Narrative:

The flight was the return portion of our high speed to ZZZ1-ZZZ2. After a normal takeoff roll with eai on and 100% torque we had a normal upwind and crosswind. Shortly after turning on course; I noticed as the PNF; the over-temperature light came on for engine #2. At this point we were about 1000 ft because I hadn't completed the after takeoff check; apparently the first officer was calling for it when my attention was diverted to the red light. My initial reaction was to pull the power lever back to reduce the temperature. I moved the power lever a minimal distance and the light went out; followed by a loss of more than 50% of our torque and another flash of the over-temperature light. Both times; the lights were on for probably no more than 5 seconds. At this point the torque remained at about 45% with obvious degradation of power. After assessing the situation; we decided #1; we were not continuing and #2 since there were no memory items or QRH procedures for this we would treat this as an engine failure. We declared an emergency and asked for vectors to keep us close to ZZZ3 and we'd eventually land at ZZZ3 after we performed the appropriate duties. I decided based on the experience level of the first officer (a little over a month on the line); that perhaps he should run the QRH and I would fly the airplane. We xferred controls to me and in the midst of the confusion when leveling off at 7000 ft I think I might have unintentionally exceeded the rudder limiter limitation speed of 180 KTS (it was deferred). It then became apparent that there would be questions as to what the first officer ought to say to dispatch; ATC; ZZZ3 operations; etc. So after he completed the memory items and QRH; I gave him control of the airplane and I talked with ATC; the flight attendant; the passenger; dispatch and ZZZ3 operations. During the securing of the engine it seemed that the first officer did not get the condition lever into the fuel off gate. Even though I was verifying the correct engine; condition lever and generator; I must have missed the effects of moving the condition lever into fuel off. I failed to recognize this while I was busy on the radios and briefing the appropriate people. It became apparent that something was not right when I returned from my communication duties and after a quick scan; I noticed the condition lever was partially in the gate; but just not enough to truly shut down the engine. Thankfully performance was not degraded too badly. At this point we xferred controls back to me and I resumed duties as the PF. We were unable to return visually so we elected to do the VOR approach to runway 7 as the winds were not favoring the ILS approach. Unfortunately I think I allowed us to get rushed to get on the ground; because I didn't want to get too far from ZZZ3. We accepted the approach before we should have and I failed to call for the descent; approach checks. We managed to get all the items done; but it was rushed. It also forced us into an unstabilized approach causing the 'too low gear' GPWS warning while configuring for the approach. I landed uneventfully and elected that since there was no severe damage or the need to evacuate; I would taxi to the gate. I figured that since ZZZ3 probably didn't have tug equipment and perhaps no means to transport 22 passenger; their bags and 3 crew members; it would be best to slowly and carefully taxi to the gate on 1 engine; which surprisingly is not nearly as hard as it is in the simulator. Upon shutdown; and a debrief with my crew I wrote the airplane up and conferred with maintenance. I'm not sure why the over-temperature light and degradation of power occurred. I do know that there was some confusion in the flight deck with multiple xfers of controls and allowing us to become rushed into landing. That was probably due to a combination of many factors such as fatigue; experience; nerves; adrenaline; no real guidance for our exact problem; etc. While we completed a safe flight; things could have been a little more organized and less rushed. Supplemental information from acn 762223: the captain was also handling all the radio calls at this point. We then realized the right engine had not completely shut down; and after he completed most of the radio work; it was discovered that I did not get the condition lever completely over the gate. Once I did that; the right engine was secured. We accepted a clearance to intercept the VOR approach inbound. I was completing items as quickly as possible. At the same time I dropped the gear handle; the taws activated with a 500 ft gear warning. The gear extended properly and the landing was made without any problems. Until the DFDR is analyzed; I cannot speculate as to why the engine would not respond. Not being configured earlier was due simply to not taking additional time to thoroughly complete all checklist earlier. Further; for me; it was day 3 of a high speed set of 3. It will be to all our advantages once we no longer mix regular trips with high speed trips. It can be; and in this case; extremely fatiguing. In the future I will always ensure that checklist are not rushed and time will be taken to complete all items required. Experience has taught me that a single engine failure/shutdown in the saab does not warrant a rush to return to the airport. Thank you to our training department for teaching this concept.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A SAAB 340 CREW REPORTS CONFUSION; FATIGUE; AND WX AFFECTING THEIR PERFORMANCE AFTER A POST TKOF POWER LOSS AND EMER RETURN TO LAND.

