Narrative:

We received the following clearance from clearance delivery: 'cleared to mke airport, pomona #1 SID, daggett transition, maintain 12000', expect 33000' 10 mins after...etc.' our taxi and takeoff were normal. After takeoff, we were instructed to call ont departure control. After checking in with ont departure control, the controller told us to: 'climb to 12000' and comply with all climb requirements.' I acknowledged, 'roger, climb to 12000' light transport X.' I did not read back 'and comply with all climb requirements' because I thought that this portion of the clearance was an advisory relating to aircraft performance. Since I was in the right seat operating radios and doing the navigation, I looked at the pomona 1 SID and read the climb gradient section to myself. The pilot in the left seat said, 'what do we do?' I told him that as long as both engines keep running, he will meet the climb requirements of the SID. Since the departure controller said nothing concerning any crossing restriction at karyn intersection, and he told us to 'climb to 12000'.' I assumed that the crossing restriction at karyn intersection was waivered, in other words, an unrestricted climb to 12000'. In the vicinity of the pomona VOR, we were instructed to contact la center. After checking in with la center, the controller asked us for our altitude. We told him we were climbing out of 8100'. He then proceeded to tell us that we were cleared to cross karyn intersection at or below 7000' and then cleared to climb to 12000'. We told him that we received no such clearance 'to cross karyn intersection at or below 7000'.' I told him the only clearance we got was, 'climb to 12000',' and that was the only thing I read back. We stopped the climb and started back down to 7000'. Within seconds after starting a descent to 7000', we realized we had just passed karyn intersection. Then we proceeded to stop the descent at 7700' and restart the climb to 12000'. The controller then gave me a telephone number for la center. I was instructed to call this number and ask for a team supervisor. I did so at the end of the flight. I called the la center and talked to a supervisor and explained our actions to him. I explained that I did not get a clearance to cross karyn intersection at or below 7000', and I did not read back any such clearance. I told the supervisor that the only clearance I got from the departure controller was, 'climb to 12000' and comply with all climb requirements.' I told the supervisor that I acknowledged, 'roger, climb to 12000' light transport X.' I did not read back, 'and comply with all climb requirements,' because I thought that this portion of the clearance was an advisory relating to aircraft performance. The supervisor then said that the pomona 1 SID also says to cross karyn intersection at or below 7000', 'which you didn't.' I agreed that the SID states that karyn intersection has a crossing restriction of 7000'. I then told the supervisor that it is my understanding that the clearance I got in the air from the departure controller ('climb to 12000' and comply with all climb requirements') superseded the SID crossing restriction in the clearance I got from clearance delivery. I told the supervisor that it is my understanding that the 'climb to 12000'' portion of the clearance from departure control was a waiver of the crossing restriction at karyn intersection. If the ont departure controller wanted us to meet the crossing restriction at karyn intersection, he should have said, 1) 'climb to 12000' and comply with all crossing restrictions on the SID,' or 2) 'after you comply with the crossing restriction on the SID, climb to 12000'.' the la center controller said that we were specifically instructed to cross karyn intersection at or below 7000' by the ont departure controller. If this is true, then the only thing I can say is that we did not hear that portion of the clearance and I did not read that back. The only thing I read back was, 'roger, climb to 12000' light transport X.' obviously we had a problem in communications. My reply was not enough. The departure controller should have reissued the clearance with the crossing restriction, and he should have asked me to read back that portion of the clearance that would have pertained to crossing karyn intersection at or below 7000'. Another problem that is often overlooked, but is just as important is the limitations of our communication radios. Example: let's say that a controller is giving a clearance to one aircraft. At the same time, another aircraft comes on the same frequency, and he immediately keys his microphone. The pilot of the first aircraft can miss important parts of a clearance and not realize it. This is another possibility of what could have happened in this case, I don't know. The one conclusion I keep coming back to is make sure the pilot reads back all vital parts of the clearance. Supplemental information from acn 84111: although there was no conflict with other aircraft, and the alarm did not sound at center, I think we did have a lack of communication with ground personnel. My belief while flying was that we had an unrestricted climb to 12000'. I believe the problem arose because of a failure to read back all clrncs (if heard), and also because of rushing to make a takeoff slot time. I also believe that the noise level and pilot workload may have contributed to this incident.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: CORP LTT BUSTED SID RESTRICTION AT KARYN INTERSECTION ON THE POMONA 1 SID OFF ONTARIO. ATC CAUGHT DEVIATION.

