Narrative:

I was working sector R10 (crestview). I was preparing to clear a B190 southeast bound through the airspace owned by tyndall AFB known as the compass lake MOA. I was showing that the MOA was not active. I observed several high speed radar targets in the airspace; indicatived of fighter jets typically seen there. Subsequent investigation found that the airspace had been activated several minutes before. The watch managers' phone was called; and answered by a manager from an adjacent area. The manager who took the call notified the manager on duty for the west area. The west area manager was busy coordinating meeting the goals of the facility manager of ensuring that all controllers work at least 5.5 hours on position each shift. Being distracted by these additional duties; he notified the tallahassee low sector (R28); but failed to notify me of the active airspace. This could have resulted in an operational deviation; error; or even a collision had it not been noticed. The extra workload of this initiative has both the controllers and the supervisors highly distracted. They are 'making work' having controllers working sectors with zero airplanes for sometimes hours at a time. This builds complacency; and lowers our ability to work larger volumes of traffic. The levels of extraneous conversation has raised the noise levels. It also is resulting a multiplication of instances where controllers are exceeding 2 hours on position. This failure is both a violation of established medical criteria for a safe operation; and that of the agreement between the agency and the controllers union. ZJX needs to return to matching the appropriate sector staffing to the traffic at the time.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ZJX controller described a near airspace incursion event; claiming supervisor's preoccupation with the facilities new time on position administrative efforts distracted him/her from critical operational duties.

Narrative: I was working sector R10 (Crestview). I was preparing to clear a B190 southeast bound through the airspace owned by Tyndall AFB known as the Compass Lake MOA. I was showing that the MOA was not active. I observed several high speed radar targets in the airspace; indicatived of fighter jets typically seen there. Subsequent investigation found that the airspace had been activated several minutes before. The Watch managers' phone was called; and answered by a manager from an adjacent area. The manager who took the call notified the manager on duty for the West Area. The West area manager was busy coordinating meeting the goals of the facility manager of ensuring that all controllers work at least 5.5 hours on position each shift. Being distracted by these additional duties; he notified the Tallahassee Low sector (R28); but failed to notify me of the active airspace. This could have resulted in an operational deviation; error; or even a collision had it not been noticed. The extra workload of this initiative has both the controllers and the supervisors highly distracted. They are 'making work' having controllers working sectors with zero airplanes for sometimes hours at a time. This builds complacency; and lowers our ability to work larger volumes of traffic. The levels of extraneous conversation has raised the noise levels. It also is resulting a multiplication of instances where controllers are exceeding 2 hours on position. This failure is both a violation of established medical criteria for a safe operation; and that of the agreement between the agency and the controllers union. ZJX needs to return to matching the appropriate sector staffing to the traffic at the time.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.