Narrative:

Ravnn 2 arrival into bwi. Captain flying. Cleared to descend via the ravnn 2 arrival. FCU set up in managed descent to 6000 ft MSL. Descending with a strong tailwind; I selected open descent to facilitate making the 16000 ft MSL restr at sacco. I did not change the altitude window to 16000 ft MSL for the restr at sacco. Passing through a cumulus buildup we encountered a downdraft which increased our rate of descent. Upon realizing that we had descended below 16000 ft MSL prior to sacco; I initiated a climb by selecting a positive vertical speed and a higher altitude on the FCU. This resulted in a slow correction back to 16000 ft MSL. We very quickly reached the next fix at pimbo only 3 mi away and had to descend to 14000 ft MSL in 6.5 mi at udude. We continued the descent without making it back up to 16000 ft MSL. The first officer was performing arrival duties including getting updated ATIS; PA; and inputs to the FMS. He did not see the altitude deviation and I pointed it out. We had a very high ground speed of about 557 KTS. Things were happening very quickly and we had to move on with the arrival and I did not inform ATC about our deviation. The lowest altitude I noted before pimbo was 15000 ft MSL. Approximately 5 mins later; ATC gave us a frequency change and asked us to call a phone number about a possible altitude deviation. The PF (captain) noticed the deviation and informed the PNF. With the strong tailwinds; resulting high ground speed; many stepdown restr; and arrival duties; I did not get in a call to ATC to inform them of the deviation. Upon noticing the descent below the depicted altitude on the arrival; I selected a higher altitude and positive vertical speed on the FCU. I pointed out the altitude error to the first officer. I then reset the FCU to a managed descent to continue the charted arrival. After landing; I called the phone number given and spoke to the approach control staff. They asked me for my contact information and said that although they do not think that anything will come of it; they are investigating a possible altitude deviation. I asked if there was any traffic conflict and was told that there was not. A long extended duty day started with 2 aircraft swaps on the first leg of the day due to maintenance problems. The delays resulted in a backside of the clock flight extending long into the daytime hours. Additional factors were the prevailing strong tailwinds; traversing a convective air mass; and an arrival procedure with many closely spaced altitude changing restrs; and the airbus automation performance limitations. The PF's failure to change the selected altitude in the FCU when changing from a managed descent to an open descent and not disconnecting the autoplt to expedite the recovery resulted in descending below the specified altitude. Not being able to get in a call to ATC to inform them of the deviation due to the high workload situation did not help ATC. Increased vigilance on the descent profile when encountering strong tailwinds and the application of the proper procedures to manage the descent would help to ensure that the aircraft remains on the charted profile. Additionally; it would be beneficial to have the PNF plan non critical duties at a time when not performing many crossing restrs. Being aware of possible crew fatigue should be cause for extra vigilance also. This arrival is difficult to execute in normal conditions as there is only 3 mi to level off at sacco at 16000 ft MSL and then begin a new descent to udude at 14000 ft MSL. With the maneuvering limitations of the automation on the airbus; that is a challenging profile. Supplemental information from acn 781925: we were cleared to descend via the ravnn 2 arrival from FL240. 6000 ft was selected by the captain and confirmed by me per the arrival. After a managed descent was initiated; I continued with my PNF duties. These included a brief PA to the passenger; entering the appropriate landing information on the performance page of the mcdu; completing the descent approach checklist; and making sure we had the most current ATIS information as it was about to change. I was performing my PNF duties when I was informed by the captain that he may have just busted an altitude restr at sacco. I disconnected my duties and doublechked the arrival to see if there was a discrepancy. I was unaware that the captain chose an open descent profile after he initially chose a managed profile for the descent. I'm sure he chose to forego informing me because I was busy making the PA when he selected an open descent to be sure to make the crossing restr. Additionally; I believe we were both fatigued after encountering 2 broken aircraft in ZZZ; departing ZZZ 3 hours late; and arriving in bwi 2 hours late at the end of a red-eye.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: AN A320 CREW ON A STAR MISSED A WAYPOINT ALT CONSTRAINT IN HIGH TAILWINDS AND TURBULENCE. THE CREW WAS FATIGUED FOLLOWING A DELAYED REDEYE.

