Narrative:

During preflight it was discovered that a broken door gust lock was MEL'ed incorrectly with 52-4b. MEL 52-4a was the correct sign off. The aircraft was not dispatched with 52-4a and had flown a number of legs in that condition. During my preflight two maintenance personnel appeared and were asking questions about this item and another. They said the gust lock had to be signed off each flight. I became curious and inspected the lock myself and was quite surprised to discover the latch release lever was attached and operable but the lock pin was absent. An hour or so later the plane was removed from service. A question was asked of me about the pilots of the previous legs and whether they should have seen the same thing. My answer is no they would not ordinarily have seen the same thing. There are three reasons for this: 1) the gust lock is not part of a normal pilot preflight. The confusion of the maintenance personnel and the unusual required action triggered a corresponding unusual curiosity on my part. 2) my air carrier has pilots routinely and frivolously change aircraft/crews at hub stations. The ensuing rush to get the next flight out prevents any kind of deep familiarity with any one aircraft and its peculiarities. The rush to get the next flight out in the new airplane trains pilots to simply verify that a sign off appears valid and then move on to the next hurried task to get the flight out. 3) my air carrier's removal of the maintenance manual from each aircraft prevents a pilot from knowing if correct procedures were used and if the sign off is valid. I wish to raise an additional safety concern. This is my third ordeal with an incorrect preflight maintenance action/sign off this week. I am concerned that excessive management pressure to MEL during the day and fix at night is causing unsafe maintenance practices. On preflight; both inboard flap track slot landing door seals (elephant ears) were found to be broken. Background information: this was our second aircraft for this leg. I have been flying the B737 for some ten years and have never seen even one of these broken. When both of them were broken on this aircraft I was intensely curious. Maintenance was not curious. First; I was told they were not broken. I disagreed. Then I was told that the through cracks were where caulk was. I disagreed. Finally; I was told that only the worst one would be removed. Luckily; both were removed and we proceeded on. This is my third ordeal with questionable maintenance this week. I am concerned that excessive management pressure to MEL everything during the day and fix at night is causing unsafe maintenance practices.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A B737-800 First Officer reported aircraft malfunctions and configurations which were not properly addressed or MEL'ed by maintenance during ground turn around time.

Narrative: During preflight it was discovered that a broken door gust lock was MEL'ed incorrectly with 52-4b. MEL 52-4a was the correct sign off. The aircraft was not dispatched with 52-4a and had flown a number of legs in that condition. During my preflight two maintenance personnel appeared and were asking questions about this item and another. They said the gust lock had to be signed off each flight. I became curious and inspected the lock myself and was quite surprised to discover the latch release lever was attached and operable but the lock pin was absent. An hour or so later the plane was removed from service. A question was asked of me about the pilots of the previous legs and whether they should have seen the same thing. My answer is no they would not ordinarily have seen the same thing. There are three reasons for this: 1) The gust lock is not part of a normal pilot preflight. The confusion of the maintenance personnel and the unusual required action triggered a corresponding unusual curiosity on my part. 2) My Air Carrier has pilots routinely and frivolously change aircraft/crews at hub stations. The ensuing rush to get the next flight out prevents any kind of deep familiarity with any one aircraft and its peculiarities. The rush to get the next flight out in the new airplane trains pilots to simply verify that a sign off appears valid and then move on to the next hurried task to get the flight out. 3) My Air Carrier's removal of the Maintenance Manual from each aircraft prevents a pilot from knowing if correct procedures were used and if the sign off is valid. I wish to raise an additional safety concern. This is my third ordeal with an incorrect preflight maintenance action/sign off this week. I am concerned that excessive management pressure to MEL during the day and fix at night is causing unsafe maintenance practices. On preflight; both inboard flap track slot landing door seals (elephant ears) were found to be broken. Background information: this was our second aircraft for this leg. I have been flying the B737 for some ten years and have never seen even one of these broken. When both of them were broken on this aircraft I was intensely curious. Maintenance was not curious. First; I was told they were not broken. I disagreed. Then I was told that the through cracks were where caulk was. I disagreed. Finally; I was told that only the worst one would be removed. Luckily; both were removed and we proceeded on. This is my third ordeal with questionable maintenance this week. I am concerned that excessive management pressure to MEL everything during the day and fix at night is causing unsafe maintenance practices.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.