Narrative:

On march xx and xy; 2010; a B737-300; had it's 6th and 7th 'stiff elevator'; inflight occurrence--with; again; no remedy other than cleaned feel control unit and/or operational checks good. It should be noted that the first five write-ups of stiff elevator occurred from jan xx; 2007 (in ZZZ after an aircraft wash in ZZZ1;) thru january 2010 with similar 'operational checks good on ground' signoffs. (One technician tensioned cables). Most recently; captain 'X' on march xy; 2010; indicated in the logbook 'could not increase pitch' and captain 'Y' a few days earlier (march xx) had logged 'elevator unresponsive'. Was maintenance control waiting for a hard failure of the elevator control? So why fly it revenue [passengers] with intermittent elevator control failures?? Putting safety first; and before a revenue flight last fall during the 4th incident in ZZZ2; this aircraft should have had both 60;000 hour elevator power control units (PCU)'s replaced as precautionary and a full cable run inspection and a test flight with numerous touch and go's since all write-ups are flare related. My major safety concern is that these random incidents do not fit our profile for chronic reporting; and subsequently there was no action on maintenance control to ground this aircraft for a nose-to-tail detailed visual inspection. Logs were signed-off as 'inspected exposed cables'. When it comes to finding a worn part this falls way short of being thorough. Removing floor boards and cargo ceiling panels are just the start of getting serious about finding a flight control failure on a B737. Another concern is that the technicians are following the maintenance manual perhaps without knowledge that this was the 3rd; 4th; 5th; 6th; and 7th 'elevator stiff' log with 'no corrective action' other than 'cleaned and 'operational checks normal'. Finally; since both write-ups; 'could not increase pitch' and 'elevator unresponsive' are indicative of failed components; that shows that several of the seven technicians who signed-off the logbook as 'operational checks good'; must have had reasonable doubts that the problem would just go away. And each time the problem arose again and would not duplicate on the ground; the maintenance control people should have had the good judgment to ground it for precautionary part replacement and test flights. Throw bad weather in and an accident was assured.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A Line Lead Mechanic reports a B737-300 evidenced repeated 'Stiff Elevator' inflight occurrences; with no remedy other than cleaned Feel Control Unit or Operational Checks OK. Initial write-ups occurred after aircraft wash and all write-ups were landing flare related. No test flights or full elevator cable run inspections were accomplished.

Narrative: On March XX and XY; 2010; a B737-300; had it's 6th and 7th 'Stiff Elevator'; inflight occurrence--with; again; no remedy other than cleaned Feel Control Unit and/or operational checks good. It should be noted that the first five write-ups of stiff elevator occurred from Jan XX; 2007 (in ZZZ after an aircraft wash in ZZZ1;) thru January 2010 with similar 'Operational checks good on ground' signoffs. (One Technician tensioned cables). Most recently; Captain 'X' on March XY; 2010; indicated in the Logbook 'could not increase pitch' and Captain 'Y' a few days earlier (March XX) had logged 'Elevator unresponsive'. Was Maintenance Control waiting for a hard failure of the elevator control? So why fly it revenue [passengers] with intermittent elevator control failures?? Putting safety first; and before a revenue flight last fall during the 4th incident in ZZZ2; this aircraft should have had both 60;000 hour elevator Power Control Units (PCU)'s replaced as precautionary AND a full cable run Inspection AND a Test Flight with numerous touch and go's since all write-ups are flare related. My major safety concern is that these random incidents do not fit our profile for chronic reporting; and subsequently there was no action on Maintenance Control to ground this aircraft for a nose-to-tail detailed visual inspection. Logs were signed-off as 'Inspected exposed cables'. When it comes to finding a worn part this falls way short of being thorough. Removing floor boards and cargo ceiling panels are just the start of getting serious about finding a flight control failure on a B737. Another concern is that the Technicians are following the Maintenance Manual perhaps without knowledge that this was the 3rd; 4th; 5th; 6th; and 7th 'Elevator stiff' Log with 'No Corrective Action' other than 'cleaned and 'Operational checks normal'. Finally; since both write-ups; 'Could not increase pitch' and 'Elevator Unresponsive' are indicative of failed components; that shows that several of the seven Technicians who signed-off the Logbook as 'Operational checks good'; must have had reasonable doubts that the problem would just go away. And each time the problem arose again and would not duplicate on the ground; the Maintenance Control people should have had the good judgment to ground it for precautionary part replacement and test flights. Throw bad weather in and an accident was assured.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.