|37000 Feet||Browse and search NASA's
Aviation Safety Reporting System
|Local Time Of Day||0601 To 1200|
|Locale Reference||airport : zzz.airport|
|Altitude||agl single value : 0|
|Operator||common carrier : air carrier|
|Make Model Name||A320|
|Operating Under FAR Part||Part 121|
|Flight Phase||ground : maintenance|
|Affiliation||company : air carrier|
|Function||flight crew : captain|
oversight : pic
|Anomaly||aircraft equipment problem : critical|
|Independent Detector||aircraft equipment other aircraft equipment : ecam|
other flight crewa
|Problem Areas||Maintenance Human Performance|
Flight Crew Human Performance
Upon arrival; we received several failure messages: CISD2 data; ADF1 data; MCDU3 (not installed in our aircraft); atsu; LGCIU2 and 28 volt power. We entered the appropriate maintenance report codes and called maintenance control. Maintenance control confirmed the failures through the downloaded information from the jet. Maintenance control gave us instructions for several resets; including complete power down of the aircraft and power back up. After power up and several mins; we received several additional sporadic failures and warnings; including the engine fire warning bells and fire loop failures. After several resets and troubleshooting measures; maintenance control took the jet OTS and informed us that air carrier mechanics would be working on the jet. Later that evening we were reassigned to ferry the jet in the morning at XA05. I asked if the jet; at that time; was fixed. I was informed that the jet would be fixed by tomorrow morning as they are still working on it and would be through the night. Before leaving the hotel the next morning; I called the crew desk to see if the jet was ready for departure. I was informed the jet was released by maintenance and ready for departure. Upon arrival at the airport and after getting the flight paperwork; I called maintenance control to discuss the fix on the jet. The jet had a new maintenance release issued with the fix being replacement of the centralized fault data interface unit. I asked maintenance control if that covered all the failures we had from the day before; including the fire warnings and ecams. Upon further discussion; he said no. The centralized fault data interface unit would cover most failures we received; but not the ecams. I told him I was refusing the jet until we could explain the additional ECAM warnings we received since the current fix did not cover those issues. In discussion with the supervisor; he said that he had instructed the mechanics to replace both the centralized fault data interface unit and the connector; as that should account for all the failures and warnings we received. I asked him if the connector had been replaced. He said no. He said he would get him to replace the connector in addition to replacing the centralized fault data interface unit. We were asked if we would then take the jet. I told him if that was the fix and we could be sure the system was working we would. Maintenance control said he thought it would be ok; but no guarantees. He did not think that the jet needed to be test flown. I told him I understood; but again I do not want to be in the air to see if the systems were working properly; we are not an engineering crew; and refused the jet again. The aircraft required a verification test flight to confirm system fix before being returned to service.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: A320 CAPTAIN REPORTS MANY SPURIOUS FAILURE MESSAGES UPON ARRIVAL. REPAIRS TAKE OVERNIGHT AND FERRY FIGHT IS REFUSED IN THE MORNING WHEN CREW LEARNS THAT THE REPAIR DOES NOT COVER ALL OF THE FAULTS REPORTED.
Narrative: UPON ARR; WE RECEIVED SEVERAL FAILURE MESSAGES: CISD2 DATA; ADF1 DATA; MCDU3 (NOT INSTALLED IN OUR ACFT); ATSU; LGCIU2 AND 28 VOLT PWR. WE ENTERED THE APPROPRIATE MAINT RPT CODES AND CALLED MAINT CTL. MAINT CTL CONFIRMED THE FAILURES THROUGH THE DOWNLOADED INFO FROM THE JET. MAINT CTL GAVE US INSTRUCTIONS FOR SEVERAL RESETS; INCLUDING COMPLETE PWR DOWN OF THE ACFT AND PWR BACK UP. AFTER PWR UP AND SEVERAL MINS; WE RECEIVED SEVERAL ADDITIONAL SPORADIC FAILURES AND WARNINGS; INCLUDING THE ENG FIRE WARNING BELLS AND FIRE LOOP FAILURES. AFTER SEVERAL RESETS AND TROUBLESHOOTING MEASURES; MAINT CTL TOOK THE JET OTS AND INFORMED US THAT ACR MECHS WOULD BE WORKING ON THE JET. LATER THAT EVENING WE WERE REASSIGNED TO FERRY THE JET IN THE MORNING AT XA05. I ASKED IF THE JET; AT THAT TIME; WAS FIXED. I WAS INFORMED THAT THE JET WOULD BE FIXED BY TOMORROW MORNING AS THEY ARE STILL WORKING ON IT AND WOULD BE THROUGH THE NIGHT. BEFORE LEAVING THE HOTEL THE NEXT MORNING; I CALLED THE CREW DESK TO SEE IF THE JET WAS READY FOR DEP. I WAS INFORMED THE JET WAS RELEASED BY MAINT AND READY FOR DEP. UPON ARR AT THE ARPT AND AFTER GETTING THE FLT PAPERWORK; I CALLED MAINT CTL TO DISCUSS THE FIX ON THE JET. THE JET HAD A NEW MAINT RELEASE ISSUED WITH THE FIX BEING REPLACEMENT OF THE CENTRALIZED FAULT DATA INTERFACE UNIT. I ASKED MAINT CTL IF THAT COVERED ALL THE FAILURES WE HAD FROM THE DAY BEFORE; INCLUDING THE FIRE WARNINGS AND ECAMS. UPON FURTHER DISCUSSION; HE SAID NO. THE CENTRALIZED FAULT DATA INTERFACE UNIT WOULD COVER MOST FAILURES WE RECEIVED; BUT NOT THE ECAMS. I TOLD HIM I WAS REFUSING THE JET UNTIL WE COULD EXPLAIN THE ADDITIONAL ECAM WARNINGS WE RECEIVED SINCE THE CURRENT FIX DID NOT COVER THOSE ISSUES. IN DISCUSSION WITH THE SUPVR; HE SAID THAT HE HAD INSTRUCTED THE MECHS TO REPLACE BOTH THE CENTRALIZED FAULT DATA INTERFACE UNIT AND THE CONNECTOR; AS THAT SHOULD ACCOUNT FOR ALL THE FAILURES AND WARNINGS WE RECEIVED. I ASKED HIM IF THE CONNECTOR HAD BEEN REPLACED. HE SAID NO. HE SAID HE WOULD GET HIM TO REPLACE THE CONNECTOR IN ADDITION TO REPLACING THE CENTRALIZED FAULT DATA INTERFACE UNIT. WE WERE ASKED IF WE WOULD THEN TAKE THE JET. I TOLD HIM IF THAT WAS THE FIX AND WE COULD BE SURE THE SYSTEM WAS WORKING WE WOULD. MAINT CTL SAID HE THOUGHT IT WOULD BE OK; BUT NO GUARANTEES. HE DID NOT THINK THAT THE JET NEEDED TO BE TEST FLOWN. I TOLD HIM I UNDERSTOOD; BUT AGAIN I DO NOT WANT TO BE IN THE AIR TO SEE IF THE SYSTEMS WERE WORKING PROPERLY; WE ARE NOT AN ENGINEERING CREW; AND REFUSED THE JET AGAIN. THE ACFT REQUIRED A VERIFICATION TEST FLT TO CONFIRM SYSTEM FIX BEFORE BEING RETURNED TO SVC.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of May 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.