Narrative: THE FLT WAS THE RETURN PORTION OF OUR HIGH SPD TO ZZZ1-ZZZ2. AFTER A NORMAL TKOF ROLL WITH EAI ON AND 100% TORQUE WE HAD A NORMAL UPWIND AND XWIND. SHORTLY AFTER TURNING ON COURSE; I NOTICED AS THE PNF; THE OVER-TEMP LIGHT CAME ON FOR ENG #2. AT THIS POINT WE WERE ABOUT 1000 FT BECAUSE I HADN'T COMPLETED THE AFTER TKOF CHK; APPARENTLY THE FO WAS CALLING FOR IT WHEN MY ATTN WAS DIVERTED TO THE RED LIGHT. MY INITIAL REACTION WAS TO PULL THE PWR LEVER BACK TO REDUCE THE TEMP. I MOVED THE PWR LEVER A MINIMAL DISTANCE AND THE LIGHT WENT OUT; FOLLOWED BY A LOSS OF MORE THAN 50% OF OUR TORQUE AND ANOTHER FLASH OF THE OVER-TEMP LIGHT. BOTH TIMES; THE LIGHTS WERE ON FOR PROBABLY NO MORE THAN 5 SECONDS. AT THIS POINT THE TORQUE REMAINED AT ABOUT 45% WITH OBVIOUS DEGRADATION OF PWR. AFTER ASSESSING THE SITUATION; WE DECIDED #1; WE WERE NOT CONTINUING AND #2 SINCE THERE WERE NO MEMORY ITEMS OR QRH PROCS FOR THIS WE WOULD TREAT THIS AS AN ENG FAILURE. WE DECLARED AN EMER AND ASKED FOR VECTORS TO KEEP US CLOSE TO ZZZ3 AND WE'D EVENTUALLY LAND AT ZZZ3 AFTER WE PERFORMED THE APPROPRIATE DUTIES. I DECIDED BASED ON THE EXPERIENCE LEVEL OF THE FO (A LITTLE OVER A MONTH ON THE LINE); THAT PERHAPS HE SHOULD RUN THE QRH AND I WOULD FLY THE AIRPLANE. WE XFERRED CTLS TO ME AND IN THE MIDST OF THE CONFUSION WHEN LEVELING OFF AT 7000 FT I THINK I MIGHT HAVE UNINTENTIONALLY EXCEEDED THE RUDDER LIMITER LIMITATION SPD OF 180 KTS (IT WAS DEFERRED). IT THEN BECAME APPARENT THAT THERE WOULD BE QUESTIONS AS TO WHAT THE FO OUGHT TO SAY TO DISPATCH; ATC; ZZZ3 OPS; ETC. SO AFTER HE COMPLETED THE MEMORY ITEMS AND QRH; I GAVE HIM CTL OF THE AIRPLANE AND I TALKED WITH ATC; THE FLT ATTENDANT; THE PAX; DISPATCH AND ZZZ3 OPS. DURING THE SECURING OF THE ENG IT SEEMED THAT THE FO DID NOT GET THE CONDITION LEVER INTO THE FUEL OFF GATE. EVEN THOUGH I WAS VERIFYING THE CORRECT ENG; CONDITION LEVER AND GENERATOR; I MUST HAVE MISSED THE EFFECTS OF MOVING THE CONDITION LEVER INTO FUEL OFF. I FAILED TO RECOGNIZE THIS WHILE I WAS BUSY ON THE RADIOS AND BRIEFING THE APPROPRIATE PEOPLE. IT BECAME APPARENT THAT SOMETHING WAS NOT RIGHT WHEN I RETURNED FROM MY COM DUTIES AND AFTER A QUICK SCAN; I NOTICED THE CONDITION LEVER WAS PARTIALLY IN THE GATE; BUT JUST NOT ENOUGH TO TRULY SHUT DOWN THE ENG. THANKFULLY PERFORMANCE WAS NOT DEGRADED TOO BADLY. AT THIS POINT WE XFERRED CTLS BACK TO ME AND I RESUMED DUTIES AS THE PF. WE WERE UNABLE TO RETURN VISUALLY SO WE ELECTED TO DO THE VOR APCH TO RWY 7 AS THE WINDS WERE NOT FAVORING THE ILS APCH. UNFORTUNATELY I THINK I ALLOWED US TO GET RUSHED TO GET ON THE GND; BECAUSE