Narrative:

During taxi out; a level 1 'tire differential pressure' illuminated concerning the nosewheels. The alert was turning on and off; but I decided to consult the aircraft operating manual anyway in case the alert stayed on. This happened at the same time that the captain would call for the flaps and to do the control check. I had already selected the confign page to observe the tire pressures. While I was reading the aircraft operating manual; the captain did his control check. Once I was finished reading and explaining what the aom said about the tire differential alert; I completed my control check. Most of my takeoff briefing was done in the blocks so I had a few other things to add and that was it. At this time ground control gave us a clearance to use runway 25R to access runway 25L. It was dark; raining and I was more concerned about helping the captain watch outside so we do not make a wrong turn on an active runway. During this time the tire differential pressure alert was going on and off. I was also watching the pressure and trying to keep the alert light from blinding the captain; making a difficult nonstandard taxi worse. The tire differential pressure is a 'no takeoff' alert and while it was out we were in a position to take off. The light was out as we made our turn onto runway 25L and were cleared for takeoff. As takeoff power was applied; the confign warning alerted us that the flaps were not set for takeoff. We realized also that we never did the before takeoff checklist. We rejected at no more than 40 KTS and cleared the runway. After reviewing the cockpit setup; selecting the flaps and completing the checklist; we were ready for takeoff. We were still occasionally getting the tire differential pressure but not as often as before (once the tires warmed up the alert seemed to go away). ATC cleared us for takeoff again and we proceeded. During the second takeoff we got a level 2 'generator drive fault.' this alert came on in the low speed regime of our takeoff roll and we rejected again. Our speed was around 60 KTS. We taxied to the end of the runway and by the time we were clear; the alert had cleared itself. The tire differential pressure alert was also clear. We consulted maintenance and they believed that since there were no current alerts that there was 'not much they could do for us.' we took our time reviewing the cockpit setup and I completed the checklist from after start through before takeoff; even checking the brake temperatures. All alerts were out and the ead was blank for our third takeoff. While on climb out (400 ft) we got a level 2 'generator 2 drive fault' followed by 'generator 2 off.' by 3000 ft; the generator had reset itself and the alert was clear. The epgs fault illuminated and stayed that way for the rest of the flight. In looking back at the event; I realized that I may have been removed out of my normal flow sequence due to taxiing the aircraft in a construction area. I am aware that runway incursions are a significant cause of aircraft accidents. I always try to remain heads up when taxiing in construction areas or unfamiliar airports. In trying to maintain vigilance while taxiing; in this situation; it may have been a contributing factor in not selecting flaps for takeoff. I pride myself on being a professional airman and always complete each and every checklist. A possible procedure change is to set takeoff flaps prior to aircraft movement under its own power. This may help to eliminate further events.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A MD11 CREW REPORTS TWO LOW SPD REJECTED TKOF'S; FIRST FOR FLAPS NOT SET AND THEN A GEN DRIVE WARNING. THE CREW WAS DISTRACTED BY A TIRE PRESS LOW ALERT.

