Narrative:

After maintenance fixed a multiple repeat write up for the VHF comm #1; we pushed off the gate. A large convective area was moving in from the west toward the field. Westbound departures were rerouted south for weather. We coordinated with dispatch for the new route and fuel requirements. The new route was about 200 miles further but we had the fuel necessary for the trip. Captain was flying the departure; after 10 minutes the first officer noticed the radio rack fan light annunciated and we heard a circuit breaker pop. Checking the circuit breaker panel we found H4 and H5 open; radio rack fan. Accomplished QRH air procedure and put the switch to venturi. A note mentioned that if only one pack is supplying pressure the aircraft may not be able to maintain the differential pressure for normal cabin altitude. Still heading south we heard numerous circuit breakers pop; so I transferred aircraft control to the first officer to investigate. Discovered H12; H13 cargo compartment heater circuit breakers open. Also; H19 forward right fuel boost pump; H21 forward center boost pump and H23 aft left fuel boost pump circuit breakers open. Initiated phone patch through dispatch with maintenance control. Communication so poor we discontinued and initiated again through a commercial radio service; better audio but not great. Maintenance control said no real procedure to follow for 3 boost pumps out; ended phone patch. Considerations: fuel no longer feeding from the center tank but only from main tanks. QRH fuel gives advice if all main tank pumps are working but nothing covers this situation. Decided to return to to the departure airport and declared an emergency with ATC due to upcoming overweight landing. Discussed with first officer structural integrity issue of fuel stuck in center tank versus shutting off the remaining main tank fuel boost pumps to allow the pump in the center to feed the engines. We turned the two operable main tank boost pumps back on at 10000 ft in case of a go-around. Other considerations: aircraft condition had the potential for cascading electrical issues and further deteriorating systems failures. The departure airport was nearby and had major maintenance. Storm was closing in there and need to return while weather was still VFR. Possibility existed to still get the passengers to the original destination. Continued flight over the rockies at night with a decision point and fuel and altitude considerations all pointed to the prudent safest course of action was to return. We reviewed QRH miscellaneous overweight landing. Notified flight attendants and passengers of our return. Flew ILS with first officer calling out vertical velocity. We landed with 400 FPM descent and used minimum braking action. No hot brakes were noted and we taxied to the gate uneventfully. Note: a possible solution to the poor communication with maintenance would have been to use the digital phone in the cockpit. I have received no training and there are so few in the MD80 fleet that it was an after thought on trying to use it. I suggest we get training and have free use of this equipment to contact dispatch; maintenance; etc.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A MD80 had a partial failure of the Left AC bus causing circuit breakers to pop for the following items: three fuel boost pumps; the Radio Rack Fan and Cargo Compartment Heater. An emergency was declared with a return to land at the departure airport.

Narrative: After maintenance fixed a multiple repeat write up for the VHF COMM #1; we pushed off the gate. A large convective area was moving in from the west toward the field. Westbound departures were rerouted south for weather. We coordinated with Dispatch for the new route and fuel requirements. The new route was about 200 miles further but we had the fuel necessary for the trip. Captain was flying the departure; after 10 minutes the First Officer noticed the Radio Rack Fan light annunciated and we heard a circuit breaker pop. Checking the circuit breaker panel we found H4 and H5 open; Radio Rack Fan. Accomplished QRH Air procedure and put the switch to Venturi. A note mentioned that if only one pack is supplying pressure the aircraft may not be able to maintain the differential pressure for normal cabin altitude. Still heading south we heard numerous circuit breakers pop; so I transferred aircraft control to the First Officer to investigate. Discovered H12; H13 cargo compartment heater circuit breakers open. Also; H19 Forward Right Fuel Boost Pump; H21 Forward Center Boost Pump and H23 Aft Left Fuel Boost Pump circuit breakers open. Initiated phone patch through Dispatch with Maintenance Control. Communication so poor we discontinued and initiated again through a commercial radio service; better audio but not great. Maintenance Control said no real procedure to follow for 3 boost pumps out; ended phone patch. Considerations: Fuel no longer feeding from the center tank but only from main tanks. QRH fuel gives advice if all main tank pumps are working but nothing covers this situation. Decided to return to to the departure airport and declared an emergency with ATC due to upcoming overweight landing. Discussed with First Officer structural integrity issue of fuel stuck in center tank versus shutting off the remaining main tank fuel boost pumps to allow the pump in the center to feed the engines. We turned the two operable main tank boost pumps back on at 10000 FT in case of a go-around. Other considerations: Aircraft condition had the potential for cascading electrical issues and further deteriorating systems failures. The departure airport was nearby and had major maintenance. Storm was closing in there and need to return while weather was still VFR. Possibility existed to still get the passengers to the original destination. Continued flight over the Rockies at night with a decision point and fuel and altitude considerations all pointed to the prudent safest course of action was to return. We reviewed QRH miscellaneous overweight landing. Notified flight attendants and passengers of our return. Flew ILS with First Officer calling out vertical velocity. We landed with 400 FPM descent and used minimum braking action. No hot brakes were noted and we taxied to the gate uneventfully. Note: a possible solution to the poor communication with Maintenance would have been to use the digital phone in the cockpit. I have received no training and there are so few in the MD80 fleet that it was an after thought on trying to use it. I suggest we get training and have free use of this equipment to contact Dispatch; Maintenance; etc.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.