Narrative:

I was pilot monitoring and my first officer was pilot flying the leg. We had just finished the descent check descending through fl 180. It was ATIS changeover time as well; so I went off to collect the new info. Of course phx changed from our original setup for arrival on rwy 8 to now arriving rwy 26 on the maier three arrival. We were fully automated at this time with auto throttles; VNAV; and LNAV all working normally. While I was working; I was aware that ATC had asked us to increase our descent rate and speed to 300 KIAS and comply with the published restriction at brusr of 250 kts and 12000 feet. My first officer sprang into action programming the FMC for the new descent and new runway while I worked on performance data. We had 8000 feet selected in the MCP altitude window for the RNAV arrival and were confident that the arrival was programmed correctly. On executing the new runway on the arrival with 8000 in the window; the computer was working as fast as it could; but not quick enough to level off at 12;000 feet. We both recognized this; although a little late; and the first officer caught the altitude deviation at 11;700 and started to correct. ATC asked us about our descending via the maier three and I answered that was affirmative and we were correcting to 12;000. Brusr transitioned behind us at this point. I would estimate we were within a mile of brusr for this whole episode. I should have recognized that my first officer was reprogramming and was out of VNAV momentarily and at that point changed 8000 to 12;000 for the brusr restriction; but we were both very busy and omitted this action thus setting us up for the overshoot at brusr. We were a little time compressed between 18;000 feet and 12;000 feet and my monitoring broke down a little bit. We were victimized by the quadruple whammy of ATC requests; ATIS changeover; runway change; and automation reaction times. We could have used more ears; eyes; and hands in this event. We just ran out for a moment. After looking at what happened; I think we just missed resetting the MCP altitude after reprogramming the FMC and being out of VNAV mode. I could have directed my first officer to fly the arrival using less automation while I handled the FMC as well. That way we aren't both distracted with programming performance data and the FMC. Also; just realize which panel is controlling the aircraft; the FMC or the MCP.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A B737 flight crew was distracted with programming both an arrival/runway change into the FMC and computing landing data for the new runway. Combined with confusion over the FMS mode status the result was a failure to meet a STAR crossing restriction.

Narrative: I was Pilot Monitoring and my First Officer was Pilot Flying the leg. We had just finished the descent check descending through FL 180. It was ATIS changeover time as well; so I went off to collect the new info. Of course PHX changed from our original setup for arrival on Rwy 8 to now arriving Rwy 26 on the MAIER THREE Arrival. We were fully automated at this time with auto throttles; VNAV; and LNAV all working normally. While I was working; I was aware that ATC had asked us to increase our descent rate and speed to 300 KIAS and comply with the published restriction at BRUSR of 250 kts and 12000 feet. My First Officer sprang into action programming the FMC for the new descent and new runway while I worked on performance data. We had 8000 feet selected in the MCP altitude window for the RNAV arrival and were confident that the arrival was programmed correctly. On executing the new runway on the arrival with 8000 in the window; the computer was working as fast as it could; but not quick enough to level off at 12;000 feet. We both recognized this; although a little late; and the First Officer caught the altitude deviation at 11;700 and started to correct. ATC asked us about our descending via the MAIER THREE and I answered that was affirmative and we were correcting to 12;000. BRUSR transitioned behind us at this point. I would estimate we were within a mile of BRUSR for this whole episode. I should have recognized that my First Officer was reprogramming and was out of VNAV momentarily and at that point changed 8000 to 12;000 for the BRUSR restriction; but we were both VERY busy and omitted this action thus setting us up for the overshoot at BRUSR. We were a little time compressed between 18;000 feet and 12;000 feet and my monitoring broke down a little bit. We were victimized by the quadruple whammy of ATC requests; ATIS changeover; runway change; and automation reaction times. We could have used more ears; eyes; and hands in this event. We just ran out for a moment. After looking at what happened; I think we just missed resetting the MCP altitude after reprogramming the FMC and being out of VNAV mode. I could have directed my First Officer to fly the arrival using less automation while I handled the FMC as well. That way we aren't both distracted with programming performance data and the FMC. Also; just realize which panel is controlling the aircraft; the FMC or the MCP.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.