Narrative:

I suspect a failed fadec on engine #2. Turning final at about 4000 ft MSL ECAM indicated 'engine 2 fail.' I confirmed engine failure by selecting speed (no visible damage; normal indications considering engine shutdown 'wind-milling'). I directed flaps 3 degrees (mcdu and GPWS flaps 3 degrees selected) and continued the visual approach keeping the speed slightly high. Normal landing. ECAM 'engine 2 fail' verified by no engine response when speed selected. The event occurred on short final. I relied on my experience and training. A safe landing was the priority since we were on short final and speed slightly high. I considered an immediate landing was the best option. I commanded flaps 3 degrees and landing checklist. The short time required our focused attention; therefore; I elected not to declare an emergency or inform the flight attendant. I did not see any need to cause alarm at that time (phase of flight) and I considered the communication would have been a distraction. The first officer did an outstanding job. Never broke a sweat and was a focused crew member. As these engines get older it is mandatory that every takeoff is made using reduced thrust when conditions permit. I have flown 40 yr old B-707's and the care given to the equipment by each and every crew member directly impacts the engine performance. The team takes care of our engines. I know there are a lot of factors involved; but the primary focus regarding engine performance from flight crews is reduced thrust; FOD reports; detection of possible FOD hazards; wind blown FOD (stop the aircraft); policing the pushback area; etc. Every takeoff I make is with reduced thrust when conditions permit. No contract is worth degrading safety. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: the reporter had no information as to what caused the engine to fail. Engine failures during approach had been the subject of simulator training scenarios over the years and continuing for a landing was always considered to be the best choice when time was limited and a safe landing could easily be accomplished.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A320 FLT CREW REPORTS ENGINE FAILURE AT 1800 FEET AGL DURING APPROACH. FLT CREW CONFIGURES FOR ENGINE OUT AND LANDS WITHOUT DECLARING AN EMERGENCY.

Narrative: I SUSPECT A FAILED FADEC ON ENG #2. TURNING FINAL AT ABOUT 4000 FT MSL ECAM INDICATED 'ENG 2 FAIL.' I CONFIRMED ENG FAILURE BY SELECTING SPD (NO VISIBLE DAMAGE; NORMAL INDICATIONS CONSIDERING ENG SHUTDOWN 'WIND-MILLING'). I DIRECTED FLAPS 3 DEGS (MCDU AND GPWS FLAPS 3 DEGS SELECTED) AND CONTINUED THE VISUAL APCH KEEPING THE SPD SLIGHTLY HIGH. NORMAL LNDG. ECAM 'ENG 2 FAIL' VERIFIED BY NO ENG RESPONSE WHEN SPD SELECTED. THE EVENT OCCURRED ON SHORT FINAL. I RELIED ON MY EXPERIENCE AND TRAINING. A SAFE LNDG WAS THE PRIORITY SINCE WE WERE ON SHORT FINAL AND SPD SLIGHTLY HIGH. I CONSIDERED AN IMMEDIATE LNDG WAS THE BEST OPTION. I COMMANDED FLAPS 3 DEGS AND LNDG CHKLIST. THE SHORT TIME REQUIRED OUR FOCUSED ATTN; THEREFORE; I ELECTED NOT TO DECLARE AN EMER OR INFORM THE FLT ATTENDANT. I DID NOT SEE ANY NEED TO CAUSE ALARM AT THAT TIME (PHASE OF FLT) AND I CONSIDERED THE COM WOULD HAVE BEEN A DISTR. THE FO DID AN OUTSTANDING JOB. NEVER BROKE A SWEAT AND WAS A FOCUSED CREW MEMBER. AS THESE ENGS GET OLDER IT IS MANDATORY THAT EVERY TKOF IS MADE USING REDUCED THRUST WHEN CONDITIONS PERMIT. I HAVE FLOWN 40 YR OLD B-707'S AND THE CARE GIVEN TO THE EQUIP BY EACH AND EVERY CREW MEMBER DIRECTLY IMPACTS THE ENG PERFORMANCE. THE TEAM TAKES CARE OF OUR ENGS. I KNOW THERE ARE A LOT OF FACTORS INVOLVED; BUT THE PRIMARY FOCUS REGARDING ENG PERFORMANCE FROM FLT CREWS IS REDUCED THRUST; FOD RPTS; DETECTION OF POSSIBLE FOD HAZARDS; WIND BLOWN FOD (STOP THE ACFT); POLICING THE PUSHBACK AREA; ETC. EVERY TKOF I MAKE IS WITH REDUCED THRUST WHEN CONDITIONS PERMIT. NO CONTRACT IS WORTH DEGRADING SAFETY. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: THE REPORTER HAD NO INFORMATION AS TO WHAT CAUSED THE ENGINE TO FAIL. ENGINE FAILURES DURING APPROACH HAD BEEN THE SUBJECT OF SIMULATOR TRAINING SCENARIOS OVER THE YEARS AND CONTINUING FOR A LANDING WAS ALWAYS CONSIDERED TO BE THE BEST CHOICE WHEN TIME WAS LIMITED AND A SAFE LANDING COULD EASILY BE ACCOMPLISHED.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.