Narrative:

I was performing line check airman duty providing IOE training to a new hire sic. This was day 1; leg 1 of that training with 4 passengers aboard. We were assigned the dalton 2 departure off of runway 19 to fly runway heading to 800 ft MSL; right turn to heading 280 within 4 NM; remain VFR at or below 1300 ft MSL; not to exceed 190 KIAS. I briefed that I would be reducing thrust early and going to the autopilot at 1000 ft MSL to allow for better outside vigilance of traffic arriving overhead on approach to ewr. A 30 degree bank right turn was initiated at 800 ft MSL. Flaps were retracted upon verbal prompt from the sic due to a missing '400 ft' call. I became distracted by the autopilot not being engaged upon my request for 'autopilot engage' and got behind the aircraft. Climb was arrested at 1520 ft MSL and descent correction immediately initiated back down to 1300 ft MSL. Airspeed was arrested at 234 KIAS and speed reduction correction immediately initiated back to 180 KIAS. I engaged the autopilot and a stabilized departure followed. Visual contact and adequate separation was maintained with a jetliner overhead and well south on approach to ewr. The taws properly announced 'don't sink' during the 500 FPM descent from 1520 ft back down to 1300 ft MSL. No TCAS warning activity occurred. There was no inquiry from ATC. Maneuvering was smooth and coordinated and there was no inquiry made by the passengers. Stabilizer travel may have been interrupted during the period of speed increase above 215 +/- 10 KIAS but would have resumed when the speed was reduced below that limit. Far maximum speed below class B airspace was exceeded for the short period I allowed the airspeed to continue above 200 KIAS. The primary cause was my failure to fly the airplane as I had briefed I would. Due to my training position; I knew to state the correct plan but failed to implement it. I believe this was largely due to my lack of practice in doing so. Namely; I had been maintaining only the bare minimum recency of flight experience to remain current for the lca position. I now see that this was entirely inadequate for the demands of our flight operations. As corrective action; I will now hold myself accountable to ensure that I am requesting regular line flight duty assignment in order to advance my proficiency to an increased and acceptable new and much higher personal minimum of flight hours and aircraft landings. Looking for activity in at least the previous 60 days rather than the 90 day window I had previously accepted. This new minimum will exclude simulator flight time and landings which I believe to have provided me a false sense of security of having adequately met my old personal minimum number of flight hours in the previous 90 days. This situation may have been averted by entering into a review of the exact takeoff call-outs and autopilot activation expectations with my pilot under instruction prior to taking flight. Such a discussion may have enhanced my awareness and preparation for distraction and placed a mindset for me to expect to be in a more pro-active than re-active pilot flying role. Corrective action was swift and stabilized. In addition; I went to great lengths in communicating my full ownership and understanding of this event with the pilot under instruction who is a very competent and capable airman. This event was a violation of far 91.117 and 91.123; company standard operating procedures; aircraft limitation; and resulted in a reduced margin of safety. In retrospect; it is my hope that my response in taking full ownership; providing thorough self-debriefing; and setting an aggressive course toward prevention will serve as a beneficial model for my fellow pilot. It has certainly afforded me a very important and valuable learning experience with which to prevent future pilot error.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: CITATION CHECK CAPTAIN REPORTS EXCEEDING BOTH ALTITUDE AND AIRSPEED LIMITATIONS ON THE DALTON DEPARTURE FROM TEB. LACK OF RECENT EXPERIENCE IS CITED AS THE PRIMARY CAUSE.

