Narrative:

Rain showers visible west and virga in breaks in the weather north of the airport. My first officer asked for a delay on the runway to survey the radar picture of the assigned SID off runway 25. I asked for a deviation right of course off the SID to remain on a path that was close to weather. Tower cleared us as requested to 300 degrees to 6;000 ft. Climbing through approximately 2;000 ft MSL my co-pilot saw a bright flash to the left of our aircraft and we felt a near simultaneous concussion/lightning strike. We continued climb into clear skies but passing FL180 got a cabin auto inoperative EICAS message with auto inoperative light on the pressurization controller. Cabin altitude and differential were within limits so we continued with our climb clearance to FL240. Cabin rate was 500 ft per minute and stabilized at zero with differential at 6.0 inches and cabin altitude at 7;000 ft (off normal schedule but well within limits). We called dispatch and maintenance for guidance. The combination of previous discrepancies on the pressurization systems on this aircraft and possible impact on the lightning strike on those systems and the aircraft drove the decision to divert with dispatch concurrence. Approximately 30 minutes after the lightning strike; #1 flight attendant was briefed in the cockpit followed by a PA to passengers without reference to the lightning strike. Additional contact was made with dispatch and maintenance concerning the extent of inspection required of an overweight landing at just under 340;000 pounds. Approximately 1 hour and 5 minutes after the lightning strike; we notified ATC of our intent to divert. We declared an emergency with ATC for the overweight landing. We landed approximately 2 hours and 13 minutes after the lightning strike at a gross weight of 337;700 pounds at 200 ft per minute rate of descent. Clearing the runway; we spoke directly to airfield rescue and fire fighting personnel on a dedicated frequency. After a brief inspection of the aircraft; we commenced taxi to a remote parking spot. We got an equipment cooling overheat light during taxi and referred to QRH. Approaching parking; I attempted to direct maintenance to the electronics bay to inspect the overhead condition. Ground personnel did not have access to a headset. I was unable to open my sliding window physically to communicate my overheat condition. Simultaneously; the co-pilot indicated it appeared we were still pressurized (cabin differential over 8.0 inches and cabin altitude zero). Concerned over ground personnel attempting aircraft entry with this condition; I immediately made a PA that flight attendants should disarm the aircraft doors and clear the areas around the doors. We then turned off the air conditioning packs and attempted to manually raise the cabin altitude. These actions reduced the differential (as indicated on the differential indicator and confirmed by our ears) prior to ground personnel entry to the aircraft. I made another PA explaining the pressure changes were the result of our pressurization problems. Faced with this scenario again; I would focus more attention on the manual mode of the pressurization controller (climb and descend). I also would have enlisted additional assistance from maintenance after attempting to regain control of the automatic pressurization controllers to establish if we had more control of the manual mode part of the system than we believed based on the events during taxi after landing. I suggest that station personnel (for example; maintenance) or some specific individual be tasked with access to a headset so that their first contact at the airport is with the captain; especially in a divert; abnormal; or emergency situation. Most of all; I would like to see maintenance issues addressed with specific corrective action before they are written multiple times (three in this case). I wonder if this incident could have been avoided via definitive action on previous logbook entries. Or perhapsthe confirmed damage to the lightening strike also caused the anomalies we experienced with our pressurization systems.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A B767-300 was struck by lightning on climb. Later a CABIN AUTO EICAS indicated loss of auto pressurization. An emergency was declared for the overweight landing at an enroute airport.

Narrative: Rain showers visible west and virga in breaks in the weather north of the airport. My First Officer asked for a delay on the runway to survey the radar picture of the assigned SID off Runway 25. I asked for a deviation right of course off the SID to remain on a path that was close to weather. Tower cleared us as requested to 300 degrees to 6;000 FT. Climbing through approximately 2;000 FT MSL my co-pilot saw a bright flash to the left of our aircraft and we felt a near simultaneous concussion/lightning strike. We continued climb into clear skies but passing FL180 got a cabin auto inoperative EICAS message with auto inoperative light on the pressurization controller. Cabin altitude and differential were within limits so we continued with our climb clearance to FL240. Cabin rate was 500 FT per minute and stabilized at zero with differential at 6.0 inches and cabin altitude at 7;000 FT (off normal schedule but well within limits). We called Dispatch and Maintenance for guidance. The combination of previous discrepancies on the pressurization systems on this aircraft and possible impact on the lightning strike on those systems and the aircraft drove the decision to divert with Dispatch concurrence. Approximately 30 minutes after the lightning strike; #1 Flight Attendant was briefed in the cockpit followed by a PA to passengers without reference to the lightning strike. Additional contact was made with Dispatch and Maintenance concerning the extent of inspection required of an overweight landing at just under 340;000 LBS. Approximately 1 hour and 5 minutes after the lightning strike; we notified ATC of our intent to divert. We declared an emergency with ATC for the overweight landing. We landed approximately 2 hours and 13 minutes after the lightning strike at a gross weight of 337;700 LBS at 200 FT per minute rate of descent. Clearing the Runway; we spoke directly to Airfield Rescue and Fire Fighting personnel on a dedicated frequency. After a brief inspection of the aircraft; we commenced taxi to a remote parking spot. We got an Equipment Cooling Overheat light during taxi and referred to QRH. Approaching parking; I attempted to direct Maintenance to the electronics bay to inspect the overhead condition. Ground personnel did not have access to a headset. I was unable to open my sliding window physically to communicate my overheat condition. Simultaneously; the co-pilot indicated it appeared we were still pressurized (Cabin differential over 8.0 inches and cabin altitude zero). Concerned over ground personnel attempting aircraft entry with this condition; I immediately made a PA that flight attendants should disarm the aircraft doors and clear the areas around the doors. We then turned off the air conditioning packs and attempted to manually raise the cabin altitude. These actions reduced the differential (as indicated on the differential indicator and confirmed by our ears) prior to ground personnel entry to the aircraft. I made another PA explaining the pressure changes were the result of our pressurization problems. Faced with this scenario again; I would focus more attention on the manual mode of the pressurization controller (climb and descend). I also would have enlisted additional assistance from Maintenance after attempting to regain control of the automatic pressurization controllers to establish if we had more control of the manual mode part of the system than we believed based on the events during taxi after landing. I suggest that station personnel (for example; Maintenance) or some specific individual be tasked with access to a headset so that their first contact at the airport is with the Captain; especially in a divert; abnormal; or emergency situation. Most of all; I would like to see maintenance issues addressed with specific corrective action before they are written multiple times (three in this case). I wonder if this incident could have been avoided via definitive action on previous logbook entries. Or perhapsthe confirmed damage to the lightening strike also caused the anomalies we experienced with our pressurization systems.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.