Narrative:

I feel this approach and landing needs reporting because I feel it created increased risks to operational safety and should have been avoidable. The scenario reflects poor coordination by ATC approach and tower controllers. I was on the spane four arrival into slc. When handed over from slc center to a slc approach controller; I reported that I had the current ATIS and requested the ILS to runway 16L. I was told my request would be considered but that I should expect the ILS runway 16R; which I then set up for in the cockpit. I was descending at 1000 FPM with an IAS of 136K. On the downwind for the approach I was asked for my maximum forward speed; and I offered to increase speed to 145K; which I did. Shortly thereafter; approach requested I increase my rate of descent; so I increased the rate of descent from 1000 FPM to 1500 FPM. I was given a vector to turn to the east to intercept the localizer; at which time I was told to expect runway 16L instead of runway 16R and change frequencies to talk with the controller for runway 17L. This involved changing approach plates and deleting and reloading the correct approach into the garmin 530. At the same time the runway 16L controller said; 'I am either going to give you the ILS runway 16L or the visual to runway 16L; please keep your approach speed up' to which I replied; 'either the ILS or the visual would be acceptable to me' since the WX was VMC. I was given serial vectors to intercept the ILS runway 16L localizer. I did intercept the localizer but before reaching the FAF was cleared for the visual approach for runway 16L and handed off to the tower controller for runway 16L. Just after I was inside the FAF for the ILS runway 16L; the runway 16L tower controller told me a boeing 737 was departing just ahead of me on runway 16L and 'caution wake turbulence -- could you take the visual approach to runway 14?' at this point I felt I was in such proximity to the departing B737 that my options were to go around or accept runway 14 which was in sight. As I was contemplating the safest option; the tower controller issued some terse instructions about avoiding some txwys around runway 14 which I did not understand; nor did I have time to look up and try to decipher on the airport map since at this time I was about 500 ft AGL. I checked the runway 14 length and replied I could accept the visual to runway 14. I was given one last frequency change to the tower controller for runway 14. I started a 10-20 degree right turn for a very short left base before turning for a short final for runway 14. The controller then said I was getting too far to the west and 'did you not copy my instructions about avoiding certain ground reference txwys!' I replied that I had not understood her instructions and asked that she repeat them; to which she replied only; 'cleared to land runway 14.' this experience for me was frustrating and; I believe; created unnecessary hazard and was potentially avoidable. Perhaps I should have been more decisive and insisted on staying with the ILS to runway 16L; and not agreed to accept the visual to runway 16L. However; this would have led to my having to go around to avoid the departing B737 that was just ahead of me. I was landing at an airport I had visited once 18 months ago. I was not familiar with the surface txwys or runway 14. I had landed previously on runway 17 which is now closed. I realize the controller had no way of knowing I was not thoroughly familiar with the airport. However; being rushed by ATC to increase approach speed and rates of descent; to then end up in a position too close behind departing heavy traffic to land safely is irritating. Additionally irritating was being given verbal instructions about how to fly my approach to runway 14 when I was at 400-500 ft AGL. I was given instructions I could not understand nor did I have adequate time to look up and decipher the urgently uttered and terse instructions. What seems particularly unfortunate to me is that we have no forum in which such events as I experienced could be calmly discussed with the local ATC quality coordination; the controllers; and pilot (south) involved in unusual cases; so all could learn from each other. This would help provide an environment of continual learning and one that would support greater operational safety. I am not an ATC controller and have not had their training. Although some controllers are pilots; many are not. We all share the goal of maximizing operational safety. I wish I knew what could be done to help develop and support an operational forum for learning where all could learn from each other about the challenges and dynamics of operations from everyone's perspective.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: PA46 PLT RPTS MULTIPLE CHANGES OF RWY ASSIGNMENT DURING APCH TO SLC.

