Narrative:

We were given instructions along with paperwork from engineering in ZZZ to have my technicians grease the main gear pivot assemblies at 2 position on aircraft X; after compliance to then place a deferral on the primary landing gear handle for use in the override. The technicians complied with the instructions using the maintenance manual as reference. While the technicians complied with said instructions new instructions came from engineering were sent in addition to the previous work to then replace the landing gear control module on the flight deck. Knowing that this was more involved we enlisted the assistance of our tech support personnel. With tech support the technicians pulled both fim (fault isolation manual) and amm information related to the troubleshooting and replacement of the control box. I went to the hangar and got the B767 pseu (proximity switch electronic unit) blocking plate kit required for compliance of the replacement and test of said unit and returned to the aircraft. I installed the 5 gear pins for T/south and the eventual right/right and noted the installation in the logbook. While the technicians and tech support were working together on the issue I was also answering other gate calls and assisting on other aircraft. With tech support it was found that the control unlock solenoid was currently failed and not allowing the gear handle to be put in the up position without the use of the override as in a hard failure. The technicians then replaced the control box and complied with the amm. After compliance the gear control module was found functional. We were then contacted by our maintenance controller and then notified that quality control was supposed to be involved with this aircraft and this situation from the beginning. We called quality control and requested they come out to the aircraft. Speaking to quality control we told them we were prepared to do the test compliance portion of the maintenance manual over for their review. They started to question our troubleshooting methods and how we arrived at our resulting fix referencing the fim. We attempted to explain along with tech support that there was a hard fault; but without their accepting our methods. I called our supervisor out to assist in the process but again there was no resolution with quality control. The working technician along with the supervisor decided that the MEL would be applied as it was originally going to at the beginning of the event. My involvement ended at that point and the technician placed the item on deferral. We were all under the impression that the work that had been done was proper and the deferral was correct within the MEL. I also believe that the technicians did their work in accordance with the guidelines put forth in the gmm and the amm used at the time work was being performed. Next day aircraft was grounded until the entire test process was repeated in the presence of the quality control representative. Supplemental information from acn 778336: aircraft X came in with an inbound pilot write-up 'repeat of log page XXX -- gear lever operations.' our department was notified that; per engineering department; we; the technicians working the aircraft this day; were to lubricate the pivot points of the tilt actuator of the main gear. Afterward; we were asked to place the item on a MEL deferral; or MEL. Approximately 2 hours after this we were then notified by our maintenance operations control center that they wanted the item resolved. By then we were told that our technical support department had been on the aircraft complying with the troubleshooting procedure using the fim (fault isolation manual). Task was chosen and subsequently verified that the landing gear lever control module was at fault. Soon afterward we met up with our tech support representatives on the aircraft and was made aware of the fault. I had removed and replaced the landing gear lever control module per amm. We then complied with the operation check of the item and found it to be operating normal. We all verified that the fault was fixed. All involved with this item were present at the time of the operation check. By this time it was approximately 55 mins to the aircraft's departure time. By this time we were made aware ofthe fact that this was an rii (required inspection item). Now with time against us; along with pressure from our maintenance control; we then decided to place the item on MEL and once the aircraft returned we would repeat the operation check for the landing gear lever control module for a final signoff to clear the MEL. We had also advised the flight crew that the landing gear control system was fully functional but due to time constraints along with pressure from maintenance operation we could not perform the entire operation check a second time for our quality control department. We had also asked the flight crew to make a logbook entry stating if the landing gear control lever was in fact operating as it should be. They did make an entry stating that the gear handle and landing gear system was operating normally. The only reasons for the MEL on this item was solely due to the absence of a quality control representative at the time of the removal and replacement of the component and the operation check of it as well as the lack of ground time to fully repeat the operation check of the component. Not to mention pressure from our maintenance control; which at the time could decide whether or not to initially place the item on MEL or resolving the discrepancy. Supplemental information from acn 778335: I informed maintenance line control and widebody transport (maintenance) that aircraft X had been complied with without an inspector and that the item was rii per gmm and that prior to the aircraft departure an inspector would have to go over the paperwork; look at the aircraft and buy back the log page. I sent an inspector to catch up with the mechanics working the aircraft. Shortly after we started to go over the paperwork we were told that they had troubleshot the problem per the fim and changed the landing gear control module. After we started to look into what had been done we were informed that they were going to place the item on MEL and our services were no longer needed. I was told this after the inspector returned to the shop. At that point I called and talked to maintenance control and was told that the item was placed on MEL and the aircraft was going to fly. I informed the manager and director of this event to request further guidance.

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A B767 ACFT LANDING GEAR LEVER CONTROL MODULE WAS REPLACED AFTER A CONTROL UNLOCK SOLENOID HAD FAILED. ORIGINAL MEL DEFERRAL WAS REAPPLIED DUE TO REQUIRED RII INSPECTION NOT ACCOMPLISHED IN TIME FOR DEPARTURE.

