Narrative:

While climbing out first officer and captain both heard a felt a single jolt that we attributed to the flight attendant stowing a cart. Upon level off; 5 strong; rapid jolts were felt and heard followed shortly by the 'LGCIU2' ECAM fault. Crew surmised the jolts were the nose landing gear striking the closed landing gear doors. Crew contacted dispatch/maintenance and elected to return for maintenance facilitation. Operations requested contact with captain. On a 'human factors' quiz captain was asked how 'surprised' he was by the event. The heavy jolts were unexpected but the fault was not; it was written up previously multiple times; and never adequately addressed. The prima-facie evidence of this being our incident. The crew had actually briefed the irregular page for this fault prior to departing on leg one of the assignment. This fault occurred on leg three but the maintenance history led us to believe we would experience it. Maintenance continues to be concerned with 'clearing the fault' rather than fixing the problem that caused the fault. This continued practice is troubling to line pilots and is counter to the public safety message distributed by the company.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: An A319 Captain reported abnormal noises and an ECAM message alerting him to a nose gear problem. He coordinated with dispatch and maintenance and returned to departure airport.

Narrative: While climbing out First Officer and Captain both heard a felt a single jolt that we attributed to the Flight Attendant stowing a cart. Upon level off; 5 strong; rapid jolts were felt and heard followed shortly by the 'LGCIU2' ECAM fault. Crew surmised the jolts were the nose landing gear striking the closed landing gear doors. Crew contacted dispatch/maintenance and elected to return for maintenance facilitation. Operations requested contact with Captain. On a 'human factors' quiz Captain was asked how 'surprised' he was by the event. The heavy jolts were unexpected but the fault was not; it was written up previously multiple times; and never adequately addressed. The prima-facie evidence of this being our incident. The crew had actually briefed the irregular page for this fault prior to departing on leg one of the assignment. This fault occurred on leg three but the maintenance history led us to believe we would experience it. Maintenance continues to be concerned with 'clearing the fault' rather than fixing the problem that caused the fault. This continued practice is troubling to line pilots and is counter to the public safety message distributed by the company.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.