Narrative:

Reviewing the dispatch release; the weather packet indicated the taf segment that applies is FMXAXB00 14015KT 3SM -sn OVC025. This weather is MVFR and at the minimum visibility for dispatch without an alternate. During review of the paperwork; the weather was marginal for release without an alternate. After discussion; we thought it inconsistent with prior dispatch releases from earlier in the day. We thought it was interesting that we were not given an alternate for MVFR into far. Since it was legal; and appeared to be safe; both of us were ok with dispatching without an alternate. While enroute to far; approximately 120 miles from landing; we listened to the ATIS. It was as follows: 'XA55Z winds 140 degrees at 13 KTS gusting to 21 KTS; V3/4 SM -sn indefinite ceiling 008; M13--M16 A2990; ILS approach runway 18 in use.' when we heard that; we started to get concerned. A free text ACARS message to dispatch was sent saying what the weather was; and that we were showing landing with 4;400 pounds of fuel in far. We informed the dispatcher we didn't have the fuel to add an alternate. Mr. X was on duty and working our flight at the time; and his response on ACARS was: 'speci far XAXA04Z 140 degrees at 17 KTS gusting to 23 KTS 1 1/4SM -sn OVC009 M13--M16 A2990 far XAXA55Z xaxb--2324 140 degrees at 15 KTS gusting to 22 KTS P6SM OVC035 tempo xaxb--xaxe 3/4SM -sn br OVC008' to which we replied that we needed to add an alternate; but didn't have the fuel for a legal alternate. The response came back as follows: 'if you and I agree the flight can continue safely; we are not required to list one. The fuel load will not permit adding an alternate.' at which point we discussed; and we continued since we were so close to landing in far. We were confident in our ability to land in far if the weather remained the same or got better. However; our concern was if the weather got worse. So we sent an ACARS to dispatch asking for the weather in brd and stc; as well as burn information. The ACARS message back from mr. X in dispatch was as follows: 'brd XAXA53Z automatic 1309KT 9SM OVC110 M16--M22 A3004= BRDXAXB29Z xaxc--xbxc 15005KT P6SM SCT030 BKN050 OVC090 FMXAXB30 1507KT 5SM -sn OVC030 tempo xaxd--xaxf 1SM -sn BKN015 OVC028.' the next ACARS 4 minutes later was as follows: 'burn far to brn is 1252 resv 2324; ttl 3;600LBS.' with this information; we knew that we could get to brd after an approach in far; but we would be landing at most with minimum fuel if not having to declare an emergency. We were already on vectors for the approach when we got the 2 of thee ACARS messages. So we elected to continue. We also asked center if people were getting into far tonight; and their response was that we were the first ones going to far in a while. We landed without incident; and saw the runway and approach lights by approximately 800 ft AGL. After landing; we inquired with the station personnel to ask when the snow started; and I was amazed when their response was; approximately 3 hours ago. With this information; the captain called dispatch to find out what weather they had from the time that our dispatch release was generated to the time we left the gate in ZZZ. The email we got from mr. X shows the weather that was available in the soc prior to our departure. It is as follows: far XAXC29Z 150 degrees at 4 KTS gusting to 23 KTS; 4 SM visibility -sn VV005 M13--M16 A2987 rmk AO2 P0001. Possible contributing factors: the captain's lack of checking all weather on the gate computer before departure. The captain's over-reliance on dispatch to provide him with the most up-to-date weather before departure. Dispatch's lack of monitoring weather for an ensuing departure; as well as a flight that had left. Lack of an update to the dispatch release/weather packet during deteriorating weather. Dispatcher change after a release had been generated and possible lack of review of the prior dispatcher's release. Lack of a way to check far weather in aircraft before leaving gate. Failure of captain to contact dispatch after concerns for far weather had been addressed within the crew; regardless of legality. Possible lack of personnel in dispatch to keep track of all airborne flights; and generate releases with the most current weather. Things that went well: dispatch's timely response to our ACARS messages in order to get us the information we needed. Good CRM within the cockpit to divide duties and find as much information as we could to ensure a safe outcome. The dispatcher; making time to debrief the situation with the crew and help shed light on what happened; and how to prevent it from happening in the future. Suggestions for preventing similar situations: crew should make it a habit to check weather at the gate within 30 minutes of departure; at all times; regardless of weather packet contents; or stage length of flight. Any time a fuel/weather/alternate is discussed within the crew; it should be standard practice to inquire with dispatch to get any more recent information or weather that isn't available to the crew. If digital ATIS is available for the pushback/taxi; especially in adverse weather conditions. Suggestions for dispatch: during dispatcher changes; the oncoming dispatcher should completely review the flights they are taking over. When an out message is sent via ACARS that an aircraft is departing; check the current metar/taf for the arrival airport to ensure nothing has changed that could adversely affect the flight. Add technology to alert dispatch of changes to weather after a weather package is generated.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: RJ flight crew is dispatched to FAR with no alternate and none required according to the weather packet received from Dispatch. Enroute this is discovered to be in error. Actual forecast at time of departure required an alternate.

