Narrative:

It was the last flight with my instrument student before his check ride and he was nervous about flying the VOR-a partial panel and wanted to do some unusual attitude recoveries as well. The AWOS stated that the visibility was 4 mi and the ceiling was 2800 ft (airport elevation 303). We decided to go up and give it a try; but we were going to fly the approach slightly lower than published minimums in order to provide for at least 500 ft cloud clearance -- about 2300 ft. We first went to the west to do the unusual attitude recoveries. Not a problem as there were few clouds and I estimated the visibility to be at least 5 mi with a ceiling higher than 3000 ft. We then proceeded back to the airport to set up for the VOR-a; which is northeast of the airport. The visibility seemed slightly less to the northeast and the clouds were lower. I was starting to consider turning back but it seemed alright and I really wanted to get the approach in so that my student would feel comfortable. We shot the approach but my student messed up a little at the end; almost getting full deflection on the CDI as we approached the VOR (it's a circling approach with the VOR as the missed approach). Despite my better judgement; we elected to try 1 more time. The second time out we had to keep descending to stay clear of clouds. It almost seemed to be getting worse. After giving a position call that I was about 4.5 mi outbound on the VOR-a; a jet on the ILS 23 asked me if I was on an IFR flight plan. I never responded. At that point I realized that I was starting to jeopardize safety for everyone; and although I don't think I was flying in IFR conditions; I was close. I never lost sight of the ground during the entire flight but it got hard to determine where the clouds actually started. I was definitely pushing it. I canceled the approach; descended to slightly better conditions and immediately went back to the airport and landed. I always teach my students to be careful of get homeitis; not to push the WX; and to stay within their own limitations. I was guilty of that. I should have canceled the flight sooner when I started to get uncomfortable and I shouldn't have allowed my student's impending check ride to cloud my judgement. I'm more than comfortable with his flying and that particular flight wasn't required. It was simply so that he could feel more comfortable. I learned a lot from the flight; as I broke many of my own rules and didn't lead by example; and it happened so easily and with the very best intentions. I set a bad example. Looking back; we should have canceled the flight after the unusual attitude recoveries; or even after the first approach. From now on; when I don't feel comfortable; I'm going to do something about it quickly. That was the first time I felt uncomfortable while teaching and I ignored those feelings -- never again. I'm going to emphasize to my students that they do so as well so that they always fly within their limitations and comfort zone where accidents/incidents are less likely to happen.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: C172 INSTRUMENT INSTRUCTOR PLT ALLOWS DESIRE TO COMPLETE A TRAINING FLT CLOUD HIS JUDGEMENT REGARDING CONTINUING THE FLIGHT IN MARGINAL WX CONDITIONS.

Narrative: IT WAS THE LAST FLT WITH MY INST STUDENT BEFORE HIS CHK RIDE AND HE WAS NERVOUS ABOUT FLYING THE VOR-A PARTIAL PANEL AND WANTED TO DO SOME UNUSUAL ATTITUDE RECOVERIES AS WELL. THE AWOS STATED THAT THE VISIBILITY WAS 4 MI AND THE CEILING WAS 2800 FT (ARPT ELEVATION 303). WE DECIDED TO GO UP AND GIVE IT A TRY; BUT WE WERE GOING TO FLY THE APCH SLIGHTLY LOWER THAN PUBLISHED MINIMUMS IN ORDER TO PROVIDE FOR AT LEAST 500 FT CLOUD CLRNC -- ABOUT 2300 FT. WE FIRST WENT TO THE W TO DO THE UNUSUAL ATTITUDE RECOVERIES. NOT A PROB AS THERE WERE FEW CLOUDS AND I ESTIMATED THE VISIBILITY TO BE AT LEAST 5 MI WITH A CEILING HIGHER THAN 3000 FT. WE THEN PROCEEDED BACK TO THE ARPT TO SET UP FOR THE VOR-A; WHICH IS NE OF THE ARPT. THE VISIBILITY SEEMED SLIGHTLY LESS TO THE NE AND THE CLOUDS WERE LOWER. I WAS STARTING TO CONSIDER TURNING BACK BUT IT SEEMED ALRIGHT AND I REALLY WANTED TO GET THE APCH IN SO THAT MY STUDENT WOULD FEEL COMFORTABLE. WE SHOT THE APCH BUT MY STUDENT MESSED UP A LITTLE AT THE END; ALMOST GETTING FULL DEFLECTION ON THE CDI AS WE APCHED THE VOR (IT'S A CIRCLING APCH WITH THE VOR AS THE MISSED APCH). DESPITE MY BETTER JUDGEMENT; WE ELECTED TO TRY 1 MORE TIME. THE SECOND TIME OUT WE HAD TO KEEP DSNDING TO STAY CLR OF CLOUDS. IT ALMOST SEEMED TO BE GETTING WORSE. AFTER GIVING A POS CALL THAT I WAS ABOUT 4.5 MI OUTBOUND ON THE VOR-A; A JET ON THE ILS 23 ASKED ME IF I WAS ON AN IFR FLT PLAN. I NEVER RESPONDED. AT THAT POINT I REALIZED THAT I WAS STARTING TO JEOPARDIZE SAFETY FOR EVERYONE; AND ALTHOUGH I DON'T THINK I WAS FLYING IN IFR CONDITIONS; I WAS CLOSE. I NEVER LOST SIGHT OF THE GND DURING THE ENTIRE FLT BUT IT GOT HARD TO DETERMINE WHERE THE CLOUDS ACTUALLY STARTED. I WAS DEFINITELY PUSHING IT. I CANCELED THE APCH; DSNDED TO SLIGHTLY BETTER CONDITIONS AND IMMEDIATELY WENT BACK TO THE ARPT AND LANDED. I ALWAYS TEACH MY STUDENTS TO BE CAREFUL OF GET HOMEITIS; NOT TO PUSH THE WX; AND TO STAY WITHIN THEIR OWN LIMITATIONS. I WAS GUILTY OF THAT. I SHOULD HAVE CANCELED THE FLT SOONER WHEN I STARTED TO GET UNCOMFORTABLE AND I SHOULDN'T HAVE ALLOWED MY STUDENT'S IMPENDING CHK RIDE TO CLOUD MY JUDGEMENT. I'M MORE THAN COMFORTABLE WITH HIS FLYING AND THAT PARTICULAR FLT WASN'T REQUIRED. IT WAS SIMPLY SO THAT HE COULD FEEL MORE COMFORTABLE. I LEARNED A LOT FROM THE FLT; AS I BROKE MANY OF MY OWN RULES AND DIDN'T LEAD BY EXAMPLE; AND IT HAPPENED SO EASILY AND WITH THE VERY BEST INTENTIONS. I SET A BAD EXAMPLE. LOOKING BACK; WE SHOULD HAVE CANCELED THE FLT AFTER THE UNUSUAL ATTITUDE RECOVERIES; OR EVEN AFTER THE FIRST APCH. FROM NOW ON; WHEN I DON'T FEEL COMFORTABLE; I'M GOING TO DO SOMETHING ABOUT IT QUICKLY. THAT WAS THE FIRST TIME I FELT UNCOMFORTABLE WHILE TEACHING AND I IGNORED THOSE FEELINGS -- NEVER AGAIN. I'M GOING TO EMPHASIZE TO MY STUDENTS THAT THEY DO SO AS WELL SO THAT THEY ALWAYS FLY WITHIN THEIR LIMITATIONS AND COMFORT ZONE WHERE ACCIDENTS/INCIDENTS ARE LESS LIKELY TO HAPPEN.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of May 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.