Narrative: WE RECEIVED THE FOLLOWING CLRNC FROM CLRNC DELIVERY: 'CLRED TO MKE ARPT, POMONA #1 SID, DAGGETT TRANSITION, MAINTAIN 12000', EXPECT 33000' 10 MINS AFTER...ETC.' OUR TAXI AND TKOF WERE NORMAL. AFTER TKOF, WE WERE INSTRUCTED TO CALL ONT DEP CTL. AFTER CHKING IN WITH ONT DEP CTL, THE CTLR TOLD US TO: 'CLB TO 12000' AND COMPLY WITH ALL CLB REQUIREMENTS.' I ACKNOWLEDGED, 'ROGER, CLB TO 12000' LTT X.' I DID NOT READ BACK 'AND COMPLY WITH ALL CLB REQUIREMENTS' BECAUSE I THOUGHT THAT THIS PORTION OF THE CLRNC WAS AN ADVISORY RELATING TO ACFT PERFORMANCE. SINCE I WAS IN THE RIGHT SEAT OPERATING RADIOS AND DOING THE NAV, I LOOKED AT THE POMONA 1 SID AND READ THE CLB GRADIENT SECTION TO MYSELF. THE PLT IN THE LEFT SEAT SAID, 'WHAT DO WE DO?' I TOLD HIM THAT AS LONG AS BOTH ENGS KEEP RUNNING, HE WILL MEET THE CLB REQUIREMENTS OF THE SID. SINCE THE DEP CTLR SAID NOTHING CONCERNING ANY XING RESTRICTION AT KARYN INTXN, AND HE TOLD US TO 'CLB TO 12000'.' I ASSUMED THAT THE XING RESTRICTION AT KARYN INTXN WAS WAIVERED, IN OTHER WORDS, AN UNRESTRICTED CLB TO 12000'. IN THE VICINITY OF THE POMONA VOR, WE WERE INSTRUCTED TO CONTACT LA CENTER. AFTER CHKING IN WITH LA CENTER, THE CTLR ASKED US FOR OUR ALT. WE TOLD HIM WE WERE CLBING OUT OF 8100'. HE THEN PROCEEDED TO TELL US THAT WE WERE CLRED TO CROSS KARYN INTXN AT OR BELOW 7000' AND THEN CLRED TO CLB TO 12000'. WE TOLD HIM THAT WE RECEIVED NO SUCH CLRNC 'TO CROSS KARYN INTXN AT OR BELOW 7000'.' I TOLD HIM THE ONLY CLRNC WE GOT WAS, 'CLB TO 12000',' AND THAT WAS THE ONLY THING I READ BACK. WE STOPPED THE CLB AND STARTED BACK DOWN TO 7000'. WITHIN SECS AFTER STARTING A DSCNT TO 7000', WE REALIZED WE HAD JUST PASSED KARYN INTXN. THEN WE PROCEEDED TO STOP THE DSCNT AT 7700' AND RESTART THE CLB TO 12000'. THE CTLR THEN GAVE ME A TELEPHONE NUMBER FOR LA CENTER. I WAS INSTRUCTED TO CALL THIS NUMBER AND ASK FOR A TEAM SUPVR. I DID SO AT THE END OF THE FLT. I CALLED THE LA CENTER AND TALKED TO A SUPVR AND EXPLAINED OUR ACTIONS TO HIM. I EXPLAINED THAT I DID NOT GET A CLRNC TO CROSS KARYN INTXN AT OR BELOW 7000', AND I DID NOT READ BACK ANY SUCH CLRNC. I TOLD THE SUPVR THAT THE ONLY CLRNC I GOT FROM THE DEP CTLR WAS, 'CLB TO 12000' AND COMPLY WITH ALL CLB REQUIREMENTS.' I TOLD THE SUPVR THAT I ACKNOWLEDGED, 'ROGER, CLB TO 12000' LTT X.' I DID NOT READ BACK, 'AND COMPLY WITH ALL CLB REQUIREMENTS,' BECAUSE I THOUGHT THAT THIS PORTION OF THE CLRNC WAS AN ADVISORY RELATING TO ACFT PERFORMANCE. THE SUPVR THEN SAID THAT THE