Narrative:

During preflight I made a decision to reject the aircraft assigned due to a leading edge flap actuator problem. Without going into the decision making matrix in this report; I discussed the situation with dispatch; and the flight crew; and we all decided that this was a sound decision based on the circumstances; even though the MEL allowed for dispatch. Onboard the aircraft; after refusing the aircraft for maintenance reasons; a first officer from the flight office approached me. He stated that he wanted to discuss why I had refused the aircraft. When I explained in general terms why I had; he stated that he understood the aircraft to be legal to be flown according to the MEL. I explained to him that I had a fundamental philosophical problem with having to explain myself to a first officer who is in a position that is supposed to be strictly administrative by agreement between the association and the company. I explained that I respected him as an individual but that because of this concern; and additionally that I found his approaching me with information about whether or not the aircraft should; or could be flown according to the MEL to be second guessing my decision; and to be intimidation from management. We had a long philosophical discussion during which I asked him if he talked with dispatch; or if operations had talked to dispatch. He said no. During this period and before; a maintenance representative told me 4 times that the airplane was legal to fly and asked if I would fly it. I wasn't quite sure why after I explained to him 1 time that he felt the need to push me 3 more times. An individual; who I was not familiar with; approached me 2 or 3 times; the final time while I was seated in operations waiting for the crew desk to advise what would happen was present. We were discussing with my crew the very high state of stress; distrust of senior management; distrs to flight crews; and the historic low morale of air carrier pilots and what could be done to fix these problems. This individual; who I think was some kind of maintenance supervisor; seemed to be attempting to get the decision whether or not to accept the airplane changed. When a captain makes a decision that is a sound decision based on flight safety; it seems counter to common sense and safety being our #1 priority to second guess that decision with this level of voracity. I was told the aircraft wasn't fixed during its 19 hour layover because of a 'manpower' problem. To ask flight crews to fly defective aircraft because maintenance is short is not the answer to solving the problem. First officer's who work in the flight office as administrative help should never be second guessing a captain's decision.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B747 CAPTAIN REJECTS ACFT WITH LEADING EDGE FLAP ACTUATOR ON MEL AND IS ADMONISHED BY A REPRESENTATIVE FROM THE CHIEF PILOT'S OFFICE.

Narrative: DURING PREFLT I MADE A DECISION TO REJECT THE ACFT ASSIGNED DUE TO A LEADING EDGE FLAP ACTUATOR PROB. WITHOUT GOING INTO THE DECISION MAKING MATRIX IN THIS RPT; I DISCUSSED THE SITUATION WITH DISPATCH; AND THE FLT CREW; AND WE ALL DECIDED THAT THIS WAS A SOUND DECISION BASED ON THE CIRCUMSTANCES; EVEN THOUGH THE MEL ALLOWED FOR DISPATCH. ONBOARD THE ACFT; AFTER REFUSING THE ACFT FOR MAINT REASONS; A FO FROM THE FLT OFFICE APCHED ME. HE STATED THAT HE WANTED TO DISCUSS WHY I HAD REFUSED THE ACFT. WHEN I EXPLAINED IN GENERAL TERMS WHY I HAD; HE STATED THAT HE UNDERSTOOD THE ACFT TO BE LEGAL TO BE FLOWN ACCORDING TO THE MEL. I EXPLAINED TO HIM THAT I HAD A FUNDAMENTAL PHILOSOPHICAL PROB WITH HAVING TO EXPLAIN MYSELF TO A FO WHO IS IN A POS THAT IS SUPPOSED TO BE STRICTLY ADMINISTRATIVE BY AGREEMENT BTWN THE ASSOCIATION AND THE COMPANY. I EXPLAINED THAT I RESPECTED HIM AS AN INDIVIDUAL BUT THAT BECAUSE OF THIS CONCERN; AND ADDITIONALLY THAT I FOUND HIS APCHING ME WITH INFO ABOUT WHETHER OR NOT THE ACFT SHOULD; OR COULD BE FLOWN ACCORDING TO THE MEL TO BE SECOND GUESSING MY DECISION; AND TO BE INTIMIDATION FROM MGMNT. WE HAD A LONG PHILOSOPHICAL DISCUSSION DURING WHICH I ASKED HIM IF HE TALKED WITH DISPATCH; OR IF OPS HAD TALKED TO DISPATCH. HE SAID NO. DURING THIS PERIOD AND BEFORE; A MAINT REPRESENTATIVE TOLD ME 4 TIMES THAT THE AIRPLANE WAS LEGAL TO FLY AND ASKED IF I WOULD FLY IT. I WASN'T QUITE SURE WHY AFTER I EXPLAINED TO HIM 1 TIME THAT HE FELT THE NEED TO PUSH ME 3 MORE TIMES. AN INDIVIDUAL; WHO I WAS NOT FAMILIAR WITH; APCHED ME 2 OR 3 TIMES; THE FINAL TIME WHILE I WAS SEATED IN OPS WAITING FOR THE CREW DESK TO ADVISE WHAT WOULD HAPPEN WAS PRESENT. WE WERE DISCUSSING WITH MY CREW THE VERY HIGH STATE OF STRESS; DISTRUST OF SENIOR MGMNT; DISTRS TO FLT CREWS; AND THE HISTORIC LOW MORALE OF ACR PLTS AND WHAT COULD BE DONE TO FIX THESE PROBS. THIS INDIVIDUAL; WHO I THINK WAS SOME KIND OF MAINT SUPVR; SEEMED TO BE ATTEMPTING TO GET THE DECISION WHETHER OR NOT TO ACCEPT THE AIRPLANE CHANGED. WHEN A CAPT MAKES A DECISION THAT IS A SOUND DECISION BASED ON FLT SAFETY; IT SEEMS COUNTER TO COMMON SENSE AND SAFETY BEING OUR #1 PRIORITY TO SECOND GUESS THAT DECISION WITH THIS LEVEL OF VORACITY. I WAS TOLD THE ACFT WASN'T FIXED DURING ITS 19 HR LAYOVER BECAUSE OF A 'MANPOWER' PROB. TO ASK FLT CREWS TO FLY DEFECTIVE ACFT BECAUSE MAINT IS SHORT IS NOT THE ANSWER TO SOLVING THE PROB. FO'S WHO WORK IN THE FLT OFFICE AS ADMINISTRATIVE HELP SHOULD NEVER BE SECOND GUESSING A CAPT'S DECISION.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.