Narrative: WE WERE GIVEN INSTRUCTIONS ALONG WITH PAPERWORK FROM ENGINEERING IN ZZZ TO HAVE MY TECHNICIANS GREASE THE MAIN GEAR PIVOT ASSEMBLIES AT 2 POS ON ACFT X; AFTER COMPLIANCE TO THEN PLACE A DEFERRAL ON THE PRIMARY LNDG GEAR HANDLE FOR USE IN THE OVERRIDE. THE TECHNICIANS COMPLIED WITH THE INSTRUCTIONS USING THE MAINT MANUAL AS REF. WHILE THE TECHNICIANS COMPLIED WITH SAID INSTRUCTIONS NEW INSTRUCTIONS CAME FROM ENGINEERING WERE SENT IN ADDITION TO THE PREVIOUS WORK TO THEN REPLACE THE LNDG GEAR CTL MODULE ON THE FLT DECK. KNOWING THAT THIS WAS MORE INVOLVED WE ENLISTED THE ASSISTANCE OF OUR TECH SUPPORT PERSONNEL. WITH TECH SUPPORT THE TECHNICIANS PULLED BOTH FIM (FAULT ISOLATION MANUAL) AND AMM INFO RELATED TO THE TROUBLESHOOTING AND REPLACEMENT OF THE CTL BOX. I WENT TO THE HANGAR AND GOT THE B767 PSEU (PROX SWITCH ELECTRONIC UNIT) BLOCKING PLATE KIT REQUIRED FOR COMPLIANCE OF THE REPLACEMENT AND TEST OF SAID UNIT AND RETURNED TO THE ACFT. I INSTALLED THE 5 GEAR PINS FOR T/S AND THE EVENTUAL R/R AND NOTED THE INSTALLATION IN THE LOGBOOK. WHILE THE TECHNICIANS AND TECH SUPPORT WERE WORKING TOGETHER ON THE ISSUE I WAS ALSO ANSWERING OTHER GATE CALLS AND ASSISTING ON OTHER ACFT. WITH TECH SUPPORT IT WAS FOUND THAT THE CTL UNLOCK SOLENOID WAS CURRENTLY FAILED AND NOT ALLOWING THE GEAR HANDLE TO BE PUT IN THE UP POS WITHOUT THE USE OF THE OVERRIDE AS IN A HARD FAILURE. THE TECHNICIANS THEN REPLACED THE CTL BOX AND COMPLIED WITH THE AMM. AFTER COMPLIANCE THE GEAR CTL MODULE WAS FOUND FUNCTIONAL. WE WERE THEN CONTACTED BY OUR MAINT CTLR AND THEN NOTIFIED THAT QUALITY CTL WAS SUPPOSED TO BE INVOLVED WITH THIS ACFT AND THIS SITUATION FROM THE BEGINNING. WE CALLED QUALITY CTL AND REQUESTED THEY COME OUT TO THE ACFT. SPEAKING TO QUALITY CTL WE TOLD THEM WE WERE PREPARED TO DO THE TEST COMPLIANCE PORTION OF THE MAINT MANUAL OVER FOR THEIR REVIEW. THEY STARTED TO QUESTION OUR TROUBLESHOOTING METHODS AND HOW WE ARRIVED AT OUR RESULTING FIX REFING THE FIM. WE ATTEMPTED TO EXPLAIN ALONG WITH TECH SUPPORT THAT THERE WAS A HARD FAULT; BUT WITHOUT THEIR ACCEPTING OUR METHODS. I CALLED OUR SUPVR OUT TO ASSIST IN THE PROCESS BUT AGAIN THERE WAS NO RESOLUTION WITH QUALITY CTL. THE WORKING TECHNICIAN ALONG WITH THE SUPVR DECIDED THAT THE MEL WOULD BE APPLIED AS IT WAS ORIGINALLY GOING TO AT THE BEGINNING OF THE EVENT. MY INVOLVEMENT ENDED AT THAT POINT AND THE TECHNICIAN PLACED THE ITEM ON DEFERRAL. WE WERE ALL UNDER THE IMPRESSION THAT THE WORK THAT HAD BEEN DONE WAS PROPER AND THE DEFERRAL WAS CORRECT WITHIN THE MEL. I ALSO BELIEVE THAT THE TECHNICIANS DID THEIR WORK IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE GUIDELINES PUT FORTH IN THE GMM AND THE AMM USED AT THE TIME WORK WAS BEING PERFORMED. NEXT DAY ACFT WAS GROUNDED UNTIL THE ENTIRE TEST PROCESS WAS REPEATED IN THE PRESENCE OF THE QUALITY CTL REPRESENTATIVE. