Narrative:

A runway incursion occurred at sdf airport. Both crew members had greater than 72 hours rest previous to coming on duty, so crew rest and on duty time were no factor. We, air carrier X, received and acknowledged 'taxi down runway 11 eastbound and hold short of runway 1' clearance from ground controller. Our aircraft then encroached onto runway 1 while air carrier Y had been given takeoff clearance. The first officer was actively engaged (heads down) in retrieving and entering ACARS CRT weight and balance display sequenced by manually copying the ACARS data on the weight and balance form 101 and then entering the copied data ZFW on the aircraft performance page of the CDU to then be verified and executed. His duties then continue to enter the takeoff performance page and manually enter the V1 vr and V2 speed computer reduced takeoff thrust N1 reduction. While taxiing down runway 11 towards the intersection of 11 and 1I viewed (heads down) the ACARS ZFW displayed that was washed by cockpit sunlight of the ACARS and confirmed the ZFW entry in the performance page of the CDU prior to execution. I then looked up and ascertained that I had partially encroached upon the active runway and observed air carrier Y with lights on approximately 3000' down runway 1 on takeoff roll. I then elected to cross the active runway rather than block the active runway forcing either an abort or collision. To avoid potential problems in the future I recommend: no prolonged heads down data retrieval or entry from CRT's ACARS or CDU's to occur while the aircraft is in motion on the ground or below 10000', ie sterile cockpit concept, with the exception of the ZFW entry and execution in the CDU and the manual display of the appropriate V speed FLIP chart page. It is obvious that the 2-M safety crew concept was voided by the prolonged data retrieval and display as both heads were down in the cockpit during an extremely critical phase of taxi. No aircraft should be cleared to taxi on a runway when parallel txwys are available unless hold short lines, prominent markings and signs are displayed on intersecting runways, as are always displayed on txwys. I have reflected upon and reviewed the chain of events, causative factors and preventive actions that would inhibit a recurrence of this type of incident and will most likely do so for the remainder of my life. The safety concerns of the increased cockpit workload (particularly in the 2-M aircraft) cannot be emphasized enough. Don't let the ACARS/SELCAL or radio calls distract you from the more important job of starting/monitoring the engines, taxiing the aircraft and accomplishing the checklist. Accomplish the 101 data entry calculations safely and at the appropriate time. Supplemental information from acn 85210: well into the takeoff roll, it was evident that air carrier X was not going to hold short of our runway. We were near V1 when X entered our runway. Rotation was at vr and we were airborne about 200' as we passed X, who was just clearing our runway. There was no reference to air carrier X by ground or tower. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following: very brief call to verify that air carrier Y was indeed an medium large transport type.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: RWY INCURSION RESULTED IN CRITICAL NMAC BETWEEN 2 ACR ACFT. PLT DEVIATION. SEE MULTIPLE REPORT #85210 AND 85363.

