Narrative:

ATC surface movement communication and control hazard; SOP phraseology. Beginning several years ago I noted that eddf tower and ground control were issuing clearances to arriving and departing flights that alarmed me and caused me to note what I considered to be a hazard being created by the nature of the ATC clearance issued routinely to aircraft that eddf was controlling. In short the situation is as follows. During taxi in or out for take-off when a runway crossing is required. After the 'hold short' clearance has been issued and complied with. Tower will issue a subsequent clearance; this is the area of concern; company cleared to cross runway 25R after the landing A340?. The critical word is 'after'- should this transmitted word be blocked by radio interference or some cockpit distraction- there is a potential for an aircraft to pull out in front of a plane that is taking off or landing. For the life of me I do not see how this technique is really beneficial to the ATC control function. I mention this safety concern as I feel that the condition warrants our flight crews awareness; my particular concern is not as much for the seasoned crews who are well aware of the situation but for those crews who are new to the area. I assume this condition is a result of some well-meaning ICAO change in ATC procedure (with negative safety implications); while I first was confronted with this situation at eddf several years ago I have also encountered it at egll and other international destinations. Similarly on departure tower will say; 'company flight cleared to line up and wait after the landing 747. The clearances have only be given to me in VMC conditions with the crossing aircraft on the roll or within 2 or 3 miles of touchdown; in these situation they were clearly visible from the cockpit; I have no idea what if any limitations exist that might limit the controllers use of these conditional clearances. I feel that a safety bulletin or a mention on the appropriate company tailored pages would be a positive situational awareness move to at least partially mitigate this hazard.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: Air carrier operating in EDDF voiced concern regarding ICAO conditional clearances used for various ATC operations; claiming any blocked transmission could lead to a significant safety hazard.

Narrative: ATC Surface Movement Communication and Control HAZARD; SOP phraseology. Beginning several years ago I noted that EDDF Tower and Ground Control were issuing clearances to arriving and departing flights that alarmed me and caused me to note what I considered to be a hazard being created by the nature of the ATC clearance issued routinely to aircraft that EDDF was controlling. In short the situation is as follows. During taxi in or out for take-off when a RUNWAY CROSSING is required. After the 'Hold Short' clearance has been issued and complied with. Tower will issue a subsequent clearance; this is the area of concern; Company cleared to cross Runway 25R AFTER the LANDING A340?. The CRITICAL word is 'AFTER'- should this transmitted word be blocked by radio interference or some cockpit distraction- there is A POTENTIAL for an aircraft to PULL OUT in front of a plane that is taking off or landing. For the life of me I do not see how this technique is really beneficial to the ATC control function. I mention this safety concern as I feel that the condition warrants our flight crews awareness; my particular concern is not as much for the seasoned crews who are well aware of the situation but for those crews who are new to the area. I assume this condition is a result of some well-meaning ICAO change in ATC procedure (with negative safety implications); while I first was confronted with this situation at EDDF several years ago I have also encountered it at EGLL and other international destinations. Similarly on departure Tower will say; 'Company flight cleared to LINE UP and wait AFTER the landing 747. The clearances have only be given to me in VMC conditions with the crossing aircraft on the roll or within 2 or 3 miles of touchdown; in these situation they were CLEARLY VISIBLE from the cockpit; I have no idea what if any limitations exist that might limit the controllers use of these CONDITIONAL CLEARANCES. I feel that a Safety Bulletin or a mention on the appropriate company tailored pages would be a positive situational awareness move to at least partially mitigate this hazard.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.