Narrative:

While en route on the arrival into ZZZ; we had a message on ACARS to contact ZZZ. The first officer contacted ZZZ operations and was informed of an aircraft swap with that aircraft along with several gate changes. There was confusion on the operations frequency which caused a longer than normal time frame for this occurrence. When I returned to ATC communication I informed the captain of what was going on and that I was back with him. At this point ATC questioned us if we were going to make the fix at 9000 ft. Having just come back to the scene; I asked the captain if we could; in which he said; 'yes.' I relayed that to ATC. At this point I noticed we had speed brakes extended at the fastest rate of descent the aircraft would be able to perform. ATC then asked again if we were going to make the crossing. The captain told me to tell them yes and that it shouldn't be a problem. My quick take on the scenario was that we wouldn't; but understood that the captain had much more experience with the aircraft and trusted his calculation over mine. At that point ATC changed our frequency to approach and there was a frequency block when I was trying to relay to the center controller. I finally just changed frequencys on my own and checked in with approach. At this point I noticed our miss by approximately 1500 ft and were 320 KTS going through 10000 ft for the leveloff at 9000 ft. Approach instructed us to maintain 250 KTS and a min later gave us a radar vector. The captain queried ATC about the event and ATC responded that we were high on the crossing and appeared to be fast. No other aircraft seemed conflicted with our event. The entire event happened extremely quick with little time for crew member interaction coupled with the communication changes and frequency change. Another threat was CRM breakdown between us; coupled with an artificial pressure to make the crossing restr causing 'tunnel vision' and lowering our situational awareness. Better CRM and situational awareness especially with 1 pilot doing other duties needed to occur. I; as the first officer should have spoken up more on my calculation for descent instead of trusting my captain's completely.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ATC QUERIED A CREW ABOUT A CROSSING RESTRICTION COMPLIANCE WHICH THE CAPT AFFIRMED THEY WOULD MAKE. THEY MISSED THE RESTRICTION AND WERE VECTORED.

Narrative: WHILE ENRTE ON THE ARR INTO ZZZ; WE HAD A MESSAGE ON ACARS TO CONTACT ZZZ. THE FO CONTACTED ZZZ OPS AND WAS INFORMED OF AN ACFT SWAP WITH THAT ACFT ALONG WITH SEVERAL GATE CHANGES. THERE WAS CONFUSION ON THE OPS FREQ WHICH CAUSED A LONGER THAN NORMAL TIME FRAME FOR THIS OCCURRENCE. WHEN I RETURNED TO ATC COM I INFORMED THE CAPT OF WHAT WAS GOING ON AND THAT I WAS BACK WITH HIM. AT THIS POINT ATC QUESTIONED US IF WE WERE GOING TO MAKE THE FIX AT 9000 FT. HAVING JUST COME BACK TO THE SCENE; I ASKED THE CAPT IF WE COULD; IN WHICH HE SAID; 'YES.' I RELAYED THAT TO ATC. AT THIS POINT I NOTICED WE HAD SPD BRAKES EXTENDED AT THE FASTEST RATE OF DSCNT THE ACFT WOULD BE ABLE TO PERFORM. ATC THEN ASKED AGAIN IF WE WERE GOING TO MAKE THE XING. THE CAPT TOLD ME TO TELL THEM YES AND THAT IT SHOULDN'T BE A PROB. MY QUICK TAKE ON THE SCENARIO WAS THAT WE WOULDN'T; BUT UNDERSTOOD THAT THE CAPT HAD MUCH MORE EXPERIENCE WITH THE ACFT AND TRUSTED HIS CALCULATION OVER MINE. AT THAT POINT ATC CHANGED OUR FREQ TO APCH AND THERE WAS A FREQ BLOCK WHEN I WAS TRYING TO RELAY TO THE CTR CTLR. I FINALLY JUST CHANGED FREQS ON MY OWN AND CHKED IN WITH APCH. AT THIS POINT I NOTICED OUR MISS BY APPROX 1500 FT AND WERE 320 KTS GOING THROUGH 10000 FT FOR THE LEVELOFF AT 9000 FT. APCH INSTRUCTED US TO MAINTAIN 250 KTS AND A MIN LATER GAVE US A RADAR VECTOR. THE CAPT QUERIED ATC ABOUT THE EVENT AND ATC RESPONDED THAT WE WERE HIGH ON THE XING AND APPEARED TO BE FAST. NO OTHER ACFT SEEMED CONFLICTED WITH OUR EVENT. THE ENTIRE EVENT HAPPENED EXTREMELY QUICK WITH LITTLE TIME FOR CREW MEMBER INTERACTION COUPLED WITH THE COM CHANGES AND FREQ CHANGE. ANOTHER THREAT WAS CRM BREAKDOWN BTWN US; COUPLED WITH AN ARTIFICIAL PRESSURE TO MAKE THE XING RESTR CAUSING 'TUNNEL VISION' AND LOWERING OUR SITUATIONAL AWARENESS. BETTER CRM AND SITUATIONAL AWARENESS ESPECIALLY WITH 1 PLT DOING OTHER DUTIES NEEDED TO OCCUR. I; AS THE FO SHOULD HAVE SPOKEN UP MORE ON MY CALCULATION FOR DSCNT INSTEAD OF TRUSTING MY CAPT'S COMPLETELY.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of May 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.