Narrative:

My first officer and I readied the cockpit for the flight. We had an FAA inspector on board in the observer's seat. We pushed on time and were given clearance to start engines. We began with the left engine. We had no light off on the engine so we then proceeded with the SOP for an irregular start. After switching igniters; we were then able to start the left engine and subsequently the right engine. We taxied out of the area and did our checks. We also wrote up the incident and talked with dispatch and maintenance about a deferral. That took a little time at the end of the runway. After receiving a new maintenance release; and doing our checks; we ran the before takeoff checklist and taxied up to the end of the runway. We were then cleared for takeoff. I advanced the thrust levers with normal indications and began our takeoff roll. '80 KTS; thrust set' was called and after a few seconds; my first officer announced 'low oil pressure.' a quick glance of the upper EICAS revealed an amber message 'left (or right..) eng low oil pressure.' I elected to immediately abort the takeoff at 90 KTS. The rejected takeoff autobrakes kicked on and the aircraft slowed immediately. At such a slow speed; I did not use the reverse thrust as it was not needed. I managed to get the autobrakes selector turned off at some point so we could taxi up to and exit from a runway intersection. Because we used rejected takeoff brakes; I wanted to keep from using the brakes any more than necessary; so I continued a slow taxi. We elected to taxi back to the gate to have the brakes checked and investigate what happened with the EICAS warning. Oddly enough; as we began the rejected takeoff; the message disappeared and both engines showed ample oil quantity and pressure. There was some question about which engine was involved. My first officer thought he saw 'left eng low oil pressure'; while in my quick glance I thought I saw 'right.' our jumpseater also thought he saw 'right..' as well. The EICAS indication was brief as it extinguished when we aborted. The maintenance required for our situation ultimately resulted in cancelling the flight. As of this writing; I still do not know why we got that amber message. Our FAA inspector said he thought our actions were quite appropriate for the conditions. We got the EICAS message but no upper glareshield warning as it was inhibited. A warning like that seemed prudent enough for me to abort the takeoff since we really didn't know what condition our engine was in. The engine ran just fine on taxi in and all indications normal at that point. In later reflection of our actions during the event; we made several observations. I was perhaps a little slow in getting my first officer to call the cabin about the situation. I do remember consciously wanting to not stop the airplane; before we could talk to the flight attendants. Things were quite busy in the cockpit as we were clearing the runway as ATC was asking about our intentions; and there was other jet traffic on the taxiway. In the training environment; we are more spring loaded to high speed aborts and V1 cuts; and are therefore ready to make all the necessary cabin calls; including 'remain seated'. In this real world event however with such a relatively slow airspeed abort; calling the cabin was not at the top of the list. I was more preoccupied with getting the autobrakes turned off and making our way up to an exit point from the runway. With all the other distracters such as ATC; it just took a little longer to call the flight attendants than perhaps it should have. In talking with the flight attendants later about this event; they said they were of course; spring loaded to starting an evacuation; and were obviously anxious until we called them. They did say however that because the airplane was still moving slowly (as we continued our taxi); that they were slowly ratcheting down. As time allowed though; we did call the cabin; and also made a PA to the passengersabout what had just transpired. Also in reflection of this event; I wanted my first officer's perspective. He said that after he announced the EICAS message; he was a bit surprised at the quick abort. Maybe startled was more the case here. For that matter so was I. I suppose I wasn't expecting the rejected takeoff autobrakes at such a slow speed; so was I bit startled as well. I can testify that they work just fine! We talked about the decision to abort for this indication; and ultimately decided that it was still an appropriate response for what we saw; even though we were technically in the high speed regime (more than 80 KTS); we were still slow enough with lots of runway remaining; and this seemed the safer course of action.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A B757-200 flight crew reported rejecting a takeoff at 90 KTS after a low oil pressure warning alerted. The crew and observer could not determine which engine annunciated because the warning extinguished when the reject started.

Narrative: My First Officer and I readied the cockpit for the flight. We had an FAA Inspector on board in the observer's seat. We pushed on time and were given clearance to start engines. We began with the left engine. We had no light off on the engine so we then proceeded with the SOP for an irregular start. After switching igniters; we were then able to start the left engine and subsequently the right engine. We taxied out of the area and did our checks. We also wrote up the incident and talked with Dispatch and Maintenance about a deferral. That took a little time at the end of the runway. After receiving a new maintenance release; and doing our checks; we ran the before takeoff checklist and taxied up to the end of the runway. We were then cleared for takeoff. I advanced the thrust levers with normal indications and began our takeoff roll. '80 KTS; thrust set' was called and after a few seconds; my First Officer announced 'low oil pressure.' A quick glance of the upper EICAS revealed an amber message 'left (or right..) eng low oil pressure.' I elected to immediately abort the takeoff at 90 KTS. The rejected takeoff autobrakes kicked on and the aircraft slowed immediately. At such a slow speed; I did not use the reverse thrust as it was not needed. I managed to get the autobrakes selector turned off at some point so we could taxi up to and exit from a runway intersection. Because we used rejected takeoff brakes; I wanted to keep from using the brakes any more than necessary; so I continued a slow taxi. We elected to taxi back to the gate to have the brakes checked and investigate what happened with the EICAS warning. Oddly enough; as we began the rejected takeoff; the message disappeared and both engines showed ample oil quantity and pressure. There was some question about which engine was involved. My First Officer thought he saw 'left eng low oil pressure'; while in my quick glance I thought I saw 'right.' Our jumpseater also thought he saw 'right..' as well. The EICAS indication was brief as it extinguished when we aborted. The maintenance required for our situation ultimately resulted in cancelling the flight. As of this writing; I still do not know why we got that amber message. Our FAA Inspector said he thought our actions were quite appropriate for the conditions. We got the EICAS message but no upper glareshield warning as it was inhibited. A warning like that seemed prudent enough for me to abort the takeoff since we really didn't know what condition our engine was in. The engine ran just fine on taxi in and all indications normal at that point. In later reflection of our actions during the event; we made several observations. I was perhaps a little slow in getting my First Officer to call the cabin about the situation. I do remember consciously wanting to not stop the airplane; before we could talk to the flight attendants. Things were quite busy in the cockpit as we were clearing the runway as ATC was asking about our intentions; and there was other jet traffic on the taxiway. In the training environment; we are more spring loaded to high speed aborts and V1 cuts; and are therefore ready to make all the necessary cabin calls; including 'remain seated'. In this real world event however with such a relatively slow airspeed abort; calling the cabin was not at the top of the list. I was more preoccupied with getting the autobrakes turned off and making our way up to an exit point from the runway. With all the other distracters such as ATC; it just took a little longer to call the flight attendants than perhaps it should have. In talking with the flight attendants later about this event; they said they were of course; spring loaded to starting an evacuation; and were obviously anxious until we called them. They did say however that because the airplane was still moving slowly (as we continued our taxi); that they were slowly ratcheting down. As time allowed though; we did call the cabin; and also made a PA to the passengersabout what had just transpired. Also in reflection of this event; I wanted my First Officer's perspective. He said that after he announced the EICAS message; he was a bit surprised at the quick abort. Maybe startled was more the case here. For that matter so was I. I suppose I wasn't expecting the rejected takeoff autobrakes at such a slow speed; so was I bit startled as well. I can testify that they work just fine! We talked about the decision to abort for this indication; and ultimately decided that it was still an appropriate response for what we saw; even though we were technically in the high speed regime (more than 80 KTS); we were still slow enough with lots of runway remaining; and this seemed the safer course of action.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.