Narrative:

The crew started both engines normally and taxied to the deice area. There was some contamination on the inboard part of the left wing; and the crew shut down the engine to allow for deicing. The engine was restarted; and the start was normal. There was starter cutout; but it was approximately 54% nh -- a number that is not unreasonable. All of the engine parameters were stabilized in accordance with normal start procedures. However; the 'select' light remained illuminated after 15 seconds. The crew read the quick reference handbook and believed that the issue was related to starter cutout. The quick reference handbook procedure we read required the verification of the dc generator (associated side) caution light. The dc generator caution light was off; and the generator was carrying a normal load. The quick reference handbook said end of procedure; and the note said that the flight may depart; but maint is required after next landing. There was no caution light on the overhead panel; we were away from the gate when this happened; and we believed the quick reference handbook note allowed us to depart in accordance with company procedures. Inflight; we notified dispatch to relay to maintenance to meet the airplane after we landed. The flight was uneventful; and we taxied to the gate without incident. We believed we had followed company procedures and flown in accordance with our manual system. However; after speaking with maintenance control; I learned that we inadvertently read the wrong checklist. The correct one would have been titled 'starter failure.' we did not select that title boldface because the starter had started the engine normally; and cut out on its own. We believed that the starter did not fail; and believed that we were on the proper checklist. I now understand what the correct quick reference handbook procedure was; but did not understand that during the flight. If the quick reference handbook procedure was titled based upon the light illuminated; we would have avoided this course of action. Nevertheless; we were unknowingly wrong. We believed that the select light; based upon the system descriptions; was not indicative of a starter failure whatsoever. As a result of the ambiguity of the quick reference handbook; the crew recommended an edit; so as to avoid this mistake in the future. Supplemental information from acn 816259: I believe that the quick reference handbook needs to be reviewed by both the company and the manufacturer because there very likely are more mistakes of this nature. My understanding is that the quick reference handbook was developed from the manufacturer's quick reference handbook and has already been identified as flawed by the FAA. While this mistake is serious in nature; it was highly unlikely that it would have caused a catastrophic incident. I worry that other errors are present in the quick reference handbook that could cause a more serious incident. In the future; I will endeavor to more closely read the quick reference handbook to ensure that the proper procedure is being followed; especially since it has become evident to me that it may contain flaws that could lead to improper procedures being followed after a malfunction.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: DHC-8 flight crew observes 'select' light illuminated after engine start and applies wrong QRH procedure prior to departing. Enroute the crew is informed by maintenance that starter failure is indicated and they should not have departed.

Narrative: The crew started both engines normally and taxied to the deice area. There was some contamination on the inboard part of the left wing; and the crew shut down the engine to allow for deicing. The engine was restarted; and the start was normal. There was starter cutout; but it was approximately 54% NH -- a number that is not unreasonable. All of the engine parameters were stabilized in accordance with normal start procedures. However; the 'select' light remained illuminated after 15 seconds. The crew read the Quick Reference Handbook and believed that the issue was related to starter cutout. The Quick Reference Handbook procedure we read required the verification of the DC Generator (associated side) caution light. The DC Generator caution light was off; and the generator was carrying a normal load. The Quick Reference Handbook said end of procedure; and the NOTE said that the flight may depart; but maint is required AFTER next landing. There was no caution light on the overhead panel; we were away from the gate when this happened; and we believed the Quick Reference Handbook note allowed us to depart in accordance with company procedures. Inflight; we notified Dispatch to relay to Maintenance to meet the airplane after we landed. The flight was uneventful; and we taxied to the gate without incident. We believed we had followed company procedures and flown in accordance with our manual system. However; after speaking with Maintenance Control; I learned that we inadvertently read the wrong checklist. The correct one would have been titled 'Starter Failure.' We did not select that title boldface because the starter had started the engine normally; and cut out on its own. We believed that the starter did not fail; and believed that we were on the proper checklist. I now understand what the correct Quick Reference Handbook procedure was; but did not understand that during the flight. If the Quick Reference Handbook procedure was titled based upon the light illuminated; we would have avoided this course of action. Nevertheless; we were unknowingly wrong. We believed that the select light; based upon the system descriptions; was not indicative of a starter failure whatsoever. As a result of the ambiguity of the Quick Reference Handbook; the crew recommended an edit; so as to avoid this mistake in the future. Supplemental information from ACN 816259: I believe that the Quick Reference Handbook needs to be reviewed by both the company and the manufacturer because there very likely are more mistakes of this nature. My understanding is that the Quick Reference Handbook was developed from the manufacturer's Quick Reference Handbook and has already been identified as flawed by the FAA. While this mistake is serious in nature; it was highly unlikely that it would have caused a catastrophic incident. I worry that other errors are present in the Quick Reference Handbook that could cause a more serious incident. In the future; I will endeavor to more closely read the Quick Reference Handbook to ensure that the proper procedure is being followed; especially since it has become evident to me that it may contain flaws that could lead to improper procedures being followed after a malfunction.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of May 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.