Narrative:

On climbout; had some different trim requirements than normal; but not entirely abnormal for such a steep climb in such a light airplane. Received a spoiler fail and a spoiler open indication shortly after establishing in cruise flight and just joining up with the arrival into ZZZ. I was the pilot flying. Received an EICAS message of 'spoiler fail' and a 'spoiler open' indication. Followed the procedure; declared an emergency due to loss of a flight control; and determined that ZZZ was the best and most suitable option for our needs after carefully reviewing landing distance requirements and configuration requirements. Contacted dispatch and local operations to let them know of our situation. Landed without incident. Declared an emergency; followed the procedures; checked and rechecked performance numbers and configuration; asked for priority handling when ATC advised us that ZZZ was holding (didn't find it prudent to hold slow in light chop with a spoiler system that was not operating properly). Contacted dispatch and operations to confirm situation and discussed with dispatch to confirm our assessment of performance numbers for suitability of ZZZ as our point of landing. Due to configuration and increased landing speed requirements by the aom; I requested crash fire rescue to monitor the brakes once we were clear of the runway. Landed without incident. Crash fire rescue found brakes to be warm but fine for taxi (as were cockpit indications). Taxied in without incident. Folks removed for maintenance to figure it out and fix it right. After third attempt at departure; we gave up and called fatigued in order to force local maintenance to take the time and fix the airplane properly. We returned to a 'fixed airplane' only to have the same issue haunt us once airborne. This spoiler situation was a multiple repeat write-up. Caution on the part of any crew -- vigilance -- and asking the right questions was all we could do. Once the mechanics sign something off and is provided that long to 'fix what is broken' there is not much that any crew member can do. Our livelihood as well as that of our passengers is on their backs. If they do not have the tools or support from their management to do what they need; they need to make us (pilot in command) aware of the issue so we can elevate the issue to another level for resolution. There is no such thing as 'must go' in civil aviation. We forced the maintenance issues by using the excuse of 'fatigue' the evening before to give the mechanics time to address the issues with the airplane. We took the full hit of pay loss flight delay/deferral of the flight so the airplane would be taken to the hangar and properly fixed.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: EMB135 Captain reports 'SPOILER FAIL; SPOILER OPEN' EICAS in cruise after three previous attempts to remedy problem by maintenance. Emergency is declared and flight continues to destination for uneventful landing.

Narrative: On climbout; had some different trim requirements than normal; but not entirely abnormal for such a steep climb in such a light airplane. Received a spoiler fail and a spoiler open indication shortly after establishing in cruise flight and just joining up with the arrival into ZZZ. I was the Pilot Flying. Received an EICAS message of 'Spoiler Fail' and a 'Spoiler Open' indication. Followed the procedure; declared an emergency due to loss of a flight control; and determined that ZZZ was the best and most suitable option for our needs after carefully reviewing landing distance requirements and configuration requirements. Contacted Dispatch and local operations to let them know of our situation. Landed without incident. Declared an emergency; followed the procedures; checked and rechecked performance numbers and configuration; asked for priority handling when ATC advised us that ZZZ was holding (didn't find it prudent to hold slow in light chop with a spoiler system that was not operating properly). Contacted Dispatch and Operations to confirm situation and discussed with Dispatch to confirm our assessment of performance numbers for suitability of ZZZ as our point of landing. Due to configuration and increased landing speed requirements by the AOM; I requested Crash Fire Rescue to monitor the brakes once we were clear of the runway. Landed without incident. Crash Fire Rescue found brakes to be warm but fine for taxi (as were cockpit indications). Taxied in without incident. Folks removed for Maintenance to figure it out and fix it right. After third attempt at departure; we gave up and called fatigued in order to force local maintenance to take the time and fix the airplane properly. We returned to a 'fixed airplane' only to have the same issue haunt us once airborne. This spoiler situation was a multiple repeat write-up. Caution on the part of any crew -- vigilance -- and asking the right questions was all we could do. Once the mechanics sign something off and is provided that long to 'fix what is broken' there is not much that any crew member can do. Our livelihood as well as that of our passengers is on their backs. If they do not have the tools or support from their management to do what they need; they need to make us (Pilot in Command) aware of the issue so we can elevate the issue to another level for resolution. There is no such thing as 'must go' in civil aviation. We forced the maintenance issues by using the excuse of 'fatigue' the evening before to give the mechanics time to address the issues with the airplane. We took the full hit of pay loss flight delay/deferral of the flight so the airplane would be taken to the hangar and properly fixed.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.