Narrative:

The clearance was the teb 5 departure off runway 01. We were suppose to climb via a 040 degree heading until leaving 1500 ft and then turn left directly pnj NDB to maintain 2000 ft. All avionics were properly configured. Upon checking in with ny departure; the controller read back an instruction to 'turn heading 030 degrees; climb and maintain 5000 ft.' however; the callsign was blocked. The first officer responded to the instruction and the captain started to comply. At that point; another aircraft asked departure to verify the clearance and it was then discovered by the flight crew that the instructions were for another aircraft. The captain immediately stopped the climb; but by then the aircraft was at 2500 ft. The captain descended the aircraft to 2000 ft and by then they were issued a clearance to heading of 280 degrees and a climb to 4000 ft. No further incident. The chain of events was started when the first officer read back the instructions without verifying the callsign. The captain should not have deviated from the original clearance until it was verified. To prevent this type of occurrence from happening again; the first officer should wait and verify before reading back any instructions and the captain should not deviate from any clearance unless it is confirmed that a new clearance have been issued.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: Altitude deviation occurred on the TEB 5 SID from TEB when a C560XL First Officer accepted a clearance intended for another aircraft.

Narrative: The clearance was the TEB 5 departure off Runway 01. We were suppose to climb via a 040 degree heading until leaving 1500 FT and then turn left directly PNJ NDB to maintain 2000 FT. All avionics were properly configured. Upon checking in with NY departure; the controller read back an instruction to 'turn heading 030 degrees; climb and maintain 5000 FT.' However; the callsign was blocked. The First Officer responded to the instruction and the Captain started to comply. At that point; another aircraft asked departure to verify the clearance and it was then discovered by the flight crew that the instructions were for another aircraft. The Captain immediately stopped the climb; but by then the aircraft was at 2500 FT. The Captain descended the aircraft to 2000 FT and by then they were issued a clearance to heading of 280 degrees and a climb to 4000 FT. No further incident. The chain of events was started when the First Officer read back the instructions without verifying the callsign. The Captain should not have deviated from the original clearance until it was verified. To prevent this type of occurrence from happening again; the First Officer should wait and verify before reading back any instructions and the Captain should not deviate from any clearance unless it is confirmed that a new clearance have been issued.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.