|37000 Feet||Browse and search NASA's
Aviation Safety Reporting System
|Local Time Of Day||1801 To 2400|
|Locale Reference||airport : hnl|
|Altitude||agl bound lower : 0|
agl bound upper : 0
|Controlling Facilities||tracon : huf|
|Operator||common carrier : air carrier|
|Make Model Name||Widebody, Low Wing, 3 Turbojet Eng|
|Navigation In Use||Other|
|Flight Phase||ground : preflight|
|Affiliation||company : air carrier|
|Function||flight crew : captain|
oversight : pic
|Qualification||pilot : atp|
pilot : flight engineer
|Experience||flight time last 90 days : 200|
flight time total : 15000
flight time type : 1000
|Function||flight crew : first officer|
|Qualification||pilot : commercial|
pilot : instrument
|Anomaly||other anomaly other|
|Independent Detector||other other : unspecified|
|Air Traffic Incident||other|
The mechanic on push was told by his supervisor to tow us back to the gate due to a cargo problem. Ramp said we were over gross. We were, and cargo would be taken off. Then, the jetway came back and 24 sa's were deplaned. We questioned the manifest with the dispatcher and load planning because: 1) the initial dispatch weight manifest showed cargo weight as 34852 with a ZFW of 318.2 and a fuel load (including 10600# unusable) as 104.6. 2) gross weight ZFW was 319.7. 3) but load planning said we were over gross for landing. 4) the second dispatch weight manifest showed cargo weight to be 38758, ZFW 319.2, fuel 104.6. 5) using 76.5 so our gross weight for landing with a ZFW of 319.5 would be 347.5 which was within limits as far as we knew, so we questioned load planning again. They said that 6000 pounds of cargo was added but the ZFW was still 319.5. This did not make sense. Finally, load planning advised us that our cargo weight was actually 43866# with a ZFW of 319.6! So, after a delay of 1 1/2 hours and considerable confusion regarding the resolution of this problem we finally pushed back at XC01Z with many frightened and angry passenger. The crew of course has no way to check the numbers given to us by load planning. When a major error in loading occurs, such as in this case, it would be very beneficial to have a means to verify weight and balance solely from within the cockpit to insure a second opinion and provide the highest safety efficiency in this area of operations. Questions: what went wrong? What is the outlook for an in cockpit weight and balance verification system? Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following: this was an isolated case and caught by load planning just after the aircraft had pushed off the gate. Reporter is not aware this is a particular problem with this facility. Reporter is safety rep for his airline and consequently submitted the other incident. Would like to see more reports submitted to ASRS that involve operations and not just associated with immunity. Understands the difficulty in providing to the flight crews a means of positively identifying the actual weight of the aircraft after pushback.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: ACFT RETURNED TO THE GATE ACCOUNT OVERGROSS FOR LNDG.
Narrative: THE MECHANIC ON PUSH WAS TOLD BY HIS SUPVR TO TOW US BACK TO THE GATE DUE TO A CARGO PROB. RAMP SAID WE WERE OVER GROSS. WE WERE, AND CARGO WOULD BE TAKEN OFF. THEN, THE JETWAY CAME BACK AND 24 SA'S WERE DEPLANED. WE QUESTIONED THE MANIFEST WITH THE DISPATCHER AND LOAD PLANNING BECAUSE: 1) THE INITIAL DISPATCH WT MANIFEST SHOWED CARGO WT AS 34852 WITH A ZFW OF 318.2 AND A FUEL LOAD (INCLUDING 10600# UNUSABLE) AS 104.6. 2) GROSS WT ZFW WAS 319.7. 3) BUT LOAD PLANNING SAID WE WERE OVER GROSS FOR LNDG. 4) THE SECOND DISPATCH WT MANIFEST SHOWED CARGO WT TO BE 38758, ZFW 319.2, FUEL 104.6. 5) USING 76.5 SO OUR GROSS WT FOR LNDG WITH A ZFW OF 319.5 WOULD BE 347.5 WHICH WAS WITHIN LIMITS AS FAR AS WE KNEW, SO WE QUESTIONED LOAD PLANNING AGAIN. THEY SAID THAT 6000 LBS OF CARGO WAS ADDED BUT THE ZFW WAS STILL 319.5. THIS DID NOT MAKE SENSE. FINALLY, LOAD PLANNING ADVISED US THAT OUR CARGO WT WAS ACTUALLY 43866# WITH A ZFW OF 319.6! SO, AFTER A DELAY OF 1 1/2 HRS AND CONSIDERABLE CONFUSION REGARDING THE RESOLUTION OF THIS PROB WE FINALLY PUSHED BACK AT XC01Z WITH MANY FRIGHTENED AND ANGRY PAX. THE CREW OF COURSE HAS NO WAY TO CHK THE NUMBERS GIVEN TO US BY LOAD PLANNING. WHEN A MAJOR ERROR IN LOADING OCCURS, SUCH AS IN THIS CASE, IT WOULD BE VERY BENEFICIAL TO HAVE A MEANS TO VERIFY WT AND BALANCE SOLELY FROM WITHIN THE COCKPIT TO INSURE A SECOND OPINION AND PROVIDE THE HIGHEST SAFETY EFFICIENCY IN THIS AREA OF OPS. QUESTIONS: WHAT WENT WRONG? WHAT IS THE OUTLOOK FOR AN IN COCKPIT WT AND BALANCE VERIFICATION SYS? CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING: THIS WAS AN ISOLATED CASE AND CAUGHT BY LOAD PLANNING JUST AFTER THE ACFT HAD PUSHED OFF THE GATE. RPTR IS NOT AWARE THIS IS A PARTICULAR PROB WITH THIS FAC. RPTR IS SAFETY REP FOR HIS AIRLINE AND CONSEQUENTLY SUBMITTED THE OTHER INCIDENT. WOULD LIKE TO SEE MORE RPTS SUBMITTED TO ASRS THAT INVOLVE OPS AND NOT JUST ASSOCIATED WITH IMMUNITY. UNDERSTANDS THE DIFFICULTY IN PROVIDING TO THE FLT CREWS A MEANS OF POSITIVELY IDENTIFYING THE ACTUAL WT OF THE ACFT AFTER PUSHBACK.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of August 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.