Narrative:

The problem with this flight originated on the turn from smf back to ZZZ. The captain went to get the paperwork and I did the walkaround and started the preflight programming. The gate agent had come down to ask if he could load early for an early departure. The captain said that should not be a problem; especially since it was a red-eye and it would be good to get back early. At no time did operations; the gate agent; ground crew; or anyone else tell us that our airplane was not the one returning to ZZZ. Someone either in dispatch or maintenance should have informed the station and the crew of the last second plane swap. I could not get the ACARS to initialize. Once the captain returned; I informed him of the problem. He looked at the initialization which showed the plane going from smf to ZZZ; however; the wrong employee numbers were listed. The captain manually entered our employee numbers into the FMS. He indicated that it was ok and we would just have to update it manually. In addition; I looked at my pairing printout and it showed the same aircraft returning to ZZZ. Evidently complacency crept into the cockpit or I would have insisted on verifying our tail number from the release. Due to my inexperience with the ACARS (first time this has happened) I feel like this problem should never have happened; and in the future it will not happen again. Our pre departure clearance also did not show up and at this point I thought something was wrong. The captain told me to obtain the clearance; which I did; and we verified the routing. The next chain of events was the weights would not load. At this point we were ready to push and the captain asked if I was ok with getting the numbers on the taxi out and entering them when we were in a sterile zone before takeoff. I said I was ok with that decision. In hindsight and because of my lack of knowledge with the ACARS programming; I should have asked to verify all of the flight parameters. The captain held onto all of the paperwork except for the flight plan. I should have insisted to verify the release to ensure the correct tail number. Furthermore; due to the late hour and my time awake; my cognitive abilities were probably suffering from fatigue. Once we were holding short of the runway with the parking brake set; the captain asked me to call dispatch and get the numbers for takeoff. I did call dispatch from my cell phone and asked for the numbers. I had a hard time understanding the dispatcher and I believe her to me. I don't think she understood that we couldn't get the weights to print and there was a bigger problem. She rattled off the numbers again and I relayed them to the captain. The captain set the numbers for takeoff and we departed uneventfully. Again; in hindsight; I should have been more proactive in asking for the release to verify; or told the captain that we should start over because the chain of events were piling up. However; at no time did I feel the safety of the flight was in jeopardy because we secured the numbers and set the FMS accordingly. I also feel that due to my hours awake and the late nature of the flight contributed to the mental errors that were made. In future red-eye or normal flts; I need to take better action in CRM responsibilities to facilitate execution of the threat and error management model. Once we landed in ZZZ and had confusion as to which gate we were assigned; operations told us that there was some questions about our aircraft and they would get it straightened out. At this point the captain said the operations would take care of the problem and I headed for home.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B737-800 FLT CREW OPERATED A REVENUE FLT WITH THE WRONG ACFT.

