Narrative:

This report is being submitted to document a critical safety concern with operations at psp; in regards to wind reports; runway configuration and facilities. At the scheduled arrival time for flight #1; winds were forecast to be northwesterly and gusty. The runway in use for air carriers was runway 31L. The VASI was notamed out of service and unavailable. The approach in use was a visual approach to runway 31L with no optical or instrument glide slope available. We used an FMGC computed glide slope to back up our visual picture. Winds reported by tower to arriving aircraft were basically a direct crosswind and gusty. On approach; we had some difficulty getting the aircraft to slow down with winds that were anywhere from a crosswind to a tailwind in the range of about 20 KTS. In fact; to slow below 180 KTS (in order to configure) I elected to use speed brakes (the gear was already down). With the variable direction of the winds; a quick wind shift brought a rapid deceleration to approximately 140 KTS and a 'speed; speed; speed' call from the aircraft. Speed brakes were retracted and the aircraft configured for a stabilized approach. Crossing the displaced threshold; I noted the approach end wind sock depicting a strong; gusty left quartering tailwind. To the best of my recollection; we achieved the stabilized approach criteria approximately 1000 ft afe and touched down roughly on centerline in the touchdown zone. On rollout; the plane acted as though we were being pushed along by a tailwind like what I observed on the approach end wind sock. Taxiing back to gate; we noted that the departure end wind sock was depicting a gusty direct crosswind. While we were taxiing back in; another aircraft was apparently trying to decide which runway they wanted for takeoff and we passed to ground a rough observation of our ride on final. (You would have to pull the tapes to get the specifics on this.) all in all; the approach left us with a very strong feeling that psp was using the wrong runway for prevailing conditions. Flight #2 was scheduled to depart at XA43 local; but was delayed by the late inbound. While obtaining our clearance we indicated that we would like runway 13R for departure. Clearance told us to advise ground. After engine start we had a cockpit door fault. We resolved the problem with maintenance and continued the taxi for runway 13R. Upon reaching runway 13R and confirming with tower that we were ready; we were told that there would be a 10-15 minute delay for taking off 'wrong direction.' after another inquiry as to the length of the delay; we evaluated our fuel remaining and determined that we would not be able to take off with the far minimums. We asked for taxi back to the gate to refuel. You would have to pull the tower tapes to obtain all the wind reports we heard; but the reports we heard ranged anywhere from a direction of 160 to 240 degrees with speeds 14 to 26 KTS. The runway 31L approach end wind sock appeared to continue to indicate a more southerly wind direction; while the runway 31L departure end wind sock appeared to indicate a more westerly direction; but all things considered; the prevailing winds were decidedly more southerly than northerly. I continued to feel that operations on runway 31L were a mistake and based on the wind