Narrative:

Flight to mco. Weather package included info on extensive ts in orlando area. We filed and flew the cwrld arrival into mco. During initial descent we were switched to the buggz arrival for weather avoidance. Mco closed due to weather during the switch; but quickly started accepting aircraft again and we were told to slow to 190 KIAS. We were switched to orlando approach control and told to slow to 190 KIAS and began extensive vectoring. Approach told us to expect ILS 35R. The vectors eventually led us north of the field at 7000 feet heading east to set us up for a right downwind to 35R. Crossing the field; we asked for lower and were denied with no explanation. The controller was very busy. Once on the downwind we were turned south and cleared to 5000 then to 1600. I began a descent at assigned speed and we were on a good vertical profile for the ILS. During descent on the downwind and approximately 3 to 4 miles past the 35R threshold at approximately 3000 MSL (still in and out of the clouds) the controller unexpectedly gave us a right turn to 260. I asked the first officer to ask him our sequence. He replied we were number one and cleared the visual. To say that this was a surprise is an understatement. I should have denied the approach at this point. It was awkward because the turn was given and being accomplished with no reference as to whether we had the field visually. Then there was an exchange between the first officer and the controller to clarify his intention. The clearance was given in mixed IMC at a distance and altitude that made a visual very difficult. In short; we were out of position for a stabilized approach. Unfortunately; I accepted the approach and fell into 'how can I make this work' mode. I immediately configured and slowed to approach and began a steep descent towards the runway. The first officer asked if we should request maneuvering to the east; but at the altitude and with the weather; I didn't think that would work. I told him we'd go to flaps 40 instead and see where we were at 1000 AGL. At 1000 AGL we were idle power; a full dot high on GS and on centerline with the field in sight. I continued. At 500 AGL we were power on; 1/4 to 1/2 dot high on centerline. Touchdown and rollout were uneventful. This was not a stabilized approach. Add this fact to the marginal weather and you finish with an ugly approach. ATC's approach handling was less than ideal but I accept full responsibility for the approach. It was my poor judgment that allowed the situation to continue. This was a huge lesson learned for me. I'm ultimately responsible for compliance with fom criteria and I can't ever let an outside variable interfere with this responsibility. It's a whole lot easier to say 'no' or 'go-around' than it is to do a bunch of reports and try to explain your lapse in judgment.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: Given a surprise; close in visual following lengthy vectors for weather and traffic; the Flight Crew of a B737-300 completes an unstabilized approach to a safe landing.

Narrative: Flight to MCO. Weather package included info on extensive TS in Orlando area. We filed and flew the CWRLD Arrival into MCO. During initial descent we were switched to the BUGGZ Arrival for weather avoidance. MCO closed due to weather during the switch; but quickly started accepting aircraft again and we were told to slow to 190 KIAS. We were switched to Orlando Approach Control and told to slow to 190 KIAS and began extensive vectoring. Approach told us to expect ILS 35R. The vectors eventually led us north of the field at 7000 feet heading east to set us up for a right downwind to 35R. Crossing the field; we asked for lower and were denied with no explanation. The Controller was very busy. Once on the downwind we were turned south and cleared to 5000 then to 1600. I began a descent at assigned speed and we were on a good vertical profile for the ILS. During descent on the downwind and approximately 3 to 4 miles past the 35R threshold at approximately 3000 MSL (still in and out of the clouds) the Controller unexpectedly gave us a right turn to 260. I asked the First Officer to ask him our sequence. He replied we were number one and cleared the visual. To say that this was a surprise is an understatement. I should have denied the approach at this point. It was awkward because the turn was given and being accomplished with no reference as to whether we had the field visually. Then there was an exchange between the First Officer and the Controller to clarify his intention. The clearance was given in mixed IMC at a distance and altitude that made a visual very difficult. In short; we were out of position for a stabilized approach. Unfortunately; I accepted the approach and fell into 'how can I make this work' mode. I immediately configured and slowed to approach and began a steep descent towards the runway. The F/O asked if we should request maneuvering to the east; but at the altitude and with the weather; I didn't think that would work. I told him we'd go to flaps 40 instead and see where we were at 1000 AGL. At 1000 AGL we were idle power; a full dot high on GS and on centerline with the field in sight. I continued. At 500 AGL we were power on; 1/4 to 1/2 dot high on centerline. Touchdown and rollout were uneventful. This was not a stabilized approach. Add this fact to the marginal weather and you finish with an ugly approach. ATC's approach handling was less than ideal but I accept full responsibility for the approach. It was my poor judgment that allowed the situation to continue. This was a huge lesson learned for me. I'm ultimately responsible for compliance with FOM criteria and I can't ever let an outside variable interfere with this responsibility. It's a whole lot easier to say 'no' or 'go-around' than it is to do a bunch of reports and try to explain your lapse in judgment.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.