Narrative:

The aircraft had not flown for nearly a week. Many maintenance items had been addressed in that time frame. We received the aircraft -- no maintenance deferrals. My interior and exterior preflight inspections were accomplished and no maintenance concerns were noted. Upon landing at our destination; I selected reverse thrust and received an ECAM indicating fault conditions in engine #1 and #2 thrust reverser systems. No reverse thrust was available. After parking the aircraft at the gate; capt entered this discrepancy in the logbook. Contract maintenance inspected the engines. Afterward; the mechanic reported that the hydraulic control units were shut off in each engine and that there would be no outward indication of this fact available to the flight crew during preflight. The mechanic was able to open the hydraulic control unit shutoff valves in each reverser system. Capt spoke to maintenance control on his cell phone. I asked him what maintenance control had to say. He said that I would be required to inspect the engine cowl latches and attest to their security by my signature in the aircraft logbook. The maintenance controller said this procedure was agreed to in a LOA. I was certain that at least in the context of loas between the company and union that no such agreement existed. As part of my normal preflight inspection; I check that the fan cowl latches are closed. However; I believe that if they are improperly latched; they may not be secure; although they are closed. In asking me to attest to the security of the latches I felt that I was being asked to perform a maint function which fell outside of my authority and training. I told the capt that I was unwilling to sign the logbook in this instance. He contacted his union representative who spoke on our behalf to the chief pilot. The chief pilot agreed that I should not be required to sign the log in this capacity. The air carrier later contacted the capt and indicated that the FAA had waived the 2 signature requirement and that we were released. If the incident arose from a failure of maintenance to follow SOP then those procedures should be reviewed. If I am mistaken in some way; and it was indeed possible for me to determine that the reversers were deactivated in this instance; then I would like this information made available to all pilots. I can find no reference to reverser status in the exterior preflight SOP. If it is possible for an 'opaque reverser deactivation' to occur; then some additional procedures should be developed to ensure the system is functional upon return to service. This aircraft had been repositioned by maintenance to the departure gate. If they had momentarily selected reverse thrust during taxi; the faults could have been detected at that time. In light of the potential for service into landing performance critical airports; this issue could be of greater importance in the future.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: An A319's reversers did not open on landing because the hydraulic shutoff valves controlling them were left closed following an extended hanger maintenance cycle.

Narrative: The aircraft had not flown for nearly a week. Many maintenance items had been addressed in that time frame. We received the aircraft -- no maintenance deferrals. My interior and exterior preflight inspections were accomplished and no maintenance concerns were noted. Upon landing at our destination; I selected reverse thrust and received an ECAM indicating fault conditions in engine #1 and #2 thrust reverser systems. No reverse thrust was available. After parking the aircraft at the gate; Capt entered this discrepancy in the logbook. Contract Maintenance inspected the engines. Afterward; the Mechanic reported that the Hydraulic Control Units were shut off in each engine and that there would be no outward indication of this fact available to the flight crew during preflight. The Mechanic was able to open the Hydraulic Control Unit shutoff valves in each reverser system. Capt spoke to Maintenance Control on his cell phone. I asked him what Maintenance Control had to say. He said that I would be required to inspect the engine cowl latches and attest to their security by my signature in the aircraft logbook. The Maintenance Controller said this procedure was agreed to in a LOA. I was certain that at least in the context of LOAs between the company and Union that no such agreement existed. As part of my normal preflight inspection; I check that the fan cowl latches are closed. However; I believe that if they are improperly latched; they may not be secure; although they are closed. In asking me to attest to the security of the latches I felt that I was being asked to perform a maint function which fell outside of my authority and training. I told the Capt that I was unwilling to sign the logbook in this instance. He contacted his Union representative who spoke on our behalf to the Chief Pilot. The Chief Pilot agreed that I should not be required to sign the log in this capacity. The Air Carrier later contacted the Capt and indicated that the FAA had waived the 2 signature requirement and that we were released. If the incident arose from a failure of Maintenance to follow SOP then those procedures should be reviewed. If I am mistaken in some way; and it was indeed possible for me to determine that the reversers were deactivated in this instance; then I would like this information made available to all pilots. I can find no reference to reverser status in the exterior preflight SOP. If it is possible for an 'opaque reverser deactivation' to occur; then some additional procedures should be developed to ensure the system is functional upon return to service. This aircraft had been repositioned by Maintenance to the departure gate. If they had momentarily selected reverse thrust during taxi; the faults could have been detected at that time. In light of the potential for service into landing performance critical airports; this issue could be of greater importance in the future.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of May 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.