Narrative: I WAS PERFORMING LINE CHECK AIRMAN DUTY PROVIDING IOE TRAINING TO A NEW HIRE SIC. THIS WAS DAY 1; LEG 1 OF THAT TRAINING WITH 4 PASSENGERS ABOARD. WE WERE ASSIGNED THE DALTON 2 DEP OFF OF RUNWAY 19 TO FLY RUNWAY HEADING TO 800 FT MSL; RIGHT TURN TO HDG 280 WITHIN 4 NM; REMAIN VFR AT OR BELOW 1300 FT MSL; NOT TO EXCEED 190 KIAS. I BRIEFED THAT I WOULD BE REDUCING THRUST EARLY AND GOING TO THE AUTOPILOT AT 1000 FT MSL TO ALLOW FOR BETTER OUTSIDE VIGILANCE OF TRAFFIC ARRIVING OVERHEAD ON APPROACH TO EWR. A 30 DEGREE BANK RIGHT TURN WAS INITIATED AT 800 FT MSL. FLAPS WERE RETRACTED UPON VERBAL PROMPT FROM THE SIC DUE TO A MISSING '400 FT' CALL. I BECAME DISTRACTED BY THE AUTOPILOT NOT BEING ENGAGED UPON MY REQUEST FOR 'AUTOPILOT ENGAGE' AND GOT BEHIND THE AIRCRAFT. CLIMB WAS ARRESTED AT 1520 FT MSL AND DESCENT CORRECTION IMMEDIATELY INITIATED BACK DOWN TO 1300 FT MSL. AIRSPEED WAS ARRESTED AT 234 KIAS AND SPEED REDUCTION CORRECTION IMMEDIATELY INITIATED BACK TO 180 KIAS. I ENGAGED THE AUTOPILOT AND A STABILIZED DEPARTURE FOLLOWED. VISUAL CONTACT AND ADEQUATE SEPARATION WAS MAINTAINED WITH A JETLINER OVERHEAD AND WELL SOUTH ON APPROACH TO EWR. THE TAWS PROPERLY ANNOUNCED 'DON'T SINK' DURING THE 500 FPM DESCENT FROM 1520 FT BACK DOWN TO 1300 FT MSL. NO TCAS WARNING ACTIVITY OCCURRED. THERE WAS NO INQUIRY FROM ATC. MANEUVERING WAS SMOOTH AND COORDINATED AND THERE WAS NO INQUIRY MADE BY THE PASSENGERS. STABILIZER TRAVEL MAY HAVE BEEN INTERRUPTED DURING THE PERIOD OF SPEED INCREASE ABOVE 215 +/- 10 KIAS BUT WOULD HAVE RESUMED WHEN THE SPEED WAS REDUCED BELOW THAT LIMIT. FAR MAX SPEED BELOW CLASS B AIRSPACE WAS EXCEEDED FOR THE SHORT PERIOD I ALLOWED THE AIRSPEED TO CONTINUE ABOVE 200 KIAS. THE PRIMARY CAUSE WAS MY FAILURE TO FLY THE AIRPLANE AS I HAD BRIEFED I WOULD. DUE TO MY TRAINING POSITION; I KNEW TO STATE THE CORRECT PLAN BUT FAILED TO IMPLEMENT IT. I BELIEVE THIS WAS LARGELY DUE TO MY LACK OF PRACTICE IN DOING SO. NAMELY; I HAD BEEN MAINTAINING ONLY THE BARE MINIMUM RECENCY OF FLIGHT EXPERIENCE TO REMAIN CURRENT FOR THE LCA POSITION. I NOW SEE THAT THIS WAS ENTIRELY INADEQUATE FOR THE DEMANDS OF OUR FLIGHT OPERATIONS. AS CORRECTIVE ACTION; I WILL NOW HOLD MYSELF ACCOUNTABLE TO ENSURE THAT I AM REQUESTING REGULAR LINE FLIGHT DUTY ASSIGNMENT IN ORDER TO ADVANCE MY PROFICIENCY TO AN INCREASED AND ACCEPTABLE NEW AND MUCH HIGHER PERSONAL MINIMUM OF FLIGHT HOURS AND AIRCRAFT LANDINGS. LOOKING FOR ACTIVITY IN AT LEAST THE PREVIOUS 60 DAYS RATHER THAN THE 90 DAY WINDOW I HAD PREVIOUSLY ACCEPTED. THIS NEW MINIMUM WILL EXCLUDE SIMULATOR FLIGHT TIME AND LANDINGS WHICH I BELIEVE TO HAVE PROVIDED ME A FALSE SENSE OF SECURITY OF HAVING ADEQUATELY MET MY OLD PERSONAL MINIMUM NUMBER OF FLIGHT HOURS IN THE PREVIOUS 90 DAYS. THIS SITUATION MAY HAVE BEEN AVERTED BY ENTERING INTO A REVIEW OF THE EXACT TAKEOFF CALL-OUTS AND AUTOPILOT ACTIVATION EXPECTATIONS WITH MY PILOT UNDER INSTRUCTION PRIOR TO TAKING FLIGHT. SUCH A DISCUSSION MAY HAVE ENHANCED MY AWARENESS AND PREPARATION FOR DISTRACTION AND PLACED A MINDSET FOR ME TO EXPECT TO BE IN A MORE PRO-ACTIVE THAN RE-ACTIVE PILOT FLYING ROLE. CORRECTIVE ACTION WAS SWIFT AND STABILIZED. IN ADDITION; I WENT TO GREAT LENGTHS IN COMMUNICATING MY FULL OWNERSHIP AND UNDERSTANDING OF THIS EVENT WITH THE PILOT UNDER INSTRUCTION WHO IS A VERY COMPETENT AND CAPABLE AIRMAN. THIS EVENT WAS A VIOLATION OF FAR 91.117 AND 91.123; COMPANY STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES; AIRCRAFT LIMITATION; AND RESULTED IN A REDUCED MARGIN OF SAFETY. IN RETROSPECT; IT IS MY HOPE THAT MY RESPONSE IN TAKING FULL OWNERSHIP; PROVIDING THOROUGH SELF-DEBRIEFING; AND SETTING AN AGGRESSIVE COURSE TOWARD PREVENTION WILL SERVE AS A BENEFICIAL MODEL FOR MY FELLOW PILOT. IT HAS CERTAINLY AFFORDED ME A VERY IMPORTANT AND VALUABLE LEARNING EXPERIENCE WITH WHICH TO PREVENT FUTURE PILOT ERROR.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of May 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.