|37000 Feet||Browse and search NASA's
Aviation Safety Reporting System
|Local Time Of Day||0601 To 1200|
|Locale Reference||atc facility : yyj|
|Altitude||msl bound lower : 429|
msl bound upper : 24000
|Controlling Facilities||artcc : zse|
|Operator||common carrier : air carrier|
|Make Model Name||Large Transport, Low Wing, 3 Turbojet Eng|
|Flight Phase||cruise other|
|Affiliation||company : air carrier|
|Function||flight crew : captain|
oversight : pic
|Qualification||pilot : instrument|
pilot : flight engineer
pilot : commercial
pilot : atp
|Experience||flight time last 90 days : 180|
flight time total : 19000
flight time type : 3000
|Anomaly||aircraft equipment problem : critical|
|Independent Detector||aircraft equipment other aircraft equipment : unspecified|
|Resolutory Action||flight crew : declared emergency|
Over yyj (victoria, back course) as throttles were retarded to idle, the #3 oil low pressure/filter bypass light came on. Oil pressure was normal, but abnormal procedures were followed, and this led to a precautionary engine shutdown. By this time, the aircraft was in the vicinity of everett, wa. ATC was notified at engine shutdown, and emergency declared in order to provide expeditious handling and emergency veh's at sea-tac. Sea-tac was reporting scattered clouds and 2 mi visibility. Paine field was wide open. I elected to continue to sea (original destination) due to improving WX, fire and crash, airport familiarity and altitude (landing at pae would have required steep des, rushed completion of engine failure checklist and des & approach and landing checklists). At no time was any airport other than sea mentioned by ATC or any crew member. Safe landing was effected at sea in VMC. Airport was in sight from approximately 30 mi north. I file this report to preclude an FAA monday morning quarterback who arbitrarily might try to argue that pae would have been more suitable. There is a definite potential misinterp of the captain's responsibility in the event of engine shutdown in 2 or 3 engine aircraft. In the case of 2 engine aircraft, it is most suitable airport 'in point of time.' in more than 2 engine aircraft, the captain may continue if he considers several other factors which I used in this case. Nevertheless, this question of 'suitable airport' is wide open to interpretation and second guessing by 'experts' after the fact. The captain must decide on the spot, and should not be subject to the judgement of some armchair expert at a later date. This very fact can have a definite effect on the captain's decision making process. He tends to consider what the FAA is going to say, and this could cause vacillating attitudes by weaker capts, delaying or reversing decisions. Incidentally, I notified the lead F/a, but the passenger were not told of the situation to preclude alarming them in this day of acute anxiety about air travel. This could be criticized--a new subject.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: ACR LGT INFLT ENGINE SHUTDOWN WHEN OIL FILTER BYPASS LIGHT CAME ON INDICATING FILTER WAS BEING BYPASSED.
Narrative: OVER YYJ (VICTORIA, BC) AS THROTTLES WERE RETARDED TO IDLE, THE #3 OIL LOW PRESSURE/FILTER BYPASS LIGHT CAME ON. OIL PRESSURE WAS NORMAL, BUT ABNORMAL PROCS WERE FOLLOWED, AND THIS LED TO A PRECAUTIONARY ENG SHUTDOWN. BY THIS TIME, THE ACFT WAS IN THE VICINITY OF EVERETT, WA. ATC WAS NOTIFIED AT ENG SHUTDOWN, AND EMER DECLARED IN ORDER TO PROVIDE EXPEDITIOUS HANDLING AND EMER VEH'S AT SEA-TAC. SEA-TAC WAS REPORTING SCATTERED CLOUDS AND 2 MI VIS. PAINE FIELD WAS WIDE OPEN. I ELECTED TO CONTINUE TO SEA (ORIGINAL DEST) DUE TO IMPROVING WX, FIRE AND CRASH, ARPT FAMILIARITY AND ALT (LNDG AT PAE WOULD HAVE REQUIRED STEEP DES, RUSHED COMPLETION OF ENG FAILURE CHKLIST AND DES & APCH AND LNDG CHKLISTS). AT NO TIME WAS ANY ARPT OTHER THAN SEA MENTIONED BY ATC OR ANY CREW MEMBER. SAFE LNDG WAS EFFECTED AT SEA IN VMC. ARPT WAS IN SIGHT FROM APPROX 30 MI N. I FILE THIS RPT TO PRECLUDE AN FAA MONDAY MORNING QUARTERBACK WHO ARBITRARILY MIGHT TRY TO ARGUE THAT PAE WOULD HAVE BEEN MORE SUITABLE. THERE IS A DEFINITE POTENTIAL MISINTERP OF THE CAPT'S RESPONSIBILITY IN THE EVENT OF ENG SHUTDOWN IN 2 OR 3 ENG ACFT. IN THE CASE OF 2 ENG ACFT, IT IS MOST SUITABLE ARPT 'IN POINT OF TIME.' IN MORE THAN 2 ENG ACFT, THE CAPT MAY CONTINUE IF HE CONSIDERS SEVERAL OTHER FACTORS WHICH I USED IN THIS CASE. NEVERTHELESS, THIS QUESTION OF 'SUITABLE ARPT' IS WIDE OPEN TO INTERP AND SECOND GUESSING BY 'EXPERTS' AFTER THE FACT. THE CAPT MUST DECIDE ON THE SPOT, AND SHOULD NOT BE SUBJECT TO THE JUDGEMENT OF SOME ARMCHAIR EXPERT AT A LATER DATE. THIS VERY FACT CAN HAVE A DEFINITE EFFECT ON THE CAPT'S DECISION MAKING PROCESS. HE TENDS TO CONSIDER WHAT THE FAA IS GOING TO SAY, AND THIS COULD CAUSE VACILLATING ATTITUDES BY WEAKER CAPTS, DELAYING OR REVERSING DECISIONS. INCIDENTALLY, I NOTIFIED THE LEAD F/A, BUT THE PAX WERE NOT TOLD OF THE SITUATION TO PRECLUDE ALARMING THEM IN THIS DAY OF ACUTE ANXIETY ABOUT AIR TRAVEL. THIS COULD BE CRITICIZED--A NEW SUBJECT.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of August 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.