Narrative:

Level at a cruise altitude of FL220 in IMC and icing conditions received the following ECAM: 'anti ice stby right stat' then one minute later ECAM message was: 'anti ice captain probes'. SOP's were followed: air data switched to 'capt on 3' per ECAM action. Captain lost all primary instruments: airspeed; altitude; heading; #1 a/P; athr. Captain transferred aircraft control to the first officer. Extensive ECAM warnings ensued. An overspeed condition was corrected. An emergency was declared with center and the captain requested headings and a turn to VFR conditions along with his request for an alert from the center controller if the transponder mode 'C' altitude showed more than 200 feet off the assigned altitude. FL340 was reported VFR and the captain requested FL340. The controller; per the captain's request relayed weather for several nearby airports. All reported VFR conditions for landings. After ACARS communications with the dispatcher; the first officer; and center the flight crew decided to divert. Headings and lower altitudes were assigned. The dispatcher was advised via ACARS. The captain advised the flight attendants of the emergency divert; 12 minutes to landing; normal landing for cabin purposes. VFR conditions were experienced once below the overcast layer at 4;000 feet MSL and a visual approach to landing was made. A left turn was made off the runway followed by another left onto 'B' taxiway. The left turn onto 'B' was not apparently what tower told our flight to do so we asked for progressives to the ramp as we were unfamiliar. The captain then briefed the dispatcher and maintenance control via his cell phone. The crew was transported to the overnight hotel then returned to ferry the aircraft the next day but was unable to accomplish due to multiple operational issues: aircraft not on gate; aircraft not fueled; aircraft not deiced; nighttime ensued. Crew returned to the overnight hotel. Crew returned again to ferry aircraft. Upon engine start ECAM displayed; 'gen 1 fault'. Captain followed SOP's and flight continued under VFR flight conditions. Maintenance replaced the standby probe computer and the #1 adiru.there should be a review SOP's regarding ECAM procedures for the following reasons: 1: current SOP's work if individual ECAM's are experienced. However if confronted with multiple; and at times; conflicting ECAM directives; the current SOP's do not work to reach a concise resolution given a relatively short period of time. 2: the current QRH does not provide for an option to 'opt out' when experiencing multiple; and at times; conflicting ECAM's. During my experience the first officer and I opted out after we accomplished the SOP's for 'unreliable airspeed'. This was because; and not limited to; too many ECAM's for the short time before landing. 3: our priorities became a) keep the aircraft flying safely; b) get to VFR weather; then c) make a VFR approach and landing due to the aircraft being in alternate law and not definitely knowing the extent of the degradation to the aircraft systems because of extensive and multiple ECAM messages.

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: An A319 flight crew experienced pitot static system anti ice failures at FL220. With numerous and conflicting ECAM messages and the aircraft in Alternate Law; the crew declared an emergency and diverted to the nearest suitable VFR airport.

Narrative: Level at a cruise altitude of FL220 in IMC and icing conditions received the following ECAM: 'ANTI ICE STBY R STAT' then one minute later ECAM message was: 'ANTI ICE CAPT PROBES'. SOP's were followed: Air Data switched to 'Capt on 3' per ECAM action. Captain lost all primary instruments: airspeed; altitude; heading; #1 A/P; ATHR. Captain transferred aircraft control to the First Officer. Extensive ECAM warnings ensued. An overspeed condition was corrected. An emergency was declared with Center and the Captain requested headings and a turn to VFR conditions along with his request for an alert from the Center Controller if the transponder mode 'C' altitude showed more than 200 feet off the assigned altitude. FL340 was reported VFR and the Captain requested FL340. The Controller; per the Captain's request relayed weather for several nearby airports. All reported VFR conditions for landings. After ACARS communications with the Dispatcher; the First Officer; and Center the flight crew decided to divert. Headings and lower altitudes were assigned. The Dispatcher was advised via ACARS. The Captain advised the Flight Attendants of the emergency divert; 12 minutes to landing; normal landing for cabin purposes. VFR conditions were experienced once below the overcast layer at 4;000 feet MSL and a visual approach to landing was made. A left turn was made off the runway followed by another left onto 'B' taxiway. The left turn onto 'B' was not apparently what Tower told our flight to do so we asked for progressives to the ramp as we were unfamiliar. The Captain then briefed the Dispatcher and Maintenance Control via his cell phone. The crew was transported to the overnight hotel then returned to ferry the aircraft the next day but was unable to accomplish due to multiple operational issues: aircraft not on gate; aircraft not fueled; aircraft not deiced; nighttime ensued. Crew returned to the overnight hotel. Crew returned again to ferry aircraft. Upon engine start ECAM displayed; 'GEN 1 Fault'. Captain followed SOP's and flight continued under VFR flight conditions. Maintenance replaced the STANDBY PROBE COMPUTER and the #1 ADIRU.There should be a review SOP's regarding ECAM procedures for the following reasons: 1: current SOP's work if individual ECAM's are experienced. However if confronted with multiple; and at times; conflicting ECAM directives; the current SOP's do not work to reach a concise resolution given a relatively short period of time. 2: The current QRH does not provide for an option to 'OPT OUT' when experiencing multiple; and at times; conflicting ECAM's. During my experience the First Officer and I opted out after we accomplished the SOP's for 'unreliable airspeed'. This was because; and not limited to; too many ECAM's for the short time before landing. 3: Our priorities became a) keep the aircraft flying safely; b) get to VFR weather; then c) make a VFR approach and landing due to the aircraft being in Alternate Law and not definitely knowing the extent of the degradation to the aircraft systems because of extensive and multiple ECAM messages.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.