Narrative:

Climbing to our cruising altitude of 7000', we encountered a left engine fire warning. We executed the engine fire warning checklist which (we would later find out) extinguished the flames inside the engine cowling. Prior to discharging agent I saw no visible signs of flames from the left engine. The last item on our checklist required us to execute the single engine operating checklist. Approximately 3 months ago, one of our pilots discovered a discrepancy between the quick reference emergency checklist and the emergency checklist in the aircraft flight manual. This discrepancy was brought to the attention of the chief pilot, trainers department and our poi with the air carrier district office. A memo was soon put out stating that in the event of an emergency or abnormal situation, we were only to consult the aircraft flight manual. With regards to our emergency, we followed the memo and consulted the aircraft flight manual emergency section. The problem arose when we were to apply the single engine operating checklist. I turned the page to find it, but was unable. After flipping through every page in the emergency checklist, I was still unable to find the checklist. I checked the table of contents of the emergency checklist in the aircraft flight manual and saw that the single engine checklist was not contained in the emergency chapter of the aircraft flight manual. The emergency checklist did not state under which other chapter in the aircraft flight manual I could find the checklist. At this point, we were clrd for our approach back to the airport. We were only 12 DME from the airport, at which point I asked ATC to take us off the approach and give us additional time and vectors to the opp side of the airport so that we could find and execute this checklist. After an additional 10 mins of searching, I found the checklist. We completed the checklist and landed west/O further incident. What has upset me the most is that the FAA has been aware of this problem with the quick reference checklist for the past 3 months, and has been dragging its feet over the issue. The problem with our quick reference checklist is that for some reason there are no normal revisions to the checklist like there are to our aircraft flight manual in the airplane or our commercial charts. Our company has made no effort to help resolve this issue. I soon plan to put out a personal memo to our pilots making them aware of the problem my first officer and myself encountered with the aircraft flight manual checklist. I hope that until the FAA moves on this issue, my plan of action will help avoid some of the frustration that I encountered. Ps: if you were curious as to what caused the fire, our mechanic told us that an o-ring on a fuel nozzle had broken allowing raw fuel to enter or spill into the engine area. Cbc revealed the following information: discussed with chief pilot and was advised changes are in the process. The abbreviated checklist must be approved by the FAA and this takes time. This checklist is no longer used in trainers. Had the conditions been more critical, he would not have delayed the return to the departure station.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ENGINE FIRE REQUIRING RETURN TO DEP STATION. EMERGENCY PROC FOLLOWED AND THE FIRE EXTINGUISHED IN THE AIR.

Narrative: CLBING TO OUR CRUISING ALT OF 7000', WE ENCOUNTERED A LEFT ENG FIRE WARNING. WE EXECUTED THE ENG FIRE WARNING CHKLIST WHICH (WE WOULD LATER FIND OUT) EXTINGUISHED THE FLAMES INSIDE THE ENG COWLING. PRIOR TO DISCHARGING AGENT I SAW NO VISIBLE SIGNS OF FLAMES FROM THE LEFT ENG. THE LAST ITEM ON OUR CHKLIST REQUIRED US TO EXECUTE THE SINGLE ENG OPERATING CHKLIST. APPROX 3 MONTHS AGO, ONE OF OUR PLTS DISCOVERED A DISCREPANCY BTWN THE QUICK REF EMER CHKLIST AND THE EMER CHKLIST IN THE ACFT FLT MANUAL. THIS DISCREPANCY WAS BROUGHT TO THE ATTN OF THE CHIEF PLT, TRAINERS DEPT AND OUR POI WITH THE AIR CARRIER DISTRICT OFFICE. A MEMO WAS SOON PUT OUT STATING THAT IN THE EVENT OF AN EMER OR ABNORMAL SITUATION, WE WERE ONLY TO CONSULT THE ACFT FLT MANUAL. WITH REGARDS TO OUR EMER, WE FOLLOWED THE MEMO AND CONSULTED THE ACFT FLT MANUAL EMER SECTION. THE PROB AROSE WHEN WE WERE TO APPLY THE SINGLE ENG OPERATING CHKLIST. I TURNED THE PAGE TO FIND IT, BUT WAS UNABLE. AFTER FLIPPING THROUGH EVERY PAGE IN THE EMER CHKLIST, I WAS STILL UNABLE TO FIND THE CHKLIST. I CHKED THE TABLE OF CONTENTS OF THE EMER CHKLIST IN THE ACFT FLT MANUAL AND SAW THAT THE SINGLE ENG CHKLIST WAS NOT CONTAINED IN THE EMER CHAPTER OF THE ACFT FLT MANUAL. THE EMER CHKLIST DID NOT STATE UNDER WHICH OTHER CHAPTER IN THE ACFT FLT MANUAL I COULD FIND THE CHKLIST. AT THIS POINT, WE WERE CLRD FOR OUR APCH BACK TO THE ARPT. WE WERE ONLY 12 DME FROM THE ARPT, AT WHICH POINT I ASKED ATC TO TAKE US OFF THE APCH AND GIVE US ADDITIONAL TIME AND VECTORS TO THE OPP SIDE OF THE ARPT SO THAT WE COULD FIND AND EXECUTE THIS CHKLIST. AFTER AN ADDITIONAL 10 MINS OF SEARCHING, I FOUND THE CHKLIST. WE COMPLETED THE CHKLIST AND LANDED W/O FURTHER INCIDENT. WHAT HAS UPSET ME THE MOST IS THAT THE FAA HAS BEEN AWARE OF THIS PROB WITH THE QUICK REF CHKLIST FOR THE PAST 3 MONTHS, AND HAS BEEN DRAGGING ITS FEET OVER THE ISSUE. THE PROB WITH OUR QUICK REF CHKLIST IS THAT FOR SOME REASON THERE ARE NO NORMAL REVISIONS TO THE CHKLIST LIKE THERE ARE TO OUR ACFT FLT MANUAL IN THE AIRPLANE OR OUR COMMERCIAL CHARTS. OUR COMPANY HAS MADE NO EFFORT TO HELP RESOLVE THIS ISSUE. I SOON PLAN TO PUT OUT A PERSONAL MEMO TO OUR PLTS MAKING THEM AWARE OF THE PROB MY F/O AND MYSELF ENCOUNTERED WITH THE ACFT FLT MANUAL CHKLIST. I HOPE THAT UNTIL THE FAA MOVES ON THIS ISSUE, MY PLAN OF ACTION WILL HELP AVOID SOME OF THE FRUSTRATION THAT I ENCOUNTERED. PS: IF YOU WERE CURIOUS AS TO WHAT CAUSED THE FIRE, OUR MECHANIC TOLD US THAT AN O-RING ON A FUEL NOZZLE HAD BROKEN ALLOWING RAW FUEL TO ENTER OR SPILL INTO THE ENG AREA. CBC REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: DISCUSSED WITH CHIEF PLT AND WAS ADVISED CHANGES ARE IN THE PROCESS. THE ABBREVIATED CHKLIST MUST BE APPROVED BY THE FAA AND THIS TAKES TIME. THIS CHKLIST IS NO LONGER USED IN TRAINERS. HAD THE CONDITIONS BEEN MORE CRITICAL, HE WOULD NOT HAVE DELAYED THE RETURN TO THE DEP STATION.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of August 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.