Narrative:

Pilot fatigue from 5 leg; 2 day trip. Each leg started with an early morning departure and was scheduled with a near maximum duty day. There were significant maintenance issues with each leg. There were also delays associated with the maintenance issues. Each leg of the trip was as if we were taking a pc at the training center. Only difference; a pilot takes just 1 pc a day. It is as if the preflight review of the maintenance paperwork and the walkarounds were loaded with lots of deferred items. On the last day of the trip; after a 3+ hour situation in ZZZ before our last leg home (and yes; another maintenance issue) I was exhausted (but not realizing it yet). The flight culminated with an aborted landing in dca from a tower directed go around (because of a departing aircraft on the runway). It was apparent how tired I was during the last min go around (rejected landing). The procedural calls came out of my mouth (I think); but the go around was less than pretty. The PNF was a minimum time (very new) first officer. I (as PF) was not prepared for the go around and it was very ugly. After the next approach; the landing and gate arrival were non eventful. Reflecting back on the last few mins of the last flight into dca; it was apparent from the go around to landing; we accomplished no (zero) checklists; no re-brief of the new approach; and it was flown completely nonstandard and single pilot. I would estimate from the go around to touchdown was about 5 mins (if that). There was no time for the FMGC nor runway/approach to be reloaded into the box. The 'emergency cancel' had to be used to silence the flap warning (full flaps with the gear up from the botched go around procedure) and the final approach speed was a 'wag' since the FMGC was not properly set up and hence 'managed speed' was not accurate. The go around was not meant to be a single pilot operation; but with my fatigue level; it was all I could do to fly the jet. I was so busy flying; I was not able to direct the first officer to do what is pretty much SOP in that case. The first officer is a very competent pilot; just new and not adequately trained for what had just happened. During my drive home; I called and debriefed the dca tower supervisor (great job on their end; by the way). I also called pilot crew scheduling to inform them I was fatigued and would not make my next; very early morning; departure in 2 days.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A320 CAPTAIN DESCRIBES BREAKDOWN IN FLT CREW FUNCTION ATTRIBUTABLE TO FATIGUE GENERATED BY LENGTHY FIVE DAY FLT SEQUENCE COMBINED WITH MULTIPLE DELAYS AND MECHANICALS. A CONTRIBUTING FACTOR WAS A VERY INEXPERIENCED FO.

Narrative: PLT FATIGUE FROM 5 LEG; 2 DAY TRIP. EACH LEG STARTED WITH AN EARLY MORNING DEP AND WAS SCHEDULED WITH A NEAR MAX DUTY DAY. THERE WERE SIGNIFICANT MAINT ISSUES WITH EACH LEG. THERE WERE ALSO DELAYS ASSOCIATED WITH THE MAINT ISSUES. EACH LEG OF THE TRIP WAS AS IF WE WERE TAKING A PC AT THE TRAINING CTR. ONLY DIFFERENCE; A PLT TAKES JUST 1 PC A DAY. IT IS AS IF THE PREFLT REVIEW OF THE MAINT PAPERWORK AND THE WALKAROUNDS WERE LOADED WITH LOTS OF DEFERRED ITEMS. ON THE LAST DAY OF THE TRIP; AFTER A 3+ HR SIT IN ZZZ BEFORE OUR LAST LEG HOME (AND YES; ANOTHER MAINT ISSUE) I WAS EXHAUSTED (BUT NOT REALIZING IT YET). THE FLT CULMINATED WITH AN ABORTED LNDG IN DCA FROM A TWR DIRECTED GAR (BECAUSE OF A DEPARTING ACFT ON THE RWY). IT WAS APPARENT HOW TIRED I WAS DURING THE LAST MIN GAR (REJECTED LNDG). THE PROCEDURAL CALLS CAME OUT OF MY MOUTH (I THINK); BUT THE GAR WAS LESS THAN PRETTY. THE PNF WAS A MINIMUM TIME (VERY NEW) FO. I (AS PF) WAS NOT PREPARED FOR THE GAR AND IT WAS VERY UGLY. AFTER THE NEXT APCH; THE LNDG AND GATE ARR WERE NON EVENTFUL. REFLECTING BACK ON THE LAST FEW MINS OF THE LAST FLT INTO DCA; IT WAS APPARENT FROM THE GAR TO LNDG; WE ACCOMPLISHED NO (ZERO) CHKLISTS; NO RE-BRIEF OF THE NEW APCH; AND IT WAS FLOWN COMPLETELY NONSTANDARD AND SINGLE PLT. I WOULD ESTIMATE FROM THE GAR TO TOUCHDOWN WAS ABOUT 5 MINS (IF THAT). THERE WAS NO TIME FOR THE FMGC NOR RWY/APCH TO BE RELOADED INTO THE BOX. THE 'EMER CANCEL' HAD TO BE USED TO SILENCE THE FLAP WARNING (FULL FLAPS WITH THE GEAR UP FROM THE BOTCHED GAR PROC) AND THE FINAL APCH SPD WAS A 'WAG' SINCE THE FMGC WAS NOT PROPERLY SET UP AND HENCE 'MANAGED SPD' WAS NOT ACCURATE. THE GAR WAS NOT MEANT TO BE A SINGLE PLT OP; BUT WITH MY FATIGUE LEVEL; IT WAS ALL I COULD DO TO FLY THE JET. I WAS SO BUSY FLYING; I WAS NOT ABLE TO DIRECT THE FO TO DO WHAT IS PRETTY MUCH SOP IN THAT CASE. THE FO IS A VERY COMPETENT PLT; JUST NEW AND NOT ADEQUATELY TRAINED FOR WHAT HAD JUST HAPPENED. DURING MY DRIVE HOME; I CALLED AND DEBRIEFED THE DCA TWR SUPVR (GREAT JOB ON THEIR END; BY THE WAY). I ALSO CALLED PLT CREW SCHEDULING TO INFORM THEM I WAS FATIGUED AND WOULD NOT MAKE MY NEXT; VERY EARLY MORNING; DEP IN 2 DAYS.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of May 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.