Narrative:

At mhk helicopters from nearby fri are a real nuisance; particularly when the tower is closed and especially after dark. The problem is mostly caused by the fact that they either refuse or are unaware of standard traffic pattern operating procedures. Often these helicopters hover over the runway for extended periods of time (upwards of five minutes); and when aircraft (it should also be pointed out that mhk is a fairly busy airport) need to take off or land they will often sidestep the runway by mere ft and call clear. Their radio phraseology is vague and unclear and sometimes inexistent. Often they appear distracted and seem completely unaware of the presence of other traffic. The problem is further compounded by the fact that they are an extremely dark aircraft (they are designed to be camouflaged); with very little lighting. As an example let me explain a mishap in which I was involved occurring may 2007. After having just taken off (avoiding a helicopter which had sidestepped the runway no less) with my student to get in some night takeoff and lndgs; we made a TA on downwind announcing our intentions to execute an option on runway 3. We were aware of the presence of another helicopter which was stationary over the approach end to runway 3. No acknowledgement was received from the helicopter. Turning base I was monitoring the progress of the helicopter and made the decision that after turning final if the helicopter showed no signs of moving I would execute a go around. Upon turning final I made another TA (much louder and more assertively) that we were on a half mile final for runway 3; upon which immediately the helicopter lifted off and appeared to proceed upwind. At this point I felt assured that the helicopter was no longer a factor and made the decision to land. After making the decision; I proceeded to explain the VASI lighting system to my student; pointing out how we were on a nice glideslope; red over white. Student mentioned that his airspeed was a little fast; I concurred. Generally we look for about 65 KTS and we were approaching at 70 KTS. He pitched up and slightly reduced the power. Approximately 200 ft above the ground; I looked up and realized the helicopter had not proceeded downwind but rather had began hovering approximately 200 to 300 ft above the ground. Even though I had visually been scanning for the helicopter I was unable to see the helicopter until this point (they are very dark aircraft; extremely hard to see; and not very well lit) even after obtaining a visual on the helicopter. At this point he appeared to be about two-thirds of the way down the runway (once again very difficult to see at night). At this point my options were limited. I could have executed a go around but elected not to; fearing a mid-air collision with the helicopter (especially being that the helicopter appeared to be paying no attention to my radio calls). A go around followed by an immediate turn I felt was not an option due partly to our close proximity to the ground and also fearing the risk of a mid-air collision with the other helicopter in the pattern. So; believing that the helicopter was two-thirds down the runway; elected to land and attempt to stop before entering the rotor wash. Over the threshold I realized that he was in fact not two-thirds of the way down the runway but rather hovering approximately over the thousand foot markers at approximately 200 ft above the runway. At this point we were completely committed to land. Our main wheels touched down initially until we caught a gust of wind from the outflow of the propeller wash which caused us to balloon to approximately 2 ft above the runway. At this point we entered the down flow of the propeller wash which forced us to the ground. Our main wheels landed first followed by our nosewheel which collapsed on impact. We skidded for approximately 25 ft before coming to rest. I elected to leave the master switch on so that the lights would remain illuminated. My initial fear; now becoming aware of the helicopter's complete obliviousness to our existence; was that the helicopter would land on top of us. My suspicions as to the helicopter's complete lack of awareness were compounded by the fact that he continued to hover aboveus for at least another minute. At this point I made a quick radio call announcing the fact that there was a disabled aircraft on the runway and then left the aircraft seeking help.callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: reporter stated that he has been working at mhk for a number of months and has subjectively observed that military training has increased at mhk. One runway at fri is closed and because mhk is only 7 miles away; it is a more convenient training location.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A C172 PILOT REPORTS MILITARY NIGHT TRAINING TFC CONFLICTING WITH CIVIL TRAINING TFC AT MHK. DISTANCE JUDGEMENT DIFFICULTLY CAUSED NOSE GEAR COLLAPSE AFTER PASSING UNDER A HOVERING HELICOPTER.