Narrative: A RWY INCURSION OCCURRED AT SDF ARPT. BOTH CREW MEMBERS HAD GREATER THAN 72 HRS REST PREVIOUS TO COMING ON DUTY, SO CREW REST AND ON DUTY TIME WERE NO FACTOR. WE, ACR X, RECEIVED AND ACKNOWLEDGED 'TAXI DOWN RWY 11 EBND AND HOLD SHORT OF RWY 1' CLRNC FROM GND CTLR. OUR ACFT THEN ENCROACHED ONTO RWY 1 WHILE ACR Y HAD BEEN GIVEN TKOF CLRNC. THE F/O WAS ACTIVELY ENGAGED (HEADS DOWN) IN RETRIEVING AND ENTERING ACARS CRT WT AND BALANCE DISPLAY SEQUENCED BY MANUALLY COPYING THE ACARS DATA ON THE WT AND BALANCE FORM 101 AND THEN ENTERING THE COPIED DATA ZFW ON THE ACFT PERFORMANCE PAGE OF THE CDU TO THEN BE VERIFIED AND EXECUTED. HIS DUTIES THEN CONTINUE TO ENTER THE TKOF PERFORMANCE PAGE AND MANUALLY ENTER THE V1 VR AND V2 SPD COMPUTER REDUCED TKOF THRUST N1 REDUCTION. WHILE TAXIING DOWN RWY 11 TOWARDS THE INTXN OF 11 AND 1I VIEWED (HEADS DOWN) THE ACARS ZFW DISPLAYED THAT WAS WASHED BY COCKPIT SUNLIGHT OF THE ACARS AND CONFIRMED THE ZFW ENTRY IN THE PERFORMANCE PAGE OF THE CDU PRIOR TO EXECUTION. I THEN LOOKED UP AND ASCERTAINED THAT I HAD PARTIALLY ENCROACHED UPON THE ACTIVE RWY AND OBSERVED ACR Y WITH LIGHTS ON APPROX 3000' DOWN RWY 1 ON TKOF ROLL. I THEN ELECTED TO CROSS THE ACTIVE RWY RATHER THAN BLOCK THE ACTIVE RWY FORCING EITHER AN ABORT OR COLLISION. TO AVOID POTENTIAL PROBS IN THE FUTURE I RECOMMEND: NO PROLONGED HEADS DOWN DATA RETRIEVAL OR ENTRY FROM CRT'S ACARS OR CDU'S TO OCCUR WHILE THE ACFT IS IN MOTION ON THE GND OR BELOW 10000', IE STERILE COCKPIT CONCEPT, WITH THE EXCEPTION OF THE ZFW ENTRY AND EXECUTION IN THE CDU AND THE MANUAL DISPLAY OF THE APPROPRIATE V SPD FLIP CHART PAGE. IT IS OBVIOUS THAT THE 2-M SAFETY CREW CONCEPT WAS VOIDED BY THE PROLONGED DATA RETRIEVAL AND DISPLAY AS BOTH HEADS WERE DOWN IN THE COCKPIT DURING AN EXTREMELY CRITICAL PHASE OF TAXI. NO ACFT SHOULD BE CLRED TO TAXI ON A RWY WHEN PARALLEL TXWYS ARE AVAILABLE UNLESS HOLD SHORT LINES, PROMINENT MARKINGS AND SIGNS ARE DISPLAYED ON INTERSECTING RWYS, AS ARE ALWAYS DISPLAYED ON TXWYS. I HAVE REFLECTED UPON AND REVIEWED THE CHAIN OF EVENTS, CAUSATIVE FACTORS AND PREVENTIVE ACTIONS THAT WOULD INHIBIT A RECURRENCE OF THIS TYPE OF INCIDENT AND WILL MOST LIKELY DO SO FOR THE REMAINDER OF MY LIFE. THE SAFETY CONCERNS OF THE INCREASED COCKPIT WORKLOAD (PARTICULARLY IN THE 2-M ACFT) CANNOT BE EMPHASIZED ENOUGH. DON'T LET THE ACARS/SELCAL OR RADIO CALLS DISTRACT YOU FROM THE MORE IMPORTANT JOB OF STARTING/MONITORING THE ENGS, TAXIING THE ACFT AND ACCOMPLISHING THE CHKLIST. ACCOMPLISH THE 101 DATA ENTRY CALCULATIONS SAFELY AND AT THE APPROPRIATE TIME. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 85210: WELL INTO THE TKOF ROLL, IT WAS EVIDENT THAT ACR X WAS NOT GOING TO HOLD SHORT OF OUR RWY. WE WERE NEAR V1 WHEN X ENTERED OUR RWY. ROTATION WAS AT VR AND WE WERE AIRBORNE ABOUT 200' AS WE PASSED X, WHO WAS JUST CLRING OUR RWY. THERE WAS NO REFERENCE TO ACR X BY GND OR TWR. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING: VERY BRIEF CALL TO VERIFY THAT ACR Y WAS INDEED AN MLG TYPE.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of August 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.