Narrative:

I was conducting OJT with a developmental that has 1 r-side and all d-sides. This was the second day of training on this position. As the situation developed; I intervened a couple of times; while trying to let the trainee work as much of the situation as possible. In this scenario; feeder owns 100-110 ft and departures owns 120-170 ft inside the boundary. I own 100 ft and up on my side of the boundary. A flight check aircraft climbed to 130 after doing air work near. We asked his intentions and were told he wanted to overfly XXX VOR; and then proceed to xxxxx intersection; and do a few 'dipsy-doodles' inside of xxxxx; then proceed to ZZZ via the shortest route. XXX VOR to xxxxx put the aircraft in conflict with the 2 stars into ZZZ. However; since I had the impression that he would be conducting some air work before landing; I determined that the most expedient flow would be to get the regular ZZZ arrivals underneath flight check aircraft. In the process of sequencing 3 aircraft to avoid flight check aircraft with less space and time than usually used; flight check aircraft began to encroach on ZZZ TRACON airspace. I instructed the trainee to initiate a hand off on flight check aircraft to ZZZ departure position; but I did not confirm that he flashed him at the correct position. In fact; the trainee just initiated an automated hand off; so flight check aircraft flashed at the wrong position. I did not catch this discrepancy until after the whole event was over. As flight check aircraft neared the boundary; and while the trainee was still sequencing the regular ZZZ arrivals; I reminded him that he needed to coordinate flight check aircraft's intentions with departure. Nearly the same time; ZZZ south feeder attempted to call us. My trainee was unsure of what to do/say at this point; so I intervened. In my mind; ZZZ departure had the hand off on the aircraft; so I simply called to coordinate intentions. I informed the departure controller that flight check aircraft was proceeding to xxxxx and would be doing some air work. The departure controller said 'point-out approved;' to which I responded; 'no; he's coming to you.' and reiterated the intent to do air work. This exchange distracted me from completing the later part of flight check aircraft's intentions; that of proceeding to ZZZ via the quickest rout when done at xxxxx. After hanging up with departure; we answered the call from feeder. They asked what flight check aircraft was doing. I informed them that he was going to departure and doing air work; and would be talking to departure. We then shipped flight check aircraft to departure frequency. A subsequent call from departure expressed his displeasure at receiving the aircraft without a hand off. At this point; I pieced the puzzle together and figured out that the hand-off had not been made to departure as I instructed; which also explained why feeder was asking about an aircraft that was not in their airspace. A further call between the flight line managers (flm) helped piece more details together. Additionally; flight check aircraft apparently didn't want to spend any time over xxxxx as I thought; so asked for decent to ZZZ which was complicated by the previously mentioned 'regular ZZZ arrivals' underneath him; making life unnecessarily difficult for feeder and departure. After the aircraft was off of our frequency; and most of the traffic was out of our sector; my trainee and I were able to discuss what had happened. We were also able to discuss with the flm what had happened; and were able to put this narrative together. At this point; we also determined that apparently the automated hand-off didn't even go to feeder; but to satellite first; who then handed flight check aircraft off to feeder. Recommendation; flight check aircraft was not clear about his intentions and did not use proper phraseology. Flight check aircraft should use correct phraseology and be clearer about unusual requests andintentions. Flight check aircraft should have chosen a time period that was less congested to conduct his testing. I did not request that flight check aircraft clarify his intentions flight check aircraft's route/altitude caused a more complex sequencing situation that is normally seen at this position. My trainee's inexperience at the position caused more attention than necessary be devoted to sequencing other aircraft. This is just a learning experience. No way to avoid the workload overhead that is sometimes encountered unexpectedly. I did not confirm that my trainee initiated a non-standard hand off as I instructed; I should not have assumed he did it; and noticed the incorrect computer feedback (wrong position in data block). I was distracted by departure's unexpected responses during coordination. I should have completely coordinated the intentions. Additionally; I could have inferred why the departure controller's reply was other than expected and why feeder was calling; however; the situation evolved too quickly for this to happen.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: Enroute controller providing OJT; described an airspace incursion event when a wrong hand off was initiated to an adjacent TRACON; the entire scenario involved a FAA flight check aircraft checking navigational aids.