Narrative: I FEEL THIS APCH AND LNDG NEEDS RPTING BECAUSE I FEEL IT CREATED INCREASED RISKS TO OPERATIONAL SAFETY AND SHOULD HAVE BEEN AVOIDABLE. THE SCENARIO REFLECTS POOR COORD BY ATC APCH AND TWR CTLRS. I WAS ON THE SPANE FOUR ARR INTO SLC. WHEN HANDED OVER FROM SLC CENTER TO A SLC APCH CTLR; I RPTED THAT I HAD THE CURRENT ATIS AND REQUESTED THE ILS TO RWY 16L. I WAS TOLD MY REQUEST WOULD BE CONSIDERED BUT THAT I SHOULD EXPECT THE ILS RWY 16R; WHICH I THEN SET UP FOR IN THE COCKPIT. I WAS DSNDING AT 1000 FPM WITH AN IAS OF 136K. ON THE DOWNWIND FOR THE APCH I WAS ASKED FOR MY MAX FORWARD SPEED; AND I OFFERED TO INCREASE SPEED TO 145K; WHICH I DID. SHORTLY THEREAFTER; APCH REQUESTED I INCREASE MY RATE OF DSCNT; SO I INCREASED THE RATE OF DSCNT FROM 1000 FPM TO 1500 FPM. I WAS GIVEN A VECTOR TO TURN TO THE E TO INTERCEPT THE LOC; AT WHICH TIME I WAS TOLD TO EXPECT RWY 16L INSTEAD OF RWY 16R AND CHANGE FREQUENCIES TO TALK WITH THE CTLR FOR RWY 17L. THIS INVOLVED CHANGING APCH PLATES AND DELETING AND RELOADING THE CORRECT APCH INTO THE GARMIN 530. AT THE SAME TIME THE RWY 16L CTLR SAID; 'I AM EITHER GOING TO GIVE YOU THE ILS RWY 16L OR THE VISUAL TO RWY 16L; PLEASE KEEP YOUR APCH SPEED UP' TO WHICH I REPLIED; 'EITHER THE ILS OR THE VISUAL WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE TO ME' SINCE THE WX WAS VMC. I WAS GIVEN SERIAL VECTORS TO INTERCEPT THE ILS RWY 16L LOC. I DID INTERCEPT THE LOC BUT BEFORE REACHING THE FAF WAS CLRED FOR THE VISUAL APCH FOR RWY 16L AND HANDED OFF TO THE TWR CTLR FOR RWY 16L. JUST AFTER I WAS INSIDE THE FAF FOR THE ILS RWY 16L; THE RWY 16L TWR CTLR TOLD ME A BOEING 737 WAS DEPARTING JUST AHEAD OF ME ON RWY 16L AND 'CAUTION WAKE TURB -- COULD YOU TAKE THE VISUAL APCH TO RWY 14?' AT THIS POINT I FELT I WAS IN SUCH PROXIMITY TO THE DEPARTING B737 THAT MY OPTIONS WERE TO GAR OR ACCEPT RWY 14 WHICH WAS IN SIGHT. AS I WAS CONTEMPLATING THE SAFEST OPTION; THE TWR CTLR ISSUED SOME TERSE INSTRUCTIONS ABOUT AVOIDING SOME TXWYS AROUND RWY 14 WHICH I DID NOT UNDERSTAND; NOR DID I HAVE TIME TO LOOK UP AND TRY TO DECIPHER ON THE ARPT MAP SINCE AT THIS TIME I WAS ABOUT 500 FT AGL. I CHECKED THE RWY 14 LENGTH AND REPLIED I COULD ACCEPT THE VISUAL TO RWY 14. I WAS GIVEN ONE LAST FREQUENCY CHANGE TO THE TWR CTLR FOR RWY 14. I STARTED A 10-20 DEG R TURN FOR A VERY SHORT L BASE BEFORE TURNING FOR A SHORT FINAL FOR RWY 14. THE CTLR THEN SAID I WAS GETTING TOO FAR TO THE W AND 'DID YOU NOT COPY MY INSTRUCTIONS ABOUT AVOIDING CERTAIN GROUND REFERENCE TXWYS!' I REPLIED THAT I HAD NOT UNDERSTOOD HER INSTRUCTIONS AND ASKED THAT SHE REPEAT THEM; TO WHICH SHE REPLIED ONLY; 'CLRED TO LAND RWY 14.' THIS EXPERIENCE FOR ME WAS FRUSTRATING AND; I BELIEVE; CREATED UNNECESSARY HAZARD AND WAS POTENTIALLY AVOIDABLE. PERHAPS I SHOULD HAVE BEEN MORE DECISIVE AND INSISTED ON STAYING WITH THE ILS TO RWY 16L; AND NOT AGREED TO ACCEPT THE VISUAL TO RWY 16L. HOWEVER; THIS WOULD HAVE LED TO MY HAVING TO GAR TO AVOID THE DEPARTING B737 THAT WAS JUST AHEAD OF ME. I WAS LANDING AT AN ARPT I HAD VISITED ONCE 18 MONTHS AGO. I WAS NOT FAMILIAR WITH THE SURFACE TXWYS OR RWY 14. I HAD LANDED PREVIOUSLY ON RWY 17 WHICH IS NOW CLOSED. I REALIZE THE CTLR HAD NO WAY OF KNOWING I WAS NOT THOROUGHLY FAMILIAR WITH THE ARPT. HOWEVER; BEING RUSHED BY ATC TO INCREASE APCH SPEED AND RATES OF DSCNT; TO THEN END UP IN A POSITION TOO CLOSE BEHIND DEPARTING HEAVY TFC TO LAND SAFELY IS IRRITATING. ADDITIONALLY IRRITATING WAS BEING GIVEN VERBAL INSTRUCTIONS ABOUT HOW TO FLY MY APCH TO RWY 14 WHEN I WAS AT 400-500 FT AGL. I WAS GIVEN INSTRUCTIONS I COULD NOT UNDERSTAND NOR DID I HAVE ADEQUATE TIME TO LOOK UP AND DECIPHER THE URGENTLY UTTERED AND TERSE INSTRUCTIONS. WHAT SEEMS PARTICULARLY UNFORTUNATE TO ME IS THAT WE HAVE NO FORUM IN WHICH SUCH EVENTS AS I EXPERIENCED COULD BE CALMLY DISCUSSED WITH THE LOCAL ATC QUALITY COORD; THE CTLRS; AND PLT (S) INVOLVED IN UNUSUAL CASES; SO ALL COULD LEARN FROM EACH OTHER. THIS WOULD HELP PROVIDE AN ENVIRONMENT OF CONTINUAL LEARNING AND ONE THAT WOULD SUPPORT GREATER OPERATIONAL SAFETY. I AM NOT AN ATC CTLR AND HAVE NOT HAD THEIR TRAINING. ALTHOUGH SOME CTLRS ARE PLTS; MANY ARE NOT. WE ALL SHARE THE GOAL OF MAXIMIZING OPERATIONAL SAFETY. I WISH I KNEW WHAT COULD BE DONE TO HELP DEVELOP AND SUPPORT AN OPERATIONAL FORUM FOR LEARNING WHERE ALL COULD LEARN FROM EACH OTHER ABOUT THE CHALLENGES AND DYNAMICS OF OPERATIONS FROM EVERYONE'S PERSPECTIVE.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.