Narrative: AT MHK HELIS FROM NEARBY FRI ARE A REAL NUISANCE; PARTICULARLY WHEN THE TWR IS CLOSED AND ESPECIALLY AFTER DARK. THE PROB IS MOSTLY CAUSED BY THE FACT THAT THEY EITHER REFUSE OR ARE UNAWARE OF STANDARD TFC PATTERN OPERATING PROCS. OFTEN THESE HELIS HOVER OVER THE RWY FOR EXTENDED PERIODS OF TIME (UPWARDS OF FIVE MINUTES); AND WHEN ACFT (IT SHOULD ALSO BE POINTED OUT THAT MHK IS A FAIRLY BUSY ARPT) NEED TO TAKE OFF OR LAND THEY WILL OFTEN SIDESTEP THE RWY BY MERE FT AND CALL CLEAR. THEIR RADIO PHRASEOLOGY IS VAGUE AND UNCLEAR AND SOMETIMES INEXISTENT. OFTEN THEY APPEAR DISTRACTED AND SEEM COMPLETELY UNAWARE OF THE PRESENCE OF OTHER TFC. THE PROB IS FURTHER COMPOUNDED BY THE FACT THAT THEY ARE AN EXTREMELY DARK ACFT (THEY ARE DESIGNED TO BE CAMOUFLAGED); WITH VERY LITTLE LIGHTING. AS AN EXAMPLE LET ME EXPLAIN A MISHAP IN WHICH I WAS INVOLVED OCCURRING MAY 2007. AFTER HAVING JUST TAKEN OFF (AVOIDING A HELI WHICH HAD SIDESTEPPED THE RWY NO LESS) WITH MY STUDENT TO GET IN SOME NIGHT TAKEOFF AND LNDGS; WE MADE A TA ON DOWNWIND ANNOUNCING OUR INTENTIONS TO EXECUTE AN OPTION ON RWY 3. WE WERE AWARE OF THE PRESENCE OF ANOTHER HELI WHICH WAS STATIONARY OVER THE APCH END TO RWY 3. NO ACKNOWLEDGEMENT WAS RECEIVED FROM THE HELI. TURNING BASE I WAS MONITORING THE PROGRESS OF THE HELI AND MADE THE DECISION THAT AFTER TURNING FINAL IF THE HELI SHOWED NO SIGNS OF MOVING I WOULD EXECUTE A GO AROUND. UPON TURNING FINAL I MADE ANOTHER TA (MUCH LOUDER AND MORE ASSERTIVELY) THAT WE WERE ON A HALF MILE FINAL FOR RWY 3; UPON WHICH IMMEDIATELY THE HELI LIFTED OFF AND APPEARED TO PROCEED UPWIND. AT THIS POINT I FELT ASSURED THAT THE HELI WAS NO LONGER A FACTOR AND MADE THE DECISION TO LAND. AFTER MAKING THE DECISION; I PROCEEDED TO EXPLAIN THE VASI LIGHTING SYSTEM TO MY STUDENT; POINTING OUT HOW WE WERE ON A NICE GLIDESLOPE; RED OVER WHITE. STUDENT MENTIONED THAT HIS AIRSPD WAS A LITTLE FAST; I CONCURRED. GENERALLY WE LOOK FOR ABOUT 65 KTS AND WE WERE APCHING AT 70 KTS. HE PITCHED UP AND SLIGHTLY REDUCED THE POWER. APPROX 200 FT ABOVE THE GND; I LOOKED UP AND REALIZED THE HELI HAD NOT PROCEEDED DOWNWIND BUT RATHER HAD BEGAN HOVERING APPROX 200 TO 300 FT ABOVE THE GND. EVEN THOUGH I HAD VISUALLY BEEN SCANNING FOR THE HELI I WAS UNABLE TO SEE THE HELI UNTIL THIS POINT (THEY ARE VERY DARK ACFT; EXTREMELY HARD TO SEE; AND NOT VERY WELL LIT) EVEN AFTER OBTAINING A VISUAL ON THE HELI. AT THIS POINT HE APPEARED TO BE ABOUT TWO-THIRDS OF THE WAY DOWN THE RWY (ONCE AGAIN VERY DIFFICULT TO SEE AT NIGHT). AT THIS POINT MY OPTIONS WERE LIMITED. I COULD HAVE EXECUTED A GO AROUND BUT ELECTED NOT TO; FEARING A MID-AIR COLLISION WITH THE HELI (ESPECIALLY BEING THAT THE HELI APPEARED TO BE PAYING NO ATTENTION TO MY RADIO CALLS). A GO AROUND FOLLOWED BY AN IMMEDIATE TURN I FELT WAS NOT AN OPTION DUE PARTLY TO OUR CLOSE PROX TO THE GND AND ALSO FEARING THE RISK OF A MID-AIR COLLISION WITH THE OTHER HELI IN THE PATTERN. SO; BELIEVING THAT THE HELI WAS TWO-THIRDS DOWN THE RWY; ELECTED TO LAND AND ATTEMPT TO STOP BEFORE ENTERING THE ROTOR WASH. OVER THE THRESHOLD I REALIZED THAT HE WAS IN FACT NOT TWO-THIRDS OF THE WAY DOWN THE RWY BUT RATHER HOVERING APPROX OVER THE THOUSAND FOOT MARKERS AT APPROX 200 FT ABOVE THE RWY. AT THIS POINT WE WERE COMPLETELY COMMITTED TO LAND. OUR MAIN WHEELS TOUCHED DOWN INITIALLY UNTIL WE CAUGHT A GUST OF WIND FROM THE OUTFLOW OF THE PROP WASH WHICH CAUSED US TO BALLOON TO APPROX 2 FT ABOVE THE RWY. AT THIS POINT WE ENTERED THE DOWN FLOW OF THE PROP WASH WHICH FORCED US TO THE GND. OUR MAIN WHEELS LANDED FIRST FOLLOWED BY OUR NOSEWHEEL WHICH COLLAPSED ON IMPACT. WE SKIDDED FOR APPROX 25 FT BEFORE COMING TO REST. I ELECTED TO LEAVE THE MASTER SWITCH ON SO THAT THE LIGHTS WOULD REMAIN ILLUMINATED. MY INITIAL FEAR; NOW BECOMING AWARE OF THE HELI'S COMPLETE OBLIVIOUSNESS TO OUR EXISTENCE; WAS THAT THE HELI WOULD LAND ON TOP OF US. MY SUSPICIONS AS TO THE HELI'S COMPLETE LACK OF AWARENESS WERE COMPOUNDED BY THE FACT THAT HE CONTINUED TO HOVER ABOVEUS FOR AT LEAST ANOTHER MINUTE. AT THIS POINT I MADE A QUICK RADIO CALL ANNOUNCING THE FACT THAT THERE WAS A DISABLED ACFT ON THE RWY AND THEN LEFT THE ACFT SEEKING HELP.CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: REPORTER STATED THAT HE HAS BEEN WORKING AT MHK FOR A NUMBER OF MONTHS AND HAS SUBJECTIVELY OBSERVED THAT MILITARY TRAINING HAS INCREASED AT MHK. ONE RWY AT FRI IS CLOSED AND BECAUSE MHK IS ONLY 7 MILES AWAY; IT IS A MORE CONVENIENT TRAINING LOCATION.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.