Narrative:

We emerged from a line of weather after turning about 70 degrees. The controller gave us a small correcting vector and cleared us to intercept the ILS to 8L. The captain was flying and asked for an extension of the approach in the FMS. I complied; but it took slightly longer than normal due to the turbulence we were in. During this time; approach gave us a final small course adjustment and cleared us for the approach. I noticed that the radar was painting a return with a steep gradient; moving from right to left on the approach path. At this point; the aircraft became VMC and we saw a thunderstorm and associated cumulus clouds at the approximate position of the return. I pointed this out to the captain and asked if he wanted to go around it. He answered; 'yes;' and at that point I contacted the controller and told him that the heading we were on was not going to work and we needed to turn (by this time we were getting very close to the cell). I did not hear the controller's reply. We were attempting to slow and do a max rate descent per the controller and things were very busy. At this point; the captain started a slow left turn off the localizer to avoid the cell. I again called the controller and told him we were deviating and would be able to go back towards bahrr shortly. The controller replied that we had not been cleared to deviate. At this point; the captain took the radio and said he was deviating under his emergency authority. Once clear of the cell; we were given another vector back to the approach and landed normally. Factors:1. The large turn prior to intercept prevented us from surveying the approach area thoroughly; leading us to be surprised by the cell. 2. We had several expedited descents and speed reductions resulting in a heavy work load. This further narrowed our focus.3. Approach was using a runway with obvious weather moving onto the approach. The controller should have been expecting to see deviations and should have been ready to handle unexpected moves as aircraft encountered the cell. This event upset the controller. As we were deviating; he tried to pass us a number to call. At this point we were descending rapidly; slowing and deviating. The captain told him we would call them on the ground. As we were exiting the runway in moderate rain and poor visibility; the controller again tried to pass us the number. At this point; we had not run any checklist and were working to make sure we knew where we were and where we were going. I told him we were running a checklist and we would call him back. The controller called yet again requesting to pass the number on the taxi in. The point of this report is that it might be good to advise controllers that passing a number to call can be a distraction at a critical point in flight. The weather was bad and we were working hard to keep things safe. The number can wait until we are at the gate. They know who we are and where we work and probably have the phone number for operations. The priority should always be getting the plane on the ground and to the gate safely; not worrying about who did what and phone numbers.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: The need to deviate for a thunderstorm subsequent to being cleared for an approach results in a clash in ATC/flight crew responsibilities and authorities.

Narrative: We emerged from a line of weather after turning about 70 degrees. The controller gave us a small correcting vector and cleared us to intercept the ILS to 8L. The Captain was flying and asked for an extension of the approach in the FMS. I complied; but it took slightly longer than normal due to the turbulence we were in. During this time; Approach gave us a final small course adjustment and cleared us for the approach. I noticed that the radar was painting a return with a steep gradient; moving from right to left on the approach path. At this point; the aircraft became VMC and we saw a thunderstorm and associated cumulus clouds at the approximate position of the return. I pointed this out to the Captain and asked if he wanted to go around it. He answered; 'yes;' and at that point I contacted the Controller and told him that the heading we were on was not going to work and we needed to turn (by this time we were getting very close to the cell). I did not hear the Controller's reply. We were attempting to slow and do a max rate descent per the Controller and things were very busy. At this point; the Captain started a slow left turn off the localizer to avoid the cell. I again called the Controller and told him we were deviating and would be able to go back towards BAHRR shortly. The Controller replied that we had not been cleared to deviate. At this point; the Captain took the radio and said he was deviating under his emergency authority. Once clear of the cell; we were given another vector back to the approach and landed normally. Factors:1. The large turn prior to intercept prevented us from surveying the approach area thoroughly; leading us to be surprised by the cell. 2. We had several expedited descents and speed reductions resulting in a heavy work load. This further narrowed our focus.3. Approach was using a runway with obvious weather moving onto the approach. The Controller should have been expecting to see deviations and should have been ready to handle unexpected moves as aircraft encountered the cell. This event upset the Controller. As we were deviating; he tried to pass us a number to call. At this point we were descending rapidly; slowing and deviating. The Captain told him we would call them on the ground. As we were exiting the runway in moderate rain and poor visibility; the Controller again tried to pass us the number. At this point; we had not run any checklist and were working to make sure we knew where we were and where we were going. I told him we were running a checklist and we would call him back. The Controller called yet again requesting to pass the number on the taxi in. The point of this report is that it might be good to advise Controllers that passing a number to call can be a distraction at a critical point in flight. The weather was bad and we were working hard to keep things safe. The number can wait until we are at the gate. They know who we are and where we work and probably have the phone number for Operations. The priority should always be getting the plane on the ground and to the gate safely; not worrying about who did what and phone numbers.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.