Narrative:

Shortly after liftoff; we had multiple cockpit failures. The first officer airspeed indicator was rapidly accelerating; the altimeter was increasing at a highly accelerated rate; and the vvi was pegged at 6;000 FPM climb. There were multiple cockpit warnings both aural and visual. Both the warning and caution lights were illuminated. There were multiple EICAS messages. At a minimum I saw overspeed warning; aileron lockout; and rudder ratio. When I looked across the cockpit; I saw the captain's instruments were indicating a normal climb out. We were quite close to the ground; so I silenced the bell and told the captain her instruments were indicating correctly. (By the way; unusual attitude training was helpful in this case to not react in an inappropriate manner). As we climbed out; the instrument indications returned to normal and eventually all the cautions went away. As we climbed above 10;000 ft we began to troubleshoot and determined it was a problem with the air data computer. After referring to the flight manual and conferring with dispatch and maintenance; we decided to return to the departure airport to get the airplane fixed and press on to our original destination. Shortly after we made this decision and began our turn back; we got the same cockpit indications. This time; we selected the captain's air data computer to repeat on the first officer's side. Periodically; I would return to the first officer air data computer and it would be indicating normally and at other times; it would be in a state of failure; so we decided to leave the first officer instruments on the captain's air data computer. Once the decision was made to return to the departure airport; we began to dump fuel to get closer to max gross landing weight. As we flew back; we began to review the fom and flight manual to ensure we hadn't missed anything. After reading overweight landing verses fuel dumping I advocated that it didn't make sense to land overweight. It seemed an easy decision to delay landing by an hour to ensure no damage to the aircraft as opposed to having to wait at the end of the runway for an hour for the brakes to cool off possibly damaging tires or brakes. We had no dire emergency that would cause us to land immediately. The captain ultimately decided that was what we were going to do: wait until our landing weight was reached to ensure the safety of the passengers and to prevent damage to the airplane. While we were in holding burning fuel; we received a cell call. The dispatcher wanted to know why we didn't want to land overweight. I was pretty surprised that the dispatcher was asking all these questions (including page numbers and our rational) while we were in the middle of an emergency. Shortly after that; the duty manager cell called us. I was stunned to find out that he was trying to convince us to modify our decision in the middle of an ongoing emergency. He was not trying to point out something we missed that would cause injury. He was trying to point out a misinterpretation of a chart. I couldn't believe that the duty manager would try to convince a cockpit crew in flight that the decision they made was too conservative. It would have been more appropriate to wait until after landing to point out the chart misinterpretation. Unfortunately; being human; for the rest of the flight; I was second guessing our decision. Instead of thinking of the safety of the airplane; I was trying to make sure I wouldn't be reprimanded for making a poor decision. I found myself worrying about my job on final instead of being fully engaged in the cockpit. The emergency itself was relatively inane and not difficult to manage. The second guessing (while in the cockpit of an emergency aircraft) was disturbing and distracting. I have 2 recommendations. First; a duty manager should never call an emergency aircraft in the air unless his concern is for the safety of the flight. Certainly not to recommend a less conservative path than the one the crew has already chosen. Second; I would recommend renaming the B767 brake cooling time table chart to B767 maximum effort/rejected takeoff brake cooling time chart.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A B767-300 crew reported a First Officer air data computer malfunction shortly after takeoff. The decision was made to dump fuel then return to the departure airport for a normal landing. The Company Dispatcher and Duty Pilot questioned the decision to not land overweight making the crew uneasy.

Narrative: Shortly after liftoff; we had multiple cockpit failures. The First Officer airspeed indicator was rapidly accelerating; the altimeter was increasing at a highly accelerated rate; and the VVI was pegged at 6;000 FPM climb. There were multiple cockpit warnings both aural and visual. Both the warning and caution lights were illuminated. There were multiple EICAS messages. At a minimum I saw overspeed warning; aileron lockout; and rudder ratio. When I looked across the cockpit; I saw the Captain's instruments were indicating a normal climb out. We were quite close to the ground; so I silenced the bell and told the Captain her instruments were indicating correctly. (By the way; unusual attitude training was helpful in this case to not react in an inappropriate manner). As we climbed out; the instrument indications returned to normal and eventually all the cautions went away. As we climbed above 10;000 FT we began to troubleshoot and determined it was a problem with the air data computer. After referring to the flight manual and conferring with Dispatch and Maintenance; we decided to return to the departure airport to get the airplane fixed and press on to our original destination. Shortly after we made this decision and began our turn back; we got the same cockpit indications. This time; we selected the Captain's air data computer to repeat on the First Officer's side. Periodically; I would return to the First Officer air data computer and it would be indicating normally and at other times; it would be in a state of failure; so we decided to leave the First Officer instruments on the Captain's air data computer. Once the decision was made to return to the departure airport; we began to dump fuel to get closer to max gross landing weight. As we flew back; we began to review the FOM and Flight Manual to ensure we hadn't missed anything. After reading Overweight Landing Verses Fuel Dumping I advocated that it didn't make sense to land overweight. It seemed an easy decision to delay landing by an hour to ensure no damage to the aircraft as opposed to having to wait at the end of the runway for an hour for the brakes to cool off possibly damaging tires or brakes. We had no dire emergency that would cause us to land immediately. The Captain ultimately decided that was what we were going to do: wait until our landing weight was reached to ensure the safety of the passengers and to prevent damage to the airplane. While we were in holding burning fuel; we received a cell call. The Dispatcher wanted to know why we didn't want to land overweight. I was pretty surprised that the Dispatcher was asking all these questions (including page numbers and our rational) while we were in the middle of an emergency. Shortly after that; the Duty Manager cell called us. I was stunned to find out that he was trying to convince us to modify our decision in the middle of an ongoing emergency. He was not trying to point out something we missed that would cause injury. He was trying to point out a misinterpretation of a chart. I couldn't believe that the Duty Manager would try to convince a cockpit crew in flight that the decision they made was too conservative. It would have been more appropriate to wait until after landing to point out the chart misinterpretation. Unfortunately; being human; for the rest of the flight; I was second guessing our decision. Instead of thinking of the safety of the airplane; I was trying to make sure I wouldn't be reprimanded for making a poor decision. I found myself worrying about my job on final instead of being fully engaged in the cockpit. The emergency itself was relatively inane and not difficult to manage. The second guessing (while in the cockpit of an emergency aircraft) was disturbing and distracting. I have 2 recommendations. First; a Duty Manager should never call an emergency aircraft in the air unless his concern is for the safety of the flight. Certainly not to recommend a less conservative path than the one the crew has already chosen. Second; I would recommend renaming the B767 Brake Cooling Time Table chart to B767 Maximum Effort/RTO Brake Cooling Time Chart.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.