Narrative:

This aircraft has had a history of fuel system problems. This day an MEL item for tank 2 fill valve inoperative was in the logbook. Looking back there were many fuel system related problems with all the tanks. About 1+55 into the flight the tank #3 pump inoperative non alert was displayed on the ead. We followed the aom procedure and pulled the associated circuit breaker. About an hour later the tank #3 pumps inoperative came on and then extinguished. It was followed by the tank #3 xfeed valve opening. The fuel system was in automatic. The tank #3 pumps inoperative was intermittent so we reviewed the aom and monitored the fuel system. About an hour from ZZZ the engine #3 suck feed level one alert came on. We reviewed the aom which said if the fuel system was in normal to monitor. On the fuel synoptic there was nothing green feeding the #3 engine; nothing green. I conferred with the first officer and stated that I felt more comfortable having pressurized fuel to the engine in light of all the associated fuel problems with the aircraft and this tank/engine. I elected to put the fuel system in manual and operate tank to engine fuel pressure for the remainder of the flight. I did not want to induce a cruise level engine failure due to fuel starvation. The fuel levels were basically even in tanks #1; #2 and #3. We both felt more comfortable looking at the descent and landing with the fuel system in manual and having positive pressure to that engine. This is not the procedure outlined in the aom; but the aom doesn't address if there have been other fuel system problems associated with that tank or engine. I felt it was exercising good judgement to put the fuel system in manual and monitor it for the duration of the flight. We briefed the mechanics after landing and they were both surprised that there was nothing green in the fuel synoptic to engine #3 at the time and agreed and applauded my decision to go to manual as I did. My main fear was an engine #3 flameout due to fuel starvation.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: MD11 FLT CREW AT FL350 RPTS #3 FUEL TANK PUMP FAILURE AND FUEL SYS ANOMALIES WITH THE SYS IN AUTO. SYS IS SWITCHED TO MANUAL FOR REMAINDER OF FLT.

Narrative: THIS ACFT HAS HAD A HISTORY OF FUEL SYS PROBS. THIS DAY AN MEL ITEM FOR TANK 2 FILL VALVE INOP WAS IN THE LOGBOOK. LOOKING BACK THERE WERE MANY FUEL SYS RELATED PROBS WITH ALL THE TANKS. ABOUT 1+55 INTO THE FLT THE TANK #3 PUMP INOP NON ALERT WAS DISPLAYED ON THE EAD. WE FOLLOWED THE AOM PROC AND PULLED THE ASSOCIATED CIRCUIT BREAKER. ABOUT AN HR LATER THE TANK #3 PUMPS INOP CAME ON AND THEN EXTINGUISHED. IT WAS FOLLOWED BY THE TANK #3 XFEED VALVE OPENING. THE FUEL SYS WAS IN AUTO. THE TANK #3 PUMPS INOP WAS INTERMITTENT SO WE REVIEWED THE AOM AND MONITORED THE FUEL SYS. ABOUT AN HR FROM ZZZ THE ENG #3 SUCK FEED LEVEL ONE ALERT CAME ON. WE REVIEWED THE AOM WHICH SAID IF THE FUEL SYS WAS IN NORMAL TO MONITOR. ON THE FUEL SYNOPTIC THERE WAS NOTHING GREEN FEEDING THE #3 ENG; NOTHING GREEN. I CONFERRED WITH THE FO AND STATED THAT I FELT MORE COMFORTABLE HAVING PRESSURIZED FUEL TO THE ENG IN LIGHT OF ALL THE ASSOCIATED FUEL PROBS WITH THE ACFT AND THIS TANK/ENG. I ELECTED TO PUT THE FUEL SYS IN MANUAL AND OPERATE TANK TO ENG FUEL PRESSURE FOR THE REMAINDER OF THE FLT. I DID NOT WANT TO INDUCE A CRUISE LEVEL ENG FAILURE DUE TO FUEL STARVATION. THE FUEL LEVELS WERE BASICALLY EVEN IN TANKS #1; #2 AND #3. WE BOTH FELT MORE COMFORTABLE LOOKING AT THE DSCNT AND LNDG WITH THE FUEL SYS IN MANUAL AND HAVING POSITIVE PRESSURE TO THAT ENG. THIS IS NOT THE PROC OUTLINED IN THE AOM; BUT THE AOM DOESN'T ADDRESS IF THERE HAVE BEEN OTHER FUEL SYS PROBS ASSOCIATED WITH THAT TANK OR ENG. I FELT IT WAS EXERCISING GOOD JUDGEMENT TO PUT THE FUEL SYS IN MANUAL AND MONITOR IT FOR THE DURATION OF THE FLT. WE BRIEFED THE MECHS AFTER LNDG AND THEY WERE BOTH SURPRISED THAT THERE WAS NOTHING GREEN IN THE FUEL SYNOPTIC TO ENG #3 AT THE TIME AND AGREED AND APPLAUDED MY DECISION TO GO TO MANUAL AS I DID. MY MAIN FEAR WAS AN ENG #3 FLAMEOUT DUE TO FUEL STARVATION.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.