|37000 Feet||Browse and search NASA's
Aviation Safety Reporting System
|Locale Reference||airport : den|
|Altitude||agl bound lower : 3000|
agl bound upper : 3000
|Controlling Facilities||tracon : den|
|Operator||common carrier : air carrier|
|Make Model Name||Medium Large Transport, Low Wing, 2 Turbojet Eng|
|Flight Phase||descent : approach|
|Route In Use||enroute : on vectors|
|Affiliation||company : air carrier|
|Function||flight crew : first officer|
|Qualification||pilot : atp|
|Experience||flight time last 90 days : 60|
flight time total : 6500
flight time type : 200
|Function||flight crew : captain|
oversight : pic
|Qualification||pilot : atp|
|Anomaly||other anomaly other|
other spatial deviation
|Independent Detector||other flight crewa|
|Primary Problem||Flight Crew Human Performance|
|Air Traffic Incident||other|
Den stapleton was landing runways 8 when we first checked ATIS during des. We were subsequently advised to hold at ramah, (see the profile des) as den had shut off all arrs. After nearly 30 mins of holding we were notified via ATIS that den stapleton was switching landing runways to 26L & right. Shortly we were clrd for the profile and advised to plan runway 35R. Upon tuning for the localizer I incorrectly set the frequency for the left runway (35L). As I was unable to identify the localizer (35L was apparently not on the air), the captain tuned his receiver and made the same error I had--that is he set the frequency for 35L. Neither of us caught the error until after we were clrd for the approach. In discussing the whole episode with the captain later I was not at all surprised that he had been led into the error the same way I had--when checking the approach plate I had looked at the righthand page (runway 35L) instead of the lefthand page (runway 35R). I believe 3 factors contributed to this incident: no communication from ATC allowing us time to properly orient ourselves to the approach plan. The runway changes were not announced by approach control. Only when we received our vector to final were we advised of which runway to plan. The layout of the approach plates for runways 35R and 35L in our commercial chart manual is illogical! Why not print the sequence so that the 35R approach is the righthand page and the 35L approach plate is the lefthand page? General unfamiliarity with this approach. I had used this approach only once before within the previous several months. Significant is the fact that both the captain and myself made the same error.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: ACR MLG FLT CREW TUNED WRONG ILS FREQ.
Narrative: DEN STAPLETON WAS LNDG RWYS 8 WHEN WE FIRST CHKED ATIS DURING DES. WE WERE SUBSEQUENTLY ADVISED TO HOLD AT RAMAH, (SEE THE PROFILE DES) AS DEN HAD SHUT OFF ALL ARRS. AFTER NEARLY 30 MINS OF HOLDING WE WERE NOTIFIED VIA ATIS THAT DEN STAPLETON WAS SWITCHING LNDG RWYS TO 26L & R. SHORTLY WE WERE CLRD FOR THE PROFILE AND ADVISED TO PLAN RWY 35R. UPON TUNING FOR THE LOC I INCORRECTLY SET THE FREQ FOR THE LEFT RWY (35L). AS I WAS UNABLE TO IDENTIFY THE LOC (35L WAS APPARENTLY NOT ON THE AIR), THE CAPT TUNED HIS RECEIVER AND MADE THE SAME ERROR I HAD--THAT IS HE SET THE FREQ FOR 35L. NEITHER OF US CAUGHT THE ERROR UNTIL AFTER WE WERE CLRD FOR THE APCH. IN DISCUSSING THE WHOLE EPISODE WITH THE CAPT LATER I WAS NOT AT ALL SURPRISED THAT HE HAD BEEN LED INTO THE ERROR THE SAME WAY I HAD--WHEN CHKING THE APCH PLATE I HAD LOOKED AT THE RIGHTHAND PAGE (RWY 35L) INSTEAD OF THE LEFTHAND PAGE (RWY 35R). I BELIEVE 3 FACTORS CONTRIBUTED TO THIS INCIDENT: NO COM FROM ATC ALLOWING US TIME TO PROPERLY ORIENT OURSELVES TO THE APCH PLAN. THE RWY CHANGES WERE NOT ANNOUNCED BY APCH CTL. ONLY WHEN WE RECEIVED OUR VECTOR TO FINAL WERE WE ADVISED OF WHICH RWY TO PLAN. THE LAYOUT OF THE APCH PLATES FOR RWYS 35R AND 35L IN OUR COMMERCIAL CHART MANUAL IS ILLOGICAL! WHY NOT PRINT THE SEQUENCE SO THAT THE 35R APCH IS THE RIGHTHAND PAGE AND THE 35L APCH PLATE IS THE LEFTHAND PAGE? GENERAL UNFAMILIARITY WITH THIS APCH. I HAD USED THIS APCH ONLY ONCE BEFORE WITHIN THE PREVIOUS SEVERAL MONTHS. SIGNIFICANT IS THE FACT THAT BOTH THE CAPT AND MYSELF MADE THE SAME ERROR.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of August 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.