Narrative:

I rejected our takeoff at 60 KTS for a master caution and tire failure message. The warning and message cleared as I decelerated the aircraft and exited the runway. We simultaneously ran the checklist for the message and pulled up the synoptic display and there was no indication of any problem. I notified dispatch and got them in the loop because we were right at takeoff fuel. We got an artr for a new alternate which allowed us to press on with a lower takeoff fuel to save time. We referred to the brake cooling chart as well and we had no cooling time to consider. I looked at the decision matrix. Because the problem had cleared itself and I determined via the confign synoptic display that the aircraft was ok I felt we should depart as expeditiously as possible; we did not contact maintenance. I was not aware that the flight manual required me to. I was trying to get out as close to on time as possible and not burn excess fuel. I was also considering the long duty day we had and knew that if we had to go back in for fuel we were more than likely going to be unable to operate the flight.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: AN ACR CREW RPTS REJECTING A TKOF FOR A 'TIRE PRESS LOW' ECAM THAT EXTINGUISHED. THE FLT DEPARTED AFTER THE FAULT CLEARED.

Narrative: I REJECTED OUR TKOF AT 60 KTS FOR A MASTER CAUTION AND TIRE FAILURE MESSAGE. THE WARNING AND MESSAGE CLRED AS I DECELERATED THE ACFT AND EXITED THE RWY. WE SIMULTANEOUSLY RAN THE CHKLIST FOR THE MESSAGE AND PULLED UP THE SYNOPTIC DISPLAY AND THERE WAS NO INDICATION OF ANY PROB. I NOTIFIED DISPATCH AND GOT THEM IN THE LOOP BECAUSE WE WERE RIGHT AT TKOF FUEL. WE GOT AN ARTR FOR A NEW ALTERNATE WHICH ALLOWED US TO PRESS ON WITH A LOWER TKOF FUEL TO SAVE TIME. WE REFERRED TO THE BRAKE COOLING CHART AS WELL AND WE HAD NO COOLING TIME TO CONSIDER. I LOOKED AT THE DECISION MATRIX. BECAUSE THE PROB HAD CLRED ITSELF AND I DETERMINED VIA THE CONFIGN SYNOPTIC DISPLAY THAT THE ACFT WAS OK I FELT WE SHOULD DEPART AS EXPEDITIOUSLY AS POSSIBLE; WE DID NOT CONTACT MAINT. I WAS NOT AWARE THAT THE FLT MANUAL REQUIRED ME TO. I WAS TRYING TO GET OUT AS CLOSE TO ON TIME AS POSSIBLE AND NOT BURN EXCESS FUEL. I WAS ALSO CONSIDERING THE LONG DUTY DAY WE HAD AND KNEW THAT IF WE HAD TO GO BACK IN FOR FUEL WE WERE MORE THAN LIKELY GOING TO BE UNABLE TO OPERATE THE FLT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of May 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.