reports I was hearing and the observation of the wind sock; I maintain that I could not be assured that the winds would be within the aircraft operating limits for a departure using runway 31L. This; combined with our experience on the arrival led to our decision to taxi back; get fuel and sort the situation out rather than take off with what were marginal to out of limit winds. While we were getting our fuel; I noted that most; if not all; departing aircraft were using runway 13R for departure. I noted at least two landings on runway 31L. After obtaining fuel; we taxied back out and departed without delay or incident on 13R. Other factors: while taxiing out the second time; I noted an anemometer located between the tower and the runway. Given the prevailing winds; it appeared that the buildings were funneling the wind to the anemometer; quite possibly affecting both the direction and the speed. Recommendations: for air carrier: do not dispatch non-GPS aircraft to psp. The possibility of having a 'navigation accuracy downgrade' and having absolutely no reliable glide slope information in gusty to windshear type conditions is a risk not worth taking. I don't have the cost information; but I would guess it would be cheaper to route a more capable aircraft to psp than to have to deal with missed approaches or diverts. For the FAA/psp: 1) survey the placement of the anemometer/wind vane and investigate the accuracy of the tower/ASOS winds. Investigate the possibility of installing additional anemometers and wind vanes near the ends of the runways. It may also be very beneficial to place a remote sensor on the hill southeast of the airport to alert the tower to conditions such as those we encountered. 2) investigate the possibility of incorporating the wind measuring equipment into a LLWS system. The type of windshear that may have actually been present would have been a mechanical type; and thus unpredictable by aircraft radar systems. 3) re-evaluate the runway use plan. Runway 13R is already the designated calm wind runway. The continued use of runway 31L without a VASI as the winds favored runway 13R did not seem to make sense. Human factors: this airport is already a special qual airport due to the high terrain. Removing approach aids and presenting the pilots with inaccurate wind data and a dubious runway selection create an extremely high workload environment and could cause additional human factor errors seemingly unrelated to the specific events cited in this report. Conclusion: safety was compromised by the combination of the runway in use; prevailing winds and tower reported winds that differed from what aircraft experienced. A direct crosswind report from tower is misleading at best if the actual touchdown winds present the aircraft with a tailwind. Although the tower cannot know winds aloft; an experienced observer should be able to get some idea of very strong winds by observing the surroundings; the flight paths and body angles of aircraft. If expedience dictates that a certain runway configuration be maintained when other factors (no VASI; winds) indicate otherwise; it is incumbent upon the airport to do their best to mitigate the increased risk through other means.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: LGT PLT EXPERIENCED TAILWIND ON FINAL APCH AND BELIEVES THAT PSP ARPT OFTEN UTILIZES A RWY THAT EXPOSES FLT CREWS TO TAILWIND CONDITIONS.