Narrative: RAVNN 2 ARR INTO BWI. CAPT FLYING. CLRED TO DSND VIA THE RAVNN 2 ARR. FCU SET UP IN MANAGED DSCNT TO 6000 FT MSL. DSNDING WITH A STRONG TAILWIND; I SELECTED OPEN DSCNT TO FACILITATE MAKING THE 16000 FT MSL RESTR AT SACCO. I DID NOT CHANGE THE ALT WINDOW TO 16000 FT MSL FOR THE RESTR AT SACCO. PASSING THROUGH A CUMULUS BUILDUP WE ENCOUNTERED A DOWNDRAFT WHICH INCREASED OUR RATE OF DSCNT. UPON REALIZING THAT WE HAD DSNDED BELOW 16000 FT MSL PRIOR TO SACCO; I INITIATED A CLB BY SELECTING A POSITIVE VERT SPD AND A HIGHER ALT ON THE FCU. THIS RESULTED IN A SLOW CORRECTION BACK TO 16000 FT MSL. WE VERY QUICKLY REACHED THE NEXT FIX AT PIMBO ONLY 3 MI AWAY AND HAD TO DSND TO 14000 FT MSL IN 6.5 MI AT UDUDE. WE CONTINUED THE DSCNT WITHOUT MAKING IT BACK UP TO 16000 FT MSL. THE FO WAS PERFORMING ARR DUTIES INCLUDING GETTING UPDATED ATIS; PA; AND INPUTS TO THE FMS. HE DID NOT SEE THE ALTDEV AND I POINTED IT OUT. WE HAD A VERY HIGH GND SPD OF ABOUT 557 KTS. THINGS WERE HAPPENING VERY QUICKLY AND WE HAD TO MOVE ON WITH THE ARR AND I DID NOT INFORM ATC ABOUT OUR DEV. THE LOWEST ALT I NOTED BEFORE PIMBO WAS 15000 FT MSL. APPROX 5 MINS LATER; ATC GAVE US A FREQ CHANGE AND ASKED US TO CALL A PHONE NUMBER ABOUT A POSSIBLE ALTDEV. THE PF (CAPT) NOTICED THE DEV AND INFORMED THE PNF. WITH THE STRONG TAILWINDS; RESULTING HIGH GND SPD; MANY STEPDOWN RESTR; AND ARR DUTIES; I DID NOT GET IN A CALL TO ATC TO INFORM THEM OF THE DEV. UPON NOTICING THE DSCNT BELOW THE DEPICTED ALT ON THE ARR; I SELECTED A HIGHER ALT AND POSITIVE VERT SPD ON THE FCU. I POINTED OUT THE ALT ERROR TO THE FO. I THEN RESET THE FCU TO A MANAGED DSCNT TO CONTINUE THE CHARTED ARR. AFTER LNDG; I CALLED THE PHONE NUMBER GIVEN AND SPOKE TO THE APCH CTL STAFF. THEY ASKED ME FOR MY CONTACT INFO AND SAID THAT ALTHOUGH THEY DO NOT THINK THAT ANYTHING WILL COME OF IT; THEY ARE INVESTIGATING A POSSIBLE ALTDEV. I ASKED IF THERE WAS ANY TFC CONFLICT AND WAS TOLD THAT THERE WAS NOT. A LONG EXTENDED DUTY DAY STARTED WITH 2 ACFT SWAPS ON THE FIRST LEG OF THE DAY DUE TO MAINT PROBS. THE DELAYS RESULTED IN A BACKSIDE OF THE CLOCK FLT EXTENDING LONG INTO THE DAYTIME HRS. ADDITIONAL FACTORS WERE THE PREVAILING STRONG TAILWINDS; TRAVERSING A CONVECTIVE AIR MASS; AND AN ARR PROC WITH MANY CLOSELY SPACED ALT CHANGING RESTRS; AND THE AIRBUS AUTOMATION PERFORMANCE LIMITATIONS. THE PF'S FAILURE TO CHANGE THE SELECTED ALT IN THE FCU WHEN CHANGING FROM A MANAGED DSCNT TO AN OPEN DSCNT AND NOT DISCONNECTING THE AUTOPLT TO EXPEDITE THE RECOVERY RESULTED IN DSNDING BELOW THE SPECIFIED ALT. NOT BEING ABLE TO GET IN A CALL TO ATC TO INFORM THEM OF THE DEV DUE TO THE HIGH WORKLOAD SITUATION DID NOT HELP ATC. INCREASED VIGILANCE ON THE DSCNT PROFILE WHEN ENCOUNTERING STRONG TAILWINDS AND THE APPLICATION OF THE PROPER PROCS TO MANAGE THE DSCNT WOULD HELP TO ENSURE THAT THE ACFT REMAINS ON THE CHARTED PROFILE. ADDITIONALLY; IT WOULD BE BENEFICIAL TO HAVE THE PNF PLAN NON CRITICAL DUTIES AT A TIME WHEN NOT PERFORMING MANY XING RESTRS. BEING AWARE OF POSSIBLE CREW FATIGUE SHOULD BE CAUSE FOR EXTRA VIGILANCE ALSO. THIS ARR IS DIFFICULT TO EXECUTE IN NORMAL CONDITIONS AS THERE IS ONLY 3 MI TO LEVEL OFF AT SACCO AT 16000 FT MSL AND THEN BEGIN A NEW DSCNT TO UDUDE AT 14000 FT MSL. WITH THE MANEUVERING LIMITATIONS OF THE AUTOMATION ON THE AIRBUS; THAT IS A CHALLENGING PROFILE. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 781925: WE WERE CLRED TO DSND VIA THE RAVNN 2 ARR FROM FL240. 6000 FT WAS SELECTED BY THE CAPT AND CONFIRMED BY ME PER THE ARR. AFTER A MANAGED DSCNT WAS INITIATED; I CONTINUED WITH MY PNF DUTIES. THESE INCLUDED A BRIEF PA TO THE PAX; ENTERING THE APPROPRIATE LNDG INFO ON THE PERFORMANCE PAGE OF THE MCDU; COMPLETING THE DSCNT APCH CHKLIST; AND MAKING SURE WE HAD THE MOST CURRENT ATIS INFO AS IT WAS ABOUT TO CHANGE. I WAS PERFORMING MY PNF DUTIES WHEN I WAS INFORMED BY THE CAPT THAT HE MAY HAVE JUST BUSTED AN ALT RESTR AT SACCO. I DISCONNECTED MY DUTIES AND DOUBLECHKED THE ARR TO SEE IF THERE WAS A DISCREPANCY. I WAS UNAWARE THAT THE CAPT CHOSE AN OPEN DSCNT PROFILE AFTER HE INITIALLY CHOSE A MANAGED PROFILE FOR THE DSCNT. I'M SURE HE CHOSE TO FOREGO INFORMING ME BECAUSE I WAS BUSY MAKING THE PA WHEN HE SELECTED AN OPEN DSCNT TO BE SURE TO MAKE THE XING RESTR. ADDITIONALLY; I BELIEVE WE WERE BOTH FATIGUED AFTER ENCOUNTERING 2 BROKEN ACFT IN ZZZ; DEPARTING ZZZ 3 HRS LATE; AND ARRIVING IN BWI 2 HRS LATE AT THE END OF A RED-EYE.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of May 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.