Narrative: Reviewing the Dispatch Release; the weather packet indicated the TAF segment that applies is FMXAXB00 14015KT 3SM -SN OVC025. This weather is MVFR and at the minimum visibility for dispatch without an alternate. During review of the paperwork; the weather was marginal for release without an alternate. After discussion; we thought it inconsistent with prior dispatch releases from earlier in the day. We thought it was interesting that we were not given an alternate for MVFR into FAR. Since it was legal; and appeared to be safe; both of us were OK with dispatching without an alternate. While enroute to FAR; approximately 120 miles from landing; we listened to the ATIS. It was as follows: 'XA55Z winds 140 degrees at 13 KTS gusting to 21 KTS; V3/4 SM -SN indefinite ceiling 008; M13--M16 A2990; ILS approach Runway 18 in use.' When we heard that; we started to get concerned. A free text ACARS message to Dispatch was sent saying what the weather was; and that we were showing landing with 4;400 LBS of fuel in FAR. We informed the Dispatcher we didn't have the fuel to add an alternate. Mr. X was on duty and working our flight at the time; and his response on ACARS was: 'SPECI FAR XAXA04Z 140 degrees at 17 KTS gusting to 23 KTS 1 1/4SM -SN OVC009 M13--M16 A2990 FAR XAXA55Z XAXB--2324 140 degrees at 15 KTS gusting to 22 KTS P6SM OVC035 TEMPO XAXB--XAXE 3/4SM -SN BR OVC008' to which we replied that we needed to add an alternate; but didn't have the fuel for a legal alternate. The response came back as follows: 'If you and I agree the flight can continue safely; we are not required to list one. The fuel load will not permit adding an alternate.' At which point we discussed; and we continued since we were so close to landing in FAR. We were confident in our ability to land in FAR if the weather remained the same or got better. However; our concern was if the weather got worse. So we sent an ACARS to Dispatch asking for the weather in BRD and STC; as well as burn information. The ACARS message back from Mr. X in Dispatch was as follows: 'BRD XAXA53Z AUTOMATIC 1309KT 9SM OVC110 M16--M22 A3004= BRDXAXB29Z XAXC--XBXC 15005KT P6SM SCT030 BKN050 OVC090 FMXAXB30 1507KT 5SM -SN OVC030 TEMPO XAXD--XAXF 1SM -SN BKN015 OVC028.' The next ACARS 4 minutes later was as follows: 'BURN FAR TO BRN IS 1252 RESV 2324; TTL 3;600LBS.' With this information; we knew that we could get to BRD after an approach in FAR; but we would be landing at most with minimum fuel if not having to declare an emergency. We were already on vectors for the approach when we got the 2 of thee ACARS messages. So we elected to continue. We also asked Center if people were getting into FAR tonight; and their response was that we were the first ones going to FAR in a while. We landed without incident; and saw the runway and approach lights by approximately 800 FT AGL. After landing; we inquired with the station personnel to ask when the snow started; and I was amazed when their response was; approximately 3 hours ago. With this information; the Captain called Dispatch to find out what weather they had from the time that our Dispatch Release was generated to the time we left the gate in ZZZ. The email we got from Mr. X shows the weather that was available in the SOC prior to our departure. It is as follows: FAR XAXC29Z 150 degrees at 4 KTS gusting to 23 KTS; 4 SM visibility -SN VV005 M13--M16 A2987 RMK AO2 P0001. Possible contributing factors: The Captain's lack of checking all weather on the gate computer before departure. The Captain's over-reliance on Dispatch to provide him with the most up-to-date weather before departure. Dispatch's lack of monitoring weather for an ensuing departure; as well as a flight that had left. Lack of an update to the Dispatch Release/weather packet during deteriorating weather. Dispatcher change after a release had been generated and possible lack of review of the prior Dispatcher's release. Lack of a way to check FAR weather in aircraft before leaving gate. Failure of Captain to contact Dispatch after concerns for FAR weather had been addressed within the crew; regardless of legality. Possible lack of personnel in Dispatch to keep track of all airborne flights; and generate releases with the most current weather. Things that went well: Dispatch's timely response to our ACARS messages in order to get us the information we needed. Good CRM within the cockpit to divide duties and find as much information as we could to ensure a safe outcome. The Dispatcher; making time to debrief the situation with the crew and help shed light on what happened; and how to prevent it from happening in the future. Suggestions for preventing similar situations: Crew should make it a habit to check weather at the gate within 30 minutes of departure; at all times; regardless of weather packet contents; or stage length of flight. Any time a fuel/weather/alternate is discussed within the crew; it should be standard practice to inquire with Dispatch to get any more recent information or weather that isn't available to the crew. If digital ATIS is available for the pushback/taxi; especially in adverse weather conditions. Suggestions for Dispatch: During Dispatcher changes; the oncoming Dispatcher should completely review the flights they are taking over. When an out message is sent via ACARS that an aircraft is departing; check the current METAR/TAF for the arrival airport to ensure nothing has changed that could adversely affect the flight. Add technology to alert Dispatch of changes to weather after a weather package is generated.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of May 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.