Narrative:

After we secured the aircraft for departure; before push or engine start; the aircraft indicated a left side bleed leak with a light and ECAM procedure. We followed the ECAM procedures. At this time; I told the mechanic on the headset that we had a bleed leak light. He suggested that this was an airbus anomaly associated with the high outside temperature and that simply turning off the bleed valve for a few mins; then restoring it would tell if this was an anomaly; or an actual leak. I said at that time I needed more time to complete the flight manual information; and evaluate the problem. The mechanic then again interrupted that it was probably an anomaly associated with the high outside temperature; and if I would restore the air and turn the valve back on; that we would see if it was an actual leak; and could block out if the light did not come back on. I resisted this and continued with the flight manual. I have previously had a similar situation on an aircraft in the heat at ZZZ1 where the outside high temperature had been the environmental situation where the system detected a leak that had been ongoing; and felt that this needed to be evaluated. I needed to complete the flight manual supplemental information and I was not confident that this was an anomaly. The mechanic then stated that if I insisted on this route; that I should open the door. The flight manual stated and underlined in bold face in the supplemental information; that a primary bleed leak detection would extinguish with the air source removed and do not reapply air to the system. The mechanic then immediately entered the aircraft; and saw that the APU bleed valve was off; and stated that we would not know if I did not reapply the air. I felt at this time that I was not confident or comfortable with advice from the mechanic to do this; and he demanded that if I would not follow his course of action; that we were on a delay; and I needed to enter this in the logbook. I did enter this item in the logbook. I would like to state at this time that I felt that the mechanic's actions would have possibly pressured another crew to re-establish the airflow; which may or may not have again shown a bleed leak; and the crew would have continued the block out. I felt that I needed to continue the flight manual procedure checklist and subsequent need to reference the flight manual supplemental information following the flight manual procedure. I felt that the mechanic's insistence that simply turning the bleed valve off then back on and restoring the airflow was contrary to my flight manual guidance; and was the wrong course of action. At the point that the mechanic came into the aircraft; his was obvious agitation with us not following his recommended procedures; even as I was trying to evaluate the proper course via the flight manual was a very unsafe atmosphere. While I respect the necessity of operating an efficient operation; and I respect that mechanics know much more about the aircraft system than me; as a captain; I am not going to endanger my crew or aircraft by being rushed to make a decision based on the idea that something as major as a primary bleed leak warning is a suspected airbus anomaly. The mechanic left; and shortly 3 different mechanics arrived at the aircraft. I asked what was going on; and they stated they were here to fix our aircraft. These mechanics then checked the fault codes; which indicated a leak at the left wing; and performed an inspection which confirmed a blown duct seal and an actual bleed leak in the left wing root. The flight ended up canceled because of the mechanical; and I approached and thanked the mechanics for their respect and diligence in investigating the problem; and the discovery of the wing bleed leak. While I will state that communication over the headset is difficult; the mechanic's actions were not what I expected in the support of a safe operational environment. I found the mechanic unwilling to listen to my communication of the problem. His interruptions and insistence on following his own course of action; even in the case of my request for a couple of more mins to evaluate our own procedures as necessary via our guidance; as improper and unsafe.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: AN A300 ECAM INDICATED A LEFT SIDE BLEED LEAK. MECHANIC ATTEMPTED TO TALK THE CAPT INTO ALTERNATE PROCEDURES TO PREVENT A DELAY. A BLOWN LEFT WING DUCT WAS DISCOVERED.