Narrative: DURING TAXI OUT; A LEVEL 1 'TIRE DIFFERENTIAL PRESSURE' ILLUMINATED CONCERNING THE NOSEWHEELS. THE ALERT WAS TURNING ON AND OFF; BUT I DECIDED TO CONSULT THE ACFT OPERATING MANUAL ANYWAY IN CASE THE ALERT STAYED ON. THIS HAPPENED AT THE SAME TIME THAT THE CAPT WOULD CALL FOR THE FLAPS AND TO DO THE CTL CHK. I HAD ALREADY SELECTED THE CONFIGN PAGE TO OBSERVE THE TIRE PRESSURES. WHILE I WAS READING THE ACFT OPERATING MANUAL; THE CAPT DID HIS CTL CHK. ONCE I WAS FINISHED READING AND EXPLAINING WHAT THE AOM SAID ABOUT THE TIRE DIFFERENTIAL ALERT; I COMPLETED MY CTL CHK. MOST OF MY TKOF BRIEFING WAS DONE IN THE BLOCKS SO I HAD A FEW OTHER THINGS TO ADD AND THAT WAS IT. AT THIS TIME GND CTL GAVE US A CLRNC TO USE RWY 25R TO ACCESS RWY 25L. IT WAS DARK; RAINING AND I WAS MORE CONCERNED ABOUT HELPING THE CAPT WATCH OUTSIDE SO WE DO NOT MAKE A WRONG TURN ON AN ACTIVE RWY. DURING THIS TIME THE TIRE DIFFERENTIAL PRESSURE ALERT WAS GOING ON AND OFF. I WAS ALSO WATCHING THE PRESSURE AND TRYING TO KEEP THE ALERT LIGHT FROM BLINDING THE CAPT; MAKING A DIFFICULT NONSTANDARD TAXI WORSE. THE TIRE DIFFERENTIAL PRESSURE IS A 'NO TKOF' ALERT AND WHILE IT WAS OUT WE WERE IN A POS TO TAKE OFF. THE LIGHT WAS OUT AS WE MADE OUR TURN ONTO RWY 25L AND WERE CLRED FOR TKOF. AS TKOF PWR WAS APPLIED; THE CONFIGN WARNING ALERTED US THAT THE FLAPS WERE NOT SET FOR TKOF. WE REALIZED ALSO THAT WE NEVER DID THE BEFORE TKOF CHKLIST. WE REJECTED AT NO MORE THAN 40 KTS AND CLRED THE RWY. AFTER REVIEWING THE COCKPIT SETUP; SELECTING THE FLAPS AND COMPLETING THE CHKLIST; WE WERE READY FOR TKOF. WE WERE STILL OCCASIONALLY GETTING THE TIRE DIFFERENTIAL PRESSURE BUT NOT AS OFTEN AS BEFORE (ONCE THE TIRES WARMED UP THE ALERT SEEMED TO GO AWAY). ATC CLRED US FOR TKOF AGAIN AND WE PROCEEDED. DURING THE SECOND TKOF WE GOT A LEVEL 2 'GENERATOR DRIVE FAULT.' THIS ALERT CAME ON IN THE LOW SPD REGIME OF OUR TKOF ROLL AND WE REJECTED AGAIN. OUR SPD WAS AROUND 60 KTS. WE TAXIED TO THE END OF THE RWY AND BY THE TIME WE WERE CLR; THE ALERT HAD CLRED ITSELF. THE TIRE DIFFERENTIAL PRESSURE ALERT WAS ALSO CLR. WE CONSULTED MAINT AND THEY BELIEVED THAT SINCE THERE WERE NO CURRENT ALERTS THAT THERE WAS 'NOT MUCH THEY COULD DO FOR US.' WE TOOK OUR TIME REVIEWING THE COCKPIT SETUP AND I COMPLETED THE CHKLIST FROM AFTER START THROUGH BEFORE TKOF; EVEN CHKING THE BRAKE TEMPS. ALL ALERTS WERE OUT AND THE EAD WAS BLANK FOR OUR THIRD TKOF. WHILE ON CLBOUT (400 FT) WE GOT A LEVEL 2 'GENERATOR 2 DRIVE FAULT' FOLLOWED BY 'GENERATOR 2 OFF.' BY 3000 FT; THE GENERATOR HAD RESET ITSELF AND THE ALERT WAS CLR. THE EPGS FAULT ILLUMINATED AND STAYED THAT WAY FOR THE REST OF THE FLT. IN LOOKING BACK AT THE EVENT; I REALIZED THAT I MAY HAVE BEEN REMOVED OUT OF MY NORMAL FLOW SEQUENCE DUE TO TAXIING THE ACFT IN A CONSTRUCTION AREA. I AM AWARE THAT RWY INCURSIONS ARE A SIGNIFICANT CAUSE OF ACFT ACCIDENTS. I ALWAYS TRY TO REMAIN HEADS UP WHEN TAXIING IN CONSTRUCTION AREAS OR UNFAMILIAR ARPTS. IN TRYING TO MAINTAIN VIGILANCE WHILE TAXIING; IN THIS SITUATION; IT MAY HAVE BEEN A CONTRIBUTING FACTOR IN NOT SELECTING FLAPS FOR TKOF. I PRIDE MYSELF ON BEING A PROFESSIONAL AIRMAN AND ALWAYS COMPLETE EACH AND EVERY CHKLIST. A POSSIBLE PROC CHANGE IS TO SET TKOF FLAPS PRIOR TO ACFT MOVEMENT UNDER ITS OWN PWR. THIS MAY HELP TO ELIMINATE FURTHER EVENTS.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of May 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.