Narrative: THE PROB WITH THIS FLT ORIGINATED ON THE TURN FROM SMF BACK TO ZZZ. THE CAPT WENT TO GET THE PAPERWORK AND I DID THE WALKAROUND AND STARTED THE PREFLT PROGRAMMING. THE GATE AGENT HAD COME DOWN TO ASK IF HE COULD LOAD EARLY FOR AN EARLY DEP. THE CAPT SAID THAT SHOULD NOT BE A PROB; ESPECIALLY SINCE IT WAS A RED-EYE AND IT WOULD BE GOOD TO GET BACK EARLY. AT NO TIME DID OPS; THE GATE AGENT; GND CREW; OR ANYONE ELSE TELL US THAT OUR AIRPLANE WAS NOT THE ONE RETURNING TO ZZZ. SOMEONE EITHER IN DISPATCH OR MAINT SHOULD HAVE INFORMED THE STATION AND THE CREW OF THE LAST SECOND PLANE SWAP. I COULD NOT GET THE ACARS TO INITIALIZE. ONCE THE CAPT RETURNED; I INFORMED HIM OF THE PROB. HE LOOKED AT THE INITIALIZATION WHICH SHOWED THE PLANE GOING FROM SMF TO ZZZ; HOWEVER; THE WRONG EMPLOYEE NUMBERS WERE LISTED. THE CAPT MANUALLY ENTERED OUR EMPLOYEE NUMBERS INTO THE FMS. HE INDICATED THAT IT WAS OK AND WE WOULD JUST HAVE TO UPDATE IT MANUALLY. IN ADDITION; I LOOKED AT MY PAIRING PRINTOUT AND IT SHOWED THE SAME ACFT RETURNING TO ZZZ. EVIDENTLY COMPLACENCY CREPT INTO THE COCKPIT OR I WOULD HAVE INSISTED ON VERIFYING OUR TAIL NUMBER FROM THE RELEASE. DUE TO MY INEXPERIENCE WITH THE ACARS (FIRST TIME THIS HAS HAPPENED) I FEEL LIKE THIS PROB SHOULD NEVER HAVE HAPPENED; AND IN THE FUTURE IT WILL NOT HAPPEN AGAIN. OUR PDC ALSO DID NOT SHOW UP AND AT THIS POINT I THOUGHT SOMETHING WAS WRONG. THE CAPT TOLD ME TO OBTAIN THE CLRNC; WHICH I DID; AND WE VERIFIED THE ROUTING. THE NEXT CHAIN OF EVENTS WAS THE WTS WOULD NOT LOAD. AT THIS POINT WE WERE READY TO PUSH AND THE CAPT ASKED IF I WAS OK WITH GETTING THE NUMBERS ON THE TAXI OUT AND ENTERING THEM WHEN WE WERE IN A STERILE ZONE BEFORE TKOF. I SAID I WAS OK WITH THAT DECISION. IN HINDSIGHT AND BECAUSE OF MY LACK OF KNOWLEDGE WITH THE ACARS PROGRAMMING; I SHOULD HAVE ASKED TO VERIFY ALL OF THE FLT PARAMETERS. THE CAPT HELD ONTO ALL OF THE PAPERWORK EXCEPT FOR THE FLT PLAN. I SHOULD HAVE INSISTED TO VERIFY THE RELEASE TO ENSURE THE CORRECT TAIL NUMBER. FURTHERMORE; DUE TO THE LATE HR AND MY TIME AWAKE; MY COGNITIVE ABILITIES WERE PROBABLY SUFFERING FROM FATIGUE. ONCE WE WERE HOLDING SHORT OF THE RWY WITH THE PARKING BRAKE SET; THE CAPT ASKED ME TO CALL DISPATCH AND GET THE NUMBERS FOR TKOF. I DID CALL DISPATCH FROM MY CELL PHONE AND ASKED FOR THE NUMBERS. I HAD A HARD TIME UNDERSTANDING THE DISPATCHER AND I BELIEVE HER TO ME. I DON'T THINK SHE UNDERSTOOD THAT WE COULDN'T GET THE WTS TO PRINT AND THERE WAS A BIGGER PROB. SHE RATTLED OFF THE NUMBERS AGAIN AND I RELAYED THEM TO THE CAPT. THE CAPT SET THE NUMBERS FOR TKOF AND WE DEPARTED UNEVENTFULLY. AGAIN; IN HINDSIGHT; I SHOULD HAVE BEEN MORE PROACTIVE IN ASKING FOR THE RELEASE TO VERIFY; OR TOLD THE CAPT THAT WE SHOULD START OVER BECAUSE THE CHAIN OF EVENTS WERE PILING UP. HOWEVER; AT NO TIME DID I FEEL THE SAFETY OF THE FLT WAS IN JEOPARDY BECAUSE WE SECURED THE NUMBERS AND SET THE FMS ACCORDINGLY. I ALSO FEEL THAT DUE TO MY HRS AWAKE AND THE LATE NATURE OF THE FLT CONTRIBUTED TO THE MENTAL ERRORS THAT WERE MADE. IN FUTURE RED-EYE OR NORMAL FLTS; I NEED TO TAKE BETTER ACTION IN CRM RESPONSIBILITIES TO FACILITATE EXECUTION OF THE THREAT AND ERROR MGMNT MODEL. ONCE WE LANDED IN ZZZ AND HAD CONFUSION AS TO WHICH GATE WE WERE ASSIGNED; OPS TOLD US THAT THERE WAS SOME QUESTIONS ABOUT OUR ACFT AND THEY WOULD GET IT STRAIGHTENED OUT. AT THIS POINT THE CAPT SAID THE OPS WOULD TAKE CARE OF THE PROB AND I HEADED FOR HOME.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of May 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.