Narrative:

While working ground control west/east (gcw/gce) combined; I taxied aircraft X to runway 35L for an intersection departure from taxiway tango. I marked the strip appropriately; advised local control (local control) of the intersection departure; and placed the flight progress strip (fsp) in front of local control. Air carrier Y had just landed on runway 35L and was exiting the runway at taxiway golf. Aircraft X came back to my frequency and informed me that air carrier Y had lost a 'cowling'; and that the cowling was 'on the runway'. I immediately informed the controller working local control (local control). The local control controller was standing three ft from me and acknowledged the reported cowling on the runway. The local control controller did not send the aircraft on short-final around. I did not hear if the debris information was relayed to the arriving aircraft or not. I called airport operations and requested an immediate runway inspection to locate the cowling. I then looked up and observed aircraft landing and departing on runway 35L. I told the controller working local control that he needed to cancel all takeoff and landing clearances until the FOD could be removed from the runway; but he said that he would only do so if 'ordered by the controller in charge'. The airport vehicle was on the tower frequency by now and a runway inspection was in progress. The airport vehicle was unable to locate the FOD; and arrival and departure operations then resumed. The very next arrival reported FOD on the runway north of taxiway golf; on the right side of the runway. I informed local control of this reported FOD; and aircraft continued to land and depart. Our facility has experienced incidents; operational errors; operational deviations; and accidents. We have received crew resource management (CRM) training; safety program training; 'positive separation' briefings; and etc. This was a complete failure by everyone in the tower cab. Everyone downplayed the cowling report because the report came from a general aviation (GA) pilot; they simply assumed that the GA pilot did not know what he was talking about. We were uncertain about the type of FOD; but it was reported as an engine cowling. We did not know if the runway was clear of debris; yet we continued to land and depart from this runway. A MD80 pilot finally said that he wouldn't depart until this situation was sorted-out. I have no recommendations; as I am unable to comprehend how an entire tower cab team could have allowed this to happen.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: AUS Controller voiced concern regarding the actions of the tower team; i.e. continuing operations after FOD had been reported on the runway.

Narrative: While working Ground Control West/East (GCW/GCE) Combined; I taxied Aircraft X to Runway 35L for an intersection departure from Taxiway Tango. I marked the strip appropriately; advised Local Control (LC) of the intersection departure; and placed the flight progress strip (FSP) in front of Local Control. Air Carrier Y had just landed on Runway 35L and was exiting the runway at Taxiway Golf. Aircraft X came back to my frequency and informed me that Air Carrier Y had lost a 'COWLING'; and that the cowling was 'ON THE RUNWAY'. I immediately informed the Controller working Local Control (LC). The LC Controller was standing three FT from me and acknowledged the reported cowling on the runway. The LC Controller did not send the aircraft on short-final around. I did not hear if the debris information was relayed to the arriving aircraft or not. I called Airport Operations and requested an immediate runway inspection to locate the cowling. I then looked up and observed aircraft landing and departing on Runway 35L. I told the Controller working LC that he needed to cancel all takeoff and landing clearances until the FOD could be removed from the runway; but he said that he would only do so if 'ORDERED BY THE CIC'. The airport vehicle was on the Tower frequency by now and a runway inspection was in progress. The airport vehicle was unable to locate the FOD; and arrival and departure operations then resumed. The very next arrival reported FOD on the runway north of Taxiway Golf; on the right side of the runway. I informed LC of this reported FOD; and aircraft continued to land and depart. Our facility has experienced incidents; Operational Errors; Operational Deviations; and accidents. We have received Crew Resource Management (CRM) training; safety program training; 'positive separation' briefings; and etc. This was a complete failure by everyone in the Tower Cab. Everyone downplayed the cowling report because the report came from a General Aviation (GA) pilot; they simply assumed that the GA pilot did not know what he was talking about. We were uncertain about the type of FOD; but it was reported as an engine cowling. We did not know if the runway was clear of debris; yet we continued to land and depart from this runway. A MD80 pilot finally said that he wouldn't depart until this situation was sorted-out. I have no recommendations; as I am unable to comprehend how an entire Tower Cab team could have allowed this to happen.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.