Narrative:

We took off and as we began the required right turn to a heading of 280 at 800 ft; we began receiving EICAS caution messages for the right hydraulic system. We continued to the west with departure as we identified and worked through the problem. We asked for vectors and leveled off at 14;000 ft while we contacted the company. At this point we had lost the right engine-driven hydraulic pump; most of the hydraulic fluid in the right system; and the auxiliary hydraulic pump. We consulted the right hydraulic system failure checklist in the G200 QRH and secured the system. We were just a little less than 4;000 pounds over maximum landing weight so the captain and company decided to continue on to our destination in order to burn fuel and have access to a long runway as we wouldn't have thrust reverser's; normal brakes; krueger flaps; anti-skid; nose-wheel steering; and partial airbrakes upon landing. We proceeded at 14;000 ft and 245 KIAS. We informed the passengers of the issue; obtained a catering request from them; and passed that on to the company as they began working on a recovery plan. Based on our projected landing weight we determined that we needed to jettison fuel in order to get below landing weight and land safely. We coordinated with departure and began dumping fuel. We received a phone call from the company stating that we should proceed to an alternate airport as the FBO at our destination did not have means to get us off of the runway upon landing. The aircraft also had and MEL'ed nose gear piece that was required to hook a tow-bar up; so we needed to find a location that had an electric tug. We informed ATC of our change in destination and were cleared. We recalculated our fuel requirement and continued to jettison fuel. We requested an early descent in order to follow the proper checklist as it is rather lengthy due to the need to perform an alternate gear extension. We descended to 5000 ft about 65 miles east of our destination; performed the alternate gear extension and continued with the landing with the right hydraulic system failure. We also calculated our landing distance and reference (ref) speed as per the checklist. We received vectors for the ILS and landed uneventful. Once on the ground the airport fire department met us and began assisting with the effort to get a tug out to the runway and remove the aircraft. The company had enlisted an FBO to use their hydraulic tug due to the nose gear MEL; but the tug was not big enough to work properly. Meanwhile the passengers were disembarked and taken to a different aircraft in order to continue their trip. Eventually maintenance employees were able to find a tow bar and connector that worked and we slowly pulled the aircraft off of the runway.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A G-200's right engine driven hydraulic pump failed after takeoff; all right system fluid was lost. An emergency was declared; fuel dumped and the aircraft diverted to an alternate enroute airport with equipment and services to handle the aircraft.

Narrative: We took off and as we began the required right turn to a heading of 280 at 800 FT; we began receiving EICAS caution messages for the right hydraulic system. We continued to the West with Departure as we identified and worked through the problem. We asked for vectors and leveled off at 14;000 FT while we contacted the company. At this point we had lost the right engine-driven hydraulic pump; most of the hydraulic fluid in the right system; and the auxiliary hydraulic pump. We consulted the RIGHT HYDRAULIC SYSTEM FAILURE checklist in the G200 QRH and secured the system. We were just a little less than 4;000 pounds over maximum landing weight so the Captain and company decided to continue on to our destination in order to burn fuel and have access to a long runway as we wouldn't have Thrust Reverser's; normal brakes; Krueger flaps; anti-skid; nose-wheel steering; and partial airbrakes upon landing. We proceeded at 14;000 FT and 245 KIAS. We informed the passengers of the issue; obtained a catering request from them; and passed that on to the Company as they began working on a recovery plan. Based on our projected landing weight we determined that we needed to jettison fuel in order to get below landing weight and land safely. We coordinated with Departure and began dumping fuel. We received a phone call from the company stating that we should proceed to an alternate airport as the FBO at our destination did not have means to get us off of the runway upon landing. The aircraft also had and MEL'ed nose gear piece that was required to hook a tow-bar up; so we needed to find a location that had an electric tug. We informed ATC of our change in destination and were cleared. We recalculated our fuel requirement and continued to jettison fuel. We requested an early descent in order to follow the proper checklist as it is rather lengthy due to the need to perform an alternate gear extension. We descended to 5000 FT about 65 miles east of our destination; performed the alternate gear extension and continued with the landing with the Right Hydraulic System Failure. We also calculated our landing distance and reference (ref) speed as per the checklist. We received vectors for the ILS and landed uneventful. Once on the ground the airport fire department met us and began assisting with the effort to get a tug out to the runway and remove the aircraft. The company had enlisted an FBO to use their hydraulic tug due to the nose gear MEL; but the tug was not big enough to work properly. Meanwhile the passengers were disembarked and taken to a different aircraft in order to continue their trip. Eventually maintenance employees were able to find a tow bar and connector that worked and we slowly pulled the aircraft off of the runway.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.