Narrative:

Small aircraft X departed hnl airport and made radio contact with me, north radar controller. I did not observe a primary target or beacon generated target, so I rogered his transmission. Then, I observed a primary target less than a mile north of helicopter Y and instructed X to reset his transponder. Aircraft Y, a govt helicopter, was orbiting 1-2 mi north of the airport. The tower did not coordinate with me the intentions of Y and if visual sep was being applied to his northwest departures. I then had radar contact with X about a mile north of Y. X was indicating 700' and Y appeared to be at 500'. I asked X if he had the helicopter in sight. X said he had the helicopter in sight, but the tower did not advise him of the helicopter traffic. This same incident happened to another aircraft departing eastbound with another radar controller. Factor that contributed to this incident was the tower controller's lack of knowledge in directives, ie, handbook 7110.65E, paragraph 2-21 traffic advisories and paragraph 5-64,C--ensuring that potential conflicts are resolved prior to transferring radio communications. To prevent a recurrence of this incident the tower controller involved should not be allowed to work the local controller position until he has been through a remedial training class and been recertified. An area manager has been notified of this incident and no steps have been taken in this facility to prevent this particular controller of potential conflict. This makes me very concerned because I am a private pilot and would not feel safe if I heard this particular controller on the radio.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: TRACON CTLR COMPLAINT REFERENCE ATCT LCL CTLR FAILURE TO PROVIDE SEPARATION BETWEEN DEPARTING TRAFFIC AND ORBITING HELICOPTER NEAR ARPT. ACFT IN TCA, SO SEPARATION REQUIRED. OPERATIONAL ERRORS.

Narrative: SMA X DEPARTED HNL ARPT AND MADE RADIO CONTACT WITH ME, N RADAR CTLR. I DID NOT OBSERVE A PRIMARY TARGET OR BEACON GENERATED TARGET, SO I ROGERED HIS XMISSION. THEN, I OBSERVED A PRIMARY TARGET LESS THAN A MILE N OF HELI Y AND INSTRUCTED X TO RESET HIS TRANSPONDER. ACFT Y, A GOVT HELI, WAS ORBITING 1-2 MI N OF THE ARPT. THE TWR DID NOT COORDINATE WITH ME THE INTENTIONS OF Y AND IF VISUAL SEP WAS BEING APPLIED TO HIS NW DEPS. I THEN HAD RADAR CONTACT WITH X ABOUT A MILE N OF Y. X WAS INDICATING 700' AND Y APPEARED TO BE AT 500'. I ASKED X IF HE HAD THE HELI IN SIGHT. X SAID HE HAD THE HELI IN SIGHT, BUT THE TWR DID NOT ADVISE HIM OF THE HELI TFC. THIS SAME INCIDENT HAPPENED TO ANOTHER ACFT DEPARTING EBND WITH ANOTHER RADAR CTLR. FACTOR THAT CONTRIBUTED TO THIS INCIDENT WAS THE TWR CTLR'S LACK OF KNOWLEDGE IN DIRECTIVES, IE, HANDBOOK 7110.65E, PARAGRAPH 2-21 TFC ADVISORIES AND PARAGRAPH 5-64,C--ENSURING THAT POTENTIAL CONFLICTS ARE RESOLVED PRIOR TO TRANSFERRING RADIO COMS. TO PREVENT A RECURRENCE OF THIS INCIDENT THE TWR CTLR INVOLVED SHOULD NOT BE ALLOWED TO WORK THE LCL CTLR POS UNTIL HE HAS BEEN THROUGH A REMEDIAL TRNING CLASS AND BEEN RECERTIFIED. AN AREA MGR HAS BEEN NOTIFIED OF THIS INCIDENT AND NO STEPS HAVE BEEN TAKEN IN THIS FAC TO PREVENT THIS PARTICULAR CTLR OF POTENTIAL CONFLICT. THIS MAKES ME VERY CONCERNED BECAUSE I AM A PVT PLT AND WOULD NOT FEEL SAFE IF I HEARD THIS PARTICULAR CTLR ON THE RADIO.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of August 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.