Narrative: I was conducting OJT with a developmental that has 1 R-side and all D-sides. This was the second day of training on this position. As the situation developed; I intervened a couple of times; while trying to let the trainee work as much of the situation as possible. In this scenario; Feeder owns 100-110 ft and Departures owns 120-170 ft inside the boundary. I own 100 ft and up on my side of the boundary. A Flight Check aircraft climbed to 130 after doing air work near. We asked his intentions and were told he wanted to overfly XXX VOR; and then proceed to XXXXX intersection; and do a few 'dipsy-doodles' inside of XXXXX; then proceed to ZZZ via the shortest route. XXX VOR to XXXXX put the aircraft in conflict with the 2 STARs into ZZZ. However; since I had the impression that he would be conducting some air work before landing; I determined that the most expedient flow would be to get the regular ZZZ arrivals underneath Flight Check aircraft. In the process of sequencing 3 aircraft to avoid Flight Check aircraft with less space and time than usually used; Flight Check aircraft began to encroach on ZZZ TRACON airspace. I instructed the trainee to initiate a hand off on Flight Check aircraft to ZZZ Departure position; but I did not confirm that he flashed him at the correct position. In fact; the trainee just initiated an automated hand off; so Flight Check aircraft flashed at the wrong position. I did not catch this discrepancy until after the whole event was over. As Flight Check aircraft neared the boundary; and while the trainee was still sequencing the regular ZZZ arrivals; I reminded him that he needed to coordinate Flight Check aircraft's intentions with departure. Nearly the same time; ZZZ South Feeder attempted to call us. My trainee was unsure of what to do/say at this point; so I intervened. In my mind; ZZZ Departure had the hand off on the aircraft; so I simply called to coordinate intentions. I informed the Departure controller that Flight Check aircraft was proceeding to XXXXX and would be doing some air work. The departure controller said 'Point-out Approved;' to which I responded; 'No; he's coming to you.' and reiterated the intent to do air work. This exchange distracted me from completing the later part of Flight Check aircraft's intentions; that of proceeding to ZZZ via the quickest rout when done at XXXXX. After hanging up with Departure; we answered the call from Feeder. They asked what Flight Check aircraft was doing. I informed them that he was going to Departure and doing air work; and would be talking to Departure. We then shipped Flight Check aircraft to Departure frequency. A subsequent call from Departure expressed his displeasure at receiving the aircraft without a hand off. At this point; I pieced the puzzle together and figured out that the hand-off had not been made to Departure as I instructed; which also explained why Feeder was asking about an aircraft that was not in their airspace. A further call between the Flight Line Managers (FLM) helped piece more details together. Additionally; Flight Check aircraft apparently didn't want to spend any time over XXXXX as I thought; so asked for decent to ZZZ which was complicated by the previously mentioned 'regular ZZZ arrivals' underneath him; making life unnecessarily difficult for Feeder and Departure. After the aircraft was off of our frequency; and most of the traffic was out of our sector; my trainee and I were able to discuss what had happened. We were also able to discuss with the FLM what had happened; and were able to put this narrative together. At this point; we also determined that apparently the automated hand-off didn't even go to Feeder; but to Satellite first; who then handed Flight Check aircraft off to Feeder. Recommendation; Flight Check aircraft was not clear about his intentions and did not use proper phraseology. Flight Check aircraft should use correct phraseology and be clearer about unusual requests andintentions. Flight Check aircraft should have chosen a time period that was less congested to conduct his testing. I did not request that Flight Check aircraft clarify his intentions Flight Check aircraft's route/altitude caused a more complex sequencing situation that is normally seen at this position. My trainee's inexperience at the position caused more attention than necessary be devoted to sequencing other aircraft. This is just a learning experience. No way to avoid the workload overhead that is sometimes encountered unexpectedly. I did not confirm that my trainee initiated a non-standard hand off as I instructed; I should not have assumed he did it; and noticed the incorrect computer feedback (wrong position in data block). I was distracted by Departure's unexpected responses during coordination. I should have completely coordinated the intentions. Additionally; I could have inferred why the Departure controller's reply was other than expected and why Feeder was calling; however; the situation evolved too quickly for this to happen.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.