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 778336: ACFT X CAME IN WITH AN INBOUND PLT WRITE-UP 'REPEAT OF LOG PAGE XXX -- GEAR LEVER OPS.' OUR DEPT WAS NOTIFIED THAT; PER ENGINEERING DEPT; WE; THE TECHNICIANS WORKING THE ACFT THIS DAY; WERE TO LUBRICATE THE PIVOT POINTS OF THE TILT ACTUATOR OF THE MAIN GEAR. AFTERWARD; WE WERE ASKED TO PLACE THE ITEM ON A MEL DEFERRAL; OR MEL. APPROX 2 HRS AFTER THIS WE WERE THEN NOTIFIED BY OUR MAINT OPS CTL CTR THAT THEY WANTED THE ITEM RESOLVED. BY THEN WE WERE TOLD THAT OUR TECHNICAL SUPPORT DEPT HAD BEEN ON THE ACFT COMPLYING WITH THE TROUBLESHOOTING PROC USING THE FIM (FAULT ISOLATION MANUAL). TASK WAS CHOSEN AND SUBSEQUENTLY VERIFIED THAT THE LNDG GEAR LEVER CTL MODULE WAS AT FAULT. SOON AFTERWARD WE MET UP WITH OUR TECH SUPPORT REPRESENTATIVES ON THE ACFT AND WAS MADE AWARE OF THE FAULT. I HAD REMOVED AND REPLACED THE LNDG GEAR LEVER CTL MODULE PER AMM. WE THEN COMPLIED WITH THE OP CHK OF THE ITEM AND FOUND IT TO BE OPERATING NORMAL. WE ALL VERIFIED THAT THE FAULT WAS FIXED. ALL INVOLVED WITH THIS ITEM WERE PRESENT AT THE TIME OF THE OP CHK. BY THIS TIME IT WAS APPROX 55 MINS TO THE ACFT'S DEP TIME. BY THIS TIME WE WERE MADE AWARE OFTHE FACT THAT THIS WAS AN RII (REQUIRED INSPECTION ITEM). NOW WITH TIME AGAINST US; ALONG WITH PRESSURE FROM OUR MAINT CTL; WE THEN DECIDED TO PLACE THE ITEM ON MEL AND ONCE THE ACFT RETURNED WE WOULD REPEAT THE OP CHK FOR THE LNDG GEAR LEVER CTL MODULE FOR A FINAL SIGNOFF TO CLR THE MEL. WE HAD ALSO ADVISED THE FLT CREW THAT THE LNDG GEAR CTL SYS WAS FULLY FUNCTIONAL BUT DUE TO TIME CONSTRAINTS ALONG WITH PRESSURE FROM MAINT OP WE COULD NOT PERFORM THE ENTIRE OP CHK A SECOND TIME FOR OUR QUALITY CTL DEPT. WE HAD ALSO ASKED THE FLT CREW TO MAKE A LOGBOOK ENTRY STATING IF THE LNDG GEAR CTL LEVER WAS IN FACT OPERATING AS IT SHOULD BE. THEY DID MAKE AN ENTRY STATING THAT THE GEAR HANDLE AND LNDG GEAR SYS WAS OPERATING NORMALLY. THE ONLY REASONS FOR THE MEL ON THIS ITEM WAS SOLELY DUE TO THE ABSENCE OF A QUALITY CTL REPRESENTATIVE AT THE TIME OF THE REMOVAL AND REPLACEMENT OF THE COMPONENT AND THE OP CHK OF IT AS WELL AS THE LACK OF GND TIME TO FULLY REPEAT THE OP CHK OF THE COMPONENT. NOT TO MENTION PRESSURE FROM OUR MAINT CTL; WHICH AT THE TIME COULD DECIDE WHETHER OR NOT TO INITIALLY PLACE THE ITEM ON MEL OR RESOLVING THE DISCREPANCY. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 778335: I INFORMED MAINT LINE CTL AND WDB (MAINT) THAT ACFT X HAD BEEN COMPLIED WITH WITHOUT AN INSPECTOR AND THAT THE ITEM WAS RII PER GMM AND THAT PRIOR TO THE ACFT DEP AN INSPECTOR WOULD HAVE TO GO OVER THE PAPERWORK; LOOK AT THE ACFT AND BUY BACK THE LOG PAGE. I SENT AN INSPECTOR TO CATCH UP WITH THE MECHS WORKING THE ACFT. SHORTLY AFTER WE STARTED TO GO OVER THE PAPERWORK WE WERE TOLD THAT THEY HAD TROUBLESHOT THE PROB PER THE FIM AND CHANGED THE LNDG GEAR CTL MODULE. AFTER WE STARTED TO LOOK INTO WHAT HAD BEEN DONE WE WERE INFORMED THAT THEY WERE GOING TO PLACE THE ITEM ON MEL AND OUR SVCS WERE NO LONGER NEEDED. I WAS TOLD THIS AFTER THE INSPECTOR RETURNED TO THE SHOP. AT THAT POINT I CALLED AND TALKED TO MAINT CTL AND WAS TOLD THAT THE ITEM WAS PLACED ON MEL AND THE ACFT WAS GOING TO FLY. I INFORMED THE MGR AND DIRECTOR OF THIS EVENT TO REQUEST FURTHER GUIDANCE.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of May 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.