Narrative:

We encountered a right wing body overheat indication. Main carriage and right wing body overheat light came on for about 30 seconds then went out. I opened the QRH for the appropriate checklist. After about 3 mins; the main carriage and right wing body overheat light came back on. The first officer took control of the aircraft and handled ATC communications. I accomplished the checklist and contacted maintenance control for input. My initial thoughts were to divert and I opened charts in preparation for such. After several mins of conversation with dispatch and their insistence it was an indication problem; I requested a duty flight manager for consult. The duty flight manager was put on via cell phone and considered our indications. His input was to not second guess the light. Communications with the duty flight manager were interrupted and not re-established. The fleet captain was requested and his input agreed with maintenance control. Considering a previous write-up and signoff for a similar intermittent indication; I accepted maintenance and the fleet captain's evaluation. The flight was now abeam ZZZ1. We descended to reduce power settings and the overheat indication remained on until on approach to ZZZ. The flight crews have been trained to use resources outside of the aircraft. Here; these resources tend to excuse away conditions and attempt to get the flight to continue to the destinations with little regard for indications the flight crews are facing. Little if any considerations are given to any limited abilities that aircraft discrepancies may impose. Time gets compressed for the flight crews and the delay/communications encouraged by the company keep the aircraft moving toward the destination. It seems flight crews must remove the outside inputs in making operational choices in the interest of safety.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B737-800 CAPTAIN IS CONCERNED THAT COMPANY MAINT AND FLT OPS DEPARTMENTS ACTIVELY URGE FLT CREWS TO NOT TAKE SYSTEM WARNINGS SUCH AS WING BODY OVERHEATS SERIOUSLY. FEELS INTENT IS TO ENSURE COMPLETION OF REVENUE FLTS RATHER THAN TO ENSURE THEIR SAFETY.

Narrative: WE ENCOUNTERED A R WING BODY OVERHEAT INDICATION. MAIN CARRIAGE AND R WING BODY OVERHEAT LIGHT CAME ON FOR ABOUT 30 SECONDS THEN WENT OUT. I OPENED THE QRH FOR THE APPROPRIATE CHKLIST. AFTER ABOUT 3 MINS; THE MAIN CARRIAGE AND R WING BODY OVERHEAT LIGHT CAME BACK ON. THE FO TOOK CTL OF THE ACFT AND HANDLED ATC COMS. I ACCOMPLISHED THE CHKLIST AND CONTACTED MAINT CTL FOR INPUT. MY INITIAL THOUGHTS WERE TO DIVERT AND I OPENED CHARTS IN PREPARATION FOR SUCH. AFTER SEVERAL MINS OF CONVERSATION WITH DISPATCH AND THEIR INSISTENCE IT WAS AN INDICATION PROB; I REQUESTED A DUTY FLT MGR FOR CONSULT. THE DUTY FLT MGR WAS PUT ON VIA CELL PHONE AND CONSIDERED OUR INDICATIONS. HIS INPUT WAS TO NOT SECOND GUESS THE LIGHT. COMS WITH THE DUTY FLT MGR WERE INTERRUPTED AND NOT RE-ESTABLISHED. THE FLEET CAPT WAS REQUESTED AND HIS INPUT AGREED WITH MAINT CTL. CONSIDERING A PREVIOUS WRITE-UP AND SIGNOFF FOR A SIMILAR INTERMITTENT INDICATION; I ACCEPTED MAINT AND THE FLEET CAPT'S EVALUATION. THE FLT WAS NOW ABEAM ZZZ1. WE DSNDED TO REDUCE PWR SETTINGS AND THE OVERHEAT INDICATION REMAINED ON UNTIL ON APCH TO ZZZ. THE FLT CREWS HAVE BEEN TRAINED TO USE RESOURCES OUTSIDE OF THE ACFT. HERE; THESE RESOURCES TEND TO EXCUSE AWAY CONDITIONS AND ATTEMPT TO GET THE FLT TO CONTINUE TO THE DESTS WITH LITTLE REGARD FOR INDICATIONS THE FLT CREWS ARE FACING. LITTLE IF ANY CONSIDERATIONS ARE GIVEN TO ANY LIMITED ABILITIES THAT ACFT DISCREPANCIES MAY IMPOSE. TIME GETS COMPRESSED FOR THE FLT CREWS AND THE DELAY/COMS ENCOURAGED BY THE COMPANY KEEP THE ACFT MOVING TOWARD THE DEST. IT SEEMS FLT CREWS MUST REMOVE THE OUTSIDE INPUTS IN MAKING OPERATIONAL CHOICES IN THE INTEREST OF SAFETY.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of May 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.