Narrative: AFTER WE SECURED THE ACFT FOR DEP; BEFORE PUSH OR ENG START; THE ACFT INDICATED A L SIDE BLEED LEAK WITH A LIGHT AND ECAM PROC. WE FOLLOWED THE ECAM PROCS. AT THIS TIME; I TOLD THE MECH ON THE HEADSET THAT WE HAD A BLEED LEAK LIGHT. HE SUGGESTED THAT THIS WAS AN AIRBUS ANOMALY ASSOCIATED WITH THE HIGH OUTSIDE TEMP AND THAT SIMPLY TURNING OFF THE BLEED VALVE FOR A FEW MINS; THEN RESTORING IT WOULD TELL IF THIS WAS AN ANOMALY; OR AN ACTUAL LEAK. I SAID AT THAT TIME I NEEDED MORE TIME TO COMPLETE THE FLT MANUAL INFO; AND EVALUATE THE PROB. THE MECH THEN AGAIN INTERRUPTED THAT IT WAS PROBABLY AN ANOMALY ASSOCIATED WITH THE HIGH OUTSIDE TEMP; AND IF I WOULD RESTORE THE AIR AND TURN THE VALVE BACK ON; THAT WE WOULD SEE IF IT WAS AN ACTUAL LEAK; AND COULD BLOCK OUT IF THE LIGHT DID NOT COME BACK ON. I RESISTED THIS AND CONTINUED WITH THE FLT MANUAL. I HAVE PREVIOUSLY HAD A SIMILAR SITUATION ON AN ACFT IN THE HEAT AT ZZZ1 WHERE THE OUTSIDE HIGH TEMP HAD BEEN THE ENVIRONMENTAL SITUATION WHERE THE SYS DETECTED A LEAK THAT HAD BEEN ONGOING; AND FELT THAT THIS NEEDED TO BE EVALUATED. I NEEDED TO COMPLETE THE FLT MANUAL SUPPLEMENTAL INFO AND I WAS NOT CONFIDENT THAT THIS WAS AN ANOMALY. THE MECH THEN STATED THAT IF I INSISTED ON THIS RTE; THAT I SHOULD OPEN THE DOOR. THE FLT MANUAL STATED AND UNDERLINED IN BOLD FACE IN THE SUPPLEMENTAL INFO; THAT A PRIMARY BLEED LEAK DETECTION WOULD EXTINGUISH WITH THE AIR SOURCE REMOVED AND DO NOT REAPPLY AIR TO THE SYS. THE MECH THEN IMMEDIATELY ENTERED THE ACFT; AND SAW THAT THE APU BLEED VALVE WAS OFF; AND STATED THAT WE WOULD NOT KNOW IF I DID NOT REAPPLY THE AIR. I FELT AT THIS TIME THAT I WAS NOT CONFIDENT OR COMFORTABLE WITH ADVICE FROM THE MECH TO DO THIS; AND HE DEMANDED THAT IF I WOULD NOT FOLLOW HIS COURSE OF ACTION; THAT WE WERE ON A DELAY; AND I NEEDED TO ENTER THIS IN THE LOGBOOK. I DID ENTER THIS ITEM IN THE LOGBOOK. I WOULD LIKE TO STATE AT THIS TIME THAT I FELT THAT THE MECH'S ACTIONS WOULD HAVE POSSIBLY PRESSURED ANOTHER CREW TO RE-ESTABLISH THE AIRFLOW; WHICH MAY OR MAY NOT HAVE AGAIN SHOWN A BLEED LEAK; AND THE CREW WOULD HAVE CONTINUED THE BLOCK OUT. I FELT THAT I NEEDED TO CONTINUE THE FLT MANUAL PROC CHKLIST AND SUBSEQUENT NEED TO REF THE FLT MANUAL SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FOLLOWING THE FLT MANUAL PROC. I FELT THAT THE MECH'S INSISTENCE THAT SIMPLY TURNING THE BLEED VALVE OFF THEN BACK ON AND RESTORING THE AIRFLOW WAS CONTRARY TO MY FLT MANUAL GUIDANCE; AND WAS THE WRONG COURSE OF ACTION. AT THE POINT THAT THE MECH CAME INTO THE ACFT; HIS WAS OBVIOUS AGITATION WITH US NOT FOLLOWING HIS RECOMMENDED PROCS; EVEN AS I WAS TRYING TO EVALUATE THE PROPER COURSE VIA THE FLT MANUAL WAS A VERY UNSAFE ATMOSPHERE. WHILE I RESPECT THE NECESSITY OF OPERATING AN EFFICIENT OP; AND I RESPECT THAT MECHS KNOW MUCH MORE ABOUT THE ACFT SYS THAN ME; AS A CAPT; I AM NOT GOING TO ENDANGER MY CREW OR ACFT BY BEING RUSHED TO MAKE A DECISION BASED ON THE IDEA THAT SOMETHING AS MAJOR AS A PRIMARY BLEED LEAK WARNING IS A SUSPECTED AIRBUS ANOMALY. THE MECH LEFT; AND SHORTLY 3 DIFFERENT MECHS ARRIVED AT THE ACFT. I ASKED WHAT WAS GOING ON; AND THEY STATED THEY WERE HERE TO FIX OUR ACFT. THESE MECHS THEN CHKED THE FAULT CODES; WHICH INDICATED A LEAK AT THE L WING; AND PERFORMED AN INSPECTION WHICH CONFIRMED A BLOWN DUCT SEAL AND AN ACTUAL BLEED LEAK IN THE L WING ROOT. THE FLT ENDED UP CANCELED BECAUSE OF THE MECHANICAL; AND I APPROACHED AND THANKED THE MECHS FOR THEIR RESPECT AND DILIGENCE IN INVESTIGATING THE PROB; AND THE DISCOVERY OF THE WING BLEED LEAK. WHILE I WILL STATE THAT COM OVER THE HEADSET IS DIFFICULT; THE MECH'S ACTIONS WERE NOT WHAT I EXPECTED IN THE SUPPORT OF A SAFE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT. I FOUND THE MECH UNWILLING TO LISTEN TO MY COM OF THE PROB. HIS INTERRUPTIONS AND INSISTENCE ON FOLLOWING HIS OWN COURSE OF ACTION; EVEN IN THE CASE OF MY REQUEST FOR A COUPLE OF MORE MINS TO EVALUATE OUR OWN PROCS AS NECESSARY VIA OUR GUIDANCE; AS IMPROPER AND UNSAFE.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of May 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.