POMONA 1 SID ALSO SAYS TO CROSS KARYN INTXN AT OR BELOW 7000', 'WHICH YOU DIDN'T.' I AGREED THAT THE SID STATES THAT KARYN INTXN HAS A XING RESTRICTION OF 7000'. I THEN TOLD THE SUPVR THAT IT IS MY UNDERSTANDING THAT THE CLRNC I GOT IN THE AIR FROM THE DEP CTLR ('CLB TO 12000' AND COMPLY WITH ALL CLB REQUIREMENTS') SUPERSEDED THE SID XING RESTRICTION IN THE CLRNC I GOT FROM CLRNC DELIVERY. I TOLD THE SUPVR THAT IT IS MY UNDERSTANDING THAT THE 'CLB TO 12000'' PORTION OF THE CLRNC FROM DEP CTL WAS A WAIVER OF THE XING RESTRICTION AT KARYN INTXN. IF THE ONT DEP CTLR WANTED US TO MEET THE XING RESTRICTION AT KARYN INTXN, HE SHOULD HAVE SAID, 1) 'CLB TO 12000' AND COMPLY WITH ALL XING RESTRICTIONS ON THE SID,' OR 2) 'AFTER YOU COMPLY WITH THE XING RESTRICTION ON THE SID, CLB TO 12000'.' THE LA CENTER CTLR SAID THAT WE WERE SPECIFICALLY INSTRUCTED TO CROSS KARYN INTXN AT OR BELOW 7000' BY THE ONT DEP CTLR. IF THIS IS TRUE, THEN THE ONLY THING I CAN SAY IS THAT WE DID NOT HEAR THAT PORTION OF THE CLRNC AND I DID NOT READ THAT BACK. THE ONLY THING I READ BACK WAS, 'ROGER, CLB TO 12000' LTT X.' OBVIOUSLY WE HAD A PROB IN COMS. MY REPLY WAS NOT ENOUGH. THE DEP CTLR SHOULD HAVE REISSUED THE CLRNC WITH THE XING RESTRICTION, AND HE SHOULD HAVE ASKED ME TO READ BACK THAT PORTION OF THE CLRNC THAT WOULD HAVE PERTAINED TO XING KARYN INTXN AT OR BELOW 7000'. ANOTHER PROB THAT IS OFTEN OVERLOOKED, BUT IS JUST AS IMPORTANT IS THE LIMITATIONS OF OUR COM RADIOS. EXAMPLE: LET'S SAY THAT A CTLR IS GIVING A CLRNC TO ONE ACFT. AT THE SAME TIME, ANOTHER ACFT COMES ON THE SAME FREQ, AND HE IMMEDIATELY KEYS HIS MIC. THE PLT OF THE FIRST ACFT CAN MISS IMPORTANT PARTS OF A CLRNC AND NOT REALIZE IT. THIS IS ANOTHER POSSIBILITY OF WHAT COULD HAVE HAPPENED IN THIS CASE, I DON'T KNOW. THE ONE CONCLUSION I KEEP COMING BACK TO IS MAKE SURE THE PLT READS BACK ALL VITAL PARTS OF THE CLRNC. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 84111: ALTHOUGH THERE WAS NO CONFLICT WITH OTHER ACFT, AND THE ALARM DID NOT SOUND AT CENTER, I THINK WE DID HAVE A LACK OF COM WITH GND PERSONNEL. MY BELIEF WHILE FLYING WAS THAT WE HAD AN UNRESTRICTED CLB TO 12000'. I BELIEVE THE PROB AROSE BECAUSE OF A FAILURE TO READ BACK ALL CLRNCS (IF HEARD), AND ALSO BECAUSE OF RUSHING TO MAKE A TKOF SLOT TIME. I ALSO BELIEVE THAT THE NOISE LEVEL AND PLT WORKLOAD MAY HAVE CONTRIBUTED TO THIS INCIDENT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of August 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.