Narrative: THIS REPORT IS BEING SUBMITTED TO DOCUMENT A CRITICAL SAFETY CONCERN WITH OPERATIONS AT PSP; IN REGARDS TO WIND REPORTS; RWY CONFIGURATION AND FACILITIES. AT THE SCHEDULED ARRIVAL TIME FOR FLT #1; WINDS WERE FORECAST TO BE NORTHWESTERLY AND GUSTY. THE RWY IN USE FOR AIR CARRIERS WAS RWY 31L. THE VASI WAS NOTAMED OUT OF SERVICE AND UNAVAILABLE. THE APPROACH IN USE WAS A VISUAL APPROACH TO RWY 31L WITH NO OPTICAL OR INSTRUMENT GLIDE SLOPE AVAILABLE. WE USED AN FMGC COMPUTED GLIDE SLOPE TO BACK UP OUR VISUAL PICTURE. WINDS REPORTED BY TOWER TO ARRIVING AIRCRAFT WERE BASICALLY A DIRECT CROSSWIND AND GUSTY. ON APPROACH; WE HAD SOME DIFFICULTY GETTING THE AIRCRAFT TO SLOW DOWN WITH WINDS THAT WERE ANYWHERE FROM A CROSSWIND TO A TAILWIND IN THE RANGE OF ABOUT 20 KTS. IN FACT; TO SLOW BELOW 180 KTS (IN ORDER TO CONFIGURE) I ELECTED TO USE SPEED BRAKES (THE GEAR WAS ALREADY DOWN). WITH THE VARIABLE DIRECTION OF THE WINDS; A QUICK WIND SHIFT BROUGHT A RAPID DECELERATION TO APPROX 140 KTS AND A 'SPEED; SPEED; SPEED' CALL FROM THE AIRCRAFT. SPEED BRAKES WERE RETRACTED AND THE AIRCRAFT CONFIGURED FOR A STABILIZED APPROACH. CROSSING THE DISPLACED THRESHOLD; I NOTED THE APPROACH END WIND SOCK DEPICTING A STRONG; GUSTY LEFT QUARTERING TAILWIND. TO THE BEST OF MY RECOLLECTION; WE ACHIEVED THE STABILIZED APPROACH CRITERIA APPROX 1000 FT AFE AND TOUCHED DOWN ROUGHLY ON CENTERLINE IN THE TOUCHDOWN ZONE. ON ROLLOUT; THE PLANE ACTED AS THOUGH WE WERE BEING PUSHED ALONG BY A TAILWIND LIKE WHAT I OBSERVED ON THE APPROACH END WIND SOCK. TAXIING BACK TO GATE; WE NOTED THAT THE DEPARTURE END WIND SOCK WAS DEPICTING A GUSTY DIRECT CROSSWIND. WHILE WE WERE TAXIING BACK IN; ANOTHER AIRCRAFT WAS APPARENTLY TRYING TO DECIDE WHICH RWY THEY WANTED FOR TAKEOFF AND WE PASSED TO GROUND A ROUGH OBSERVATION OF OUR RIDE ON FINAL. (YOU WOULD HAVE TO PULL THE TAPES TO GET THE SPECIFICS ON THIS.) ALL IN ALL; THE APPROACH LEFT US WITH A VERY STRONG FEELING THAT PSP WAS USING THE WRONG RWY FOR PREVAILING CONDITIONS. FLT #2 WAS SCHEDULED TO DEPART AT XA43 LOCAL; BUT WAS DELAYED BY THE LATE INBOUND. WHILE OBTAINING OUR CLEARANCE WE INDICATED THAT WE WOULD LIKE RWY 13R FOR DEPARTURE. CLEARANCE TOLD US TO ADVISE GROUND. AFTER ENGINE START WE HAD A COCKPIT DOOR FAULT. WE RESOLVED THE PROBLEM WITH MAINT AND CONTINUED THE TAXI FOR RWY 13R. UPON REACHING RWY 13R AND CONFIRMING WITH TOWER THAT WE WERE READY; WE WERE TOLD THAT THERE WOULD BE A 10-15 MINUTE DELAY FOR TAKING OFF 'WRONG DIRECTION.' AFTER ANOTHER INQUIRY AS TO THE LENGTH OF THE DELAY; WE EVALUATED OUR FUEL REMAINING AND DETERMINED THAT WE WOULD NOT BE ABLE TO TAKE OFF WITH THE FAR MINIMUMS. WE ASKED FOR TAXI BACK TO THE GATE TO REFUEL. YOU WOULD HAVE TO PULL THE TOWER TAPES TO OBTAIN ALL THE WIND REPORTS WE HEARD; BUT THE REPORTS WE HEARD RANGED ANYWHERE FROM A DIRECTION OF 160 TO 240 DEGREES WITH SPEEDS 14 TO 26 KTS. THE RWY 31L APPROACH END WIND SOCK APPEARED TO CONTINUE TO INDICATE A MORE SOUTHERLY WIND DIRECTION; WHILE THE RWY 31L DEPARTURE END WIND SOCK APPEARED TO INDICATE A MORE WESTERLY DIRECTION; BUT ALL THINGS CONSIDERED; THE PREVAILING WINDS WERE DECIDEDLY MORE SOUTHERLY THAN NORTHERLY. I CONTINUED TO FEEL THAT OPERATIONS ON RWY 31L WERE