I DIDN'T WANT TO GET TOO FAR FROM ZZZ3. WE ACCEPTED THE APCH BEFORE WE SHOULD HAVE AND I FAILED TO CALL FOR THE DSCNT; APCH CHKS. WE MANAGED TO GET ALL THE ITEMS DONE; BUT IT WAS RUSHED. IT ALSO FORCED US INTO AN UNSTABILIZED APCH CAUSING THE 'TOO LOW GEAR' GPWS WARNING WHILE CONFIGURING FOR THE APCH. I LANDED UNEVENTFULLY AND ELECTED THAT SINCE THERE WAS NO SEVERE DAMAGE OR THE NEED TO EVACUATE; I WOULD TAXI TO THE GATE. I FIGURED THAT SINCE ZZZ3 PROBABLY DIDN'T HAVE TUG EQUIP AND PERHAPS NO MEANS TO TRANSPORT 22 PAX; THEIR BAGS AND 3 CREW MEMBERS; IT WOULD BE BEST TO SLOWLY AND CAREFULLY TAXI TO THE GATE ON 1 ENG; WHICH SURPRISINGLY IS NOT NEARLY AS HARD AS IT IS IN THE SIMULATOR. UPON SHUTDOWN; AND A DEBRIEF WITH MY CREW I WROTE THE AIRPLANE UP AND CONFERRED WITH MAINT. I'M NOT SURE WHY THE OVER-TEMP LIGHT AND DEGRADATION OF PWR OCCURRED. I DO KNOW THAT THERE WAS SOME CONFUSION IN THE FLT DECK WITH MULTIPLE XFERS OF CTLS AND ALLOWING US TO BECOME RUSHED INTO LNDG. THAT WAS PROBABLY DUE TO A COMBINATION OF MANY FACTORS SUCH AS FATIGUE; EXPERIENCE; NERVES; ADRENALINE; NO REAL GUIDANCE FOR OUR EXACT PROB; ETC. WHILE WE COMPLETED A SAFE FLT; THINGS COULD HAVE BEEN A LITTLE MORE ORGANIZED AND LESS RUSHED. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 762223: THE CAPT WAS ALSO HANDLING ALL THE RADIO CALLS AT THIS POINT. WE THEN REALIZED THE R ENG HAD NOT COMPLETELY SHUT DOWN; AND AFTER HE COMPLETED MOST OF THE RADIO WORK; IT WAS DISCOVERED THAT I DID NOT GET THE CONDITION LEVER COMPLETELY OVER THE GATE. ONCE I DID THAT; THE R ENG WAS SECURED. WE ACCEPTED A CLRNC TO INTERCEPT THE VOR APCH INBOUND. I WAS COMPLETING ITEMS AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE. AT THE SAME TIME I DROPPED THE GEAR HANDLE; THE TAWS ACTIVATED WITH A 500 FT GEAR WARNING. THE GEAR EXTENDED PROPERLY AND THE LNDG WAS MADE WITHOUT ANY PROBS. UNTIL THE DFDR IS ANALYZED; I CANNOT SPECULATE AS TO WHY THE ENG WOULD NOT RESPOND. NOT BEING CONFIGURED EARLIER WAS DUE SIMPLY TO NOT TAKING ADDITIONAL TIME TO THOROUGHLY COMPLETE ALL CHKLIST EARLIER. FURTHER; FOR ME; IT WAS DAY 3 OF A HIGH SPD SET OF 3. IT WILL BE TO ALL OUR ADVANTAGES ONCE WE NO LONGER MIX REGULAR TRIPS WITH HIGH SPD TRIPS. IT CAN BE; AND IN THIS CASE; EXTREMELY FATIGUING. IN THE FUTURE I WILL ALWAYS ENSURE THAT CHKLIST ARE NOT RUSHED AND TIME WILL BE TAKEN TO COMPLETE ALL ITEMS REQUIRED. EXPERIENCE HAS TAUGHT ME THAT A SINGLE ENG FAILURE/SHUTDOWN IN THE SAAB DOES NOT WARRANT A RUSH TO RETURN TO THE ARPT. THANK YOU TO OUR TRAINING DEPT FOR TEACHING THIS CONCEPT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.