings need to be accomplished prior to their execution. Air Traffic Controllers should not be handed 11 page documents on the fly and be made to figure out mission intricacies. Air Traffic Controllers should not be placed in a position as a military arbitrator to determine which aircraft are MARSA with one another. The 7110.65 states that controllers neither invoke nor deny MARSA. I strongly recommend that offices receiving requests for military operations thoroughly investigate and detail exactly what the mission requirements are and thoroughly brief Air Traffic Controllers their role; and the requirements of the mission.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.