A MISTAKE AND BASED ON THE WIND REPORTS I WAS HEARING AND THE OBSERVATION OF THE WIND SOCK; I MAINTAIN THAT I COULD NOT BE ASSURED THAT THE WINDS WOULD BE WITHIN THE AIRCRAFT OPERATING LIMITS FOR A DEPARTURE USING RWY 31L. THIS; COMBINED WITH OUR EXPERIENCE ON THE ARRIVAL LED TO OUR DECISION TO TAXI BACK; GET FUEL AND SORT THE SITUATION OUT RATHER THAN TAKE OFF WITH WHAT WERE MARGINAL TO OUT OF LIMIT WINDS. WHILE WE WERE GETTING OUR FUEL; I NOTED THAT MOST; IF NOT ALL; DEPARTING AIRCRAFT WERE USING RWY 13R FOR DEPARTURE. I NOTED AT LEAST TWO LANDINGS ON RWY 31L. AFTER OBTAINING FUEL; WE TAXIED BACK OUT AND DEPARTED WITHOUT DELAY OR INCIDENT ON 13R. OTHER FACTORS: WHILE TAXIING OUT THE SECOND TIME; I NOTED AN ANEMOMETER LOCATED BETWEEN THE TOWER AND THE RWY. GIVEN THE PREVAILING WINDS; IT APPEARED THAT THE BUILDINGS WERE FUNNELING THE WIND TO THE ANEMOMETER; QUITE POSSIBLY AFFECTING BOTH THE DIRECTION AND THE SPEED. RECOMMENDATIONS: FOR ACR: DO NOT DISPATCH NON-GPS AIRCRAFT TO PSP. THE POSSIBILITY OF HAVING A 'NAV ACCURACY DOWNGRADE' AND HAVING ABSOLUTELY NO RELIABLE GLIDE SLOPE INFORMATION IN GUSTY TO WINDSHEAR TYPE CONDITIONS IS A RISK NOT WORTH TAKING. I DON'T HAVE THE COST INFORMATION; BUT I WOULD GUESS IT WOULD BE CHEAPER TO ROUTE A MORE CAPABLE AIRCRAFT TO PSP THAN TO HAVE TO DEAL WITH MISSED APPROACHES OR DIVERTS. FOR THE FAA/PSP: 1) SURVEY THE PLACEMENT OF THE ANEMOMETER/WIND VANE AND INVESTIGATE THE ACCURACY OF THE TOWER/ASOS WINDS. INVESTIGATE THE POSSIBILITY OF INSTALLING ADDITIONAL ANEMOMETERS AND WIND VANES NEAR THE ENDS OF THE RWYS. IT MAY ALSO BE VERY BENEFICIAL TO PLACE A REMOTE SENSOR ON THE HILL SOUTHEAST OF THE AIRPORT TO ALERT THE TOWER TO CONDITIONS SUCH AS THOSE WE ENCOUNTERED. 2) INVESTIGATE THE POSSIBILITY OF INCORPORATING THE WIND MEASURING EQUIPMENT INTO A LLWS SYSTEM. THE TYPE OF WINDSHEAR THAT MAY HAVE ACTUALLY BEEN PRESENT WOULD HAVE BEEN A MECHANICAL TYPE; AND THUS UNPREDICTABLE BY AIRCRAFT RADAR SYSTEMS. 3) RE-EVALUATE THE RWY USE PLAN. RWY 13R IS ALREADY THE DESIGNATED CALM WIND RWY. THE CONTINUED USE OF RWY 31L WITHOUT A VASI AS THE WINDS FAVORED RWY 13R DID NOT SEEM TO MAKE SENSE. HUMAN FACTORS: THIS AIRPORT IS ALREADY A SPECIAL QUAL AIRPORT DUE TO THE HIGH TERRAIN. REMOVING APPROACH AIDS AND PRESENTING THE PILOTS WITH INACCURATE WIND DATA AND A DUBIOUS RWY SELECTION CREATE AN EXTREMELY HIGH WORKLOAD ENVIRONMENT AND COULD CAUSE ADDITIONAL HUMAN FACTOR ERRORS SEEMINGLY UNRELATED TO THE SPECIFIC EVENTS CITED IN THIS REPORT. CONCLUSION: SAFETY WAS COMPROMISED BY THE COMBINATION OF THE RWY IN USE; PREVAILING WINDS AND TOWER REPORTED WINDS THAT DIFFERED FROM WHAT AIRCRAFT EXPERIENCED. A DIRECT CROSSWIND REPORT FROM TOWER IS MISLEADING AT BEST IF THE ACTUAL TOUCHDOWN WINDS PRESENT THE AIRCRAFT WITH A TAILWIND. ALTHOUGH THE TOWER CANNOT KNOW WINDS ALOFT; AN EXPERIENCED OBSERVER SHOULD BE ABLE TO GET SOME IDEA OF VERY STRONG WINDS BY OBSERVING THE SURROUNDINGS; THE FLIGHT PATHS AND BODY ANGLES OF AIRCRAFT. IF EXPEDIENCE DICTATES THAT A CERTAIN RWY CONFIGURATION BE MAINTAINED WHEN OTHER FACTORS (NO VASI; WINDS) INDICATE OTHERWISE; IT IS INCUMBENT UPON THE AIRPORT TO DO THEIR BEST TO MITIGATE THE INCREASED RISK THROUGH OTHER MEANS.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of May 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.