Narrative:

The flight ws to depart bil and arrive in hln. Upon contacting approach control at hln we were instructed to intercept the 15 DME arc for the ILS runway 27 approach. At this point our position was 20 mi east of hln. We were within 2 degrees of the final approach course for the ILS runway 27 localizer. Given our altitude of 9500 ft MSL and the notes for the approach; we thought we had to proceed to the hln (VOR) to fly a radial outbound to the 15 DME arc for the ILS runway 27 approach. Our interpretation was that we could not intercept the arc as required by note #1 and thus could not fly a straight-in approach for the ILS runway 27. There was confusion as to what the controller wanted us to do and what we were required to do. This confusion was compounded by our unfamiliarity with the local controller normal procedures. In review; it is clear that we should proceed to swedd intersection or wauts intersection to be able to intercept the 15 DME arc and fly the published ILS runway 27 approach. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: the first officer reported they were at 9500 ft MSL; in a non-radar environment and cleared to report established on the 15 DME arc. At that time they were within only a couple of degrees of the extended localizer and didn't feel they could make the ess turn required to establish the arc and still have adequate distance to intercept the localizer. They than made the bad decision to 'assume' a course of action; to wit; to proceed to the VOR and fly 'a radial' back to the arc. When approach control (suspected of being a trainee by virtue of background voices appearing to direct her actions) asked if they were 'established' they advised they were proceeding to the VOR. At this time the other controller told them to depart the VOR on the 053 radial and intercept the arc. This track would keep them at or above the associated meas. The flight crew failed to heed this instruction and instead turned left towards terrain higher than their current altitude. Approach provided an appropriate altitude for the arc intercept and the subsequent approach was without incident. Of note; reporter advised that between the two pilots there was only a single previous hln arrival and that had been a visual approach in cavu WX.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: FLT CREW OF GIV IS CONFUSED BY CLRNC TO INTERCEPT AND REPORT ESTABLISHED ON THE HLN 15D ME ARC TRANSITION ROUTE FOR THE RWY 27 ILS.

Narrative: THE FLT WS TO DEPART BIL AND ARRIVE IN HLN. UPON CONTACTING APCH CTL AT HLN WE WERE INSTRUCTED TO INTERCEPT THE 15 DME ARC FOR THE ILS RWY 27 APCH. AT THIS POINT OUR POS WAS 20 MI E OF HLN. WE WERE WITHIN 2 DEGS OF THE FINAL APCH COURSE FOR THE ILS RWY 27 LOC. GIVEN OUR ALT OF 9500 FT MSL AND THE NOTES FOR THE APCH; WE THOUGHT WE HAD TO PROCEED TO THE HLN (VOR) TO FLY A RADIAL OUTBOUND TO THE 15 DME ARC FOR THE ILS RWY 27 APCH. OUR INTERP WAS THAT WE COULD NOT INTERCEPT THE ARC AS REQUIRED BY NOTE #1 AND THUS COULD NOT FLY A STRAIGHT-IN APCH FOR THE ILS RWY 27. THERE WAS CONFUSION AS TO WHAT THE CTLR WANTED US TO DO AND WHAT WE WERE REQUIRED TO DO. THIS CONFUSION WAS COMPOUNDED BY OUR UNFAMILIARITY WITH THE LCL CTLR NORMAL PROCS. IN REVIEW; IT IS CLR THAT WE SHOULD PROCEED TO SWEDD INTXN OR WAUTS INTXN TO BE ABLE TO INTERCEPT THE 15 DME ARC AND FLY THE PUBLISHED ILS RWY 27 APCH. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: THE FO REPORTED THEY WERE AT 9500 FT MSL; IN A NON-RADAR ENVIRONMENT AND CLEARED TO REPORT ESTABLISHED ON THE 15 DME ARC. AT THAT TIME THEY WERE WITHIN ONLY A COUPLE OF DEGREES OF THE EXTENDED LOCALIZER AND DIDN'T FEEL THEY COULD MAKE THE ESS TURN REQUIRED TO ESTABLISH THE ARC AND STILL HAVE ADEQUATE DISTANCE TO INTERCEPT THE LOC. THEY THAN MADE THE BAD DECISION TO 'ASSUME' A COURSE OF ACTION; TO WIT; TO PROCEED TO THE VOR AND FLY 'A RADIAL' BACK TO THE ARC. WHEN APCH CTL (SUSPECTED OF BEING A TRAINEE BY VIRTUE OF BACKGROUND VOICES APPEARING TO DIRECT HER ACTIONS) ASKED IF THEY WERE 'ESTABLISHED' THEY ADVISED THEY WERE PROCEEDING TO THE VOR. AT THIS TIME THE OTHER CTLR TOLD THEM TO DEPART THE VOR ON THE 053 RADIAL AND INTERCEPT THE ARC. THIS TRACK WOULD KEEP THEM AT OR ABOVE THE ASSOCIATED MEAS. THE FLT CREW FAILED TO HEED THIS INSTRUCTION AND INSTEAD TURNED LEFT TOWARDS TERRAIN HIGHER THAN THEIR CURRENT ALT. APCH PROVIDED AN APPROPRIATE ALT FOR THE ARC INTERCEPT AND THE SUBSEQUENT APCH WAS WITHOUT INCIDENT. OF NOTE; REPORTER ADVISED THAT BETWEEN THE TWO PLTS THERE WAS ONLY A SINGLE PREVIOUS HLN ARRIVAL AND THAT HAD BEEN A VISUAL APCH IN CAVU WX.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of May 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.