|37000 Feet||Browse and search NASA's
Aviation Safety Reporting System
|Local Time Of Day||1801 To 2400|
|Locale Reference||airport : zzz.airport|
|Altitude||msl single value : 23000|
|Controlling Facilities||artcc : zzz.artcc|
|Operator||common carrier : air carrier|
|Make Model Name||EMB ERJ 190/195 ER&LR|
|Operating Under FAR Part||Part 121|
|Flight Phase||cruise : level|
|Affiliation||company : air carrier|
|Function||flight crew : captain|
oversight : pic
|Qualification||pilot : atp|
|Anomaly||aircraft equipment problem : critical|
inflight encounter : weather
|Independent Detector||aircraft equipment other aircraft equipment : eicas|
other flight crewa
|Resolutory Action||none taken : unable|
Approximately 20 DME southwest of ZZZ1 VOR we experienced loss of autoplt; at 23000 ft with the associated EICAS messages. Ground spoiler fault; #1 electric hydraulic failure; #2 electric hydraulic failure; ADS3 fail; hydraulic ptu not on automatic; slats at half rate; and approximately 1 min later automatic-pressurization fault. Cabin started to climb at 4000 FPM and stopped climbing at cabin altitude of approximately 8900 ft. Around 14000 ft during descent; approximately 20 mi west of ZZZ2 VOR experienced icing conditions. The automatic feature engaged but then failed to close the a/I valves; therefore we got another set of EICAS messages. #1 engine a/I valve fail open; #2 a/I valve fail open; and wing anti-ice fail open. Experienced extreme heat and cold temperatures in the cabin associated with thrust position. On final; as a condition of the ground spoiler fault; the automatic trim compensation did not work. The autoplt clicked off at 23000 ft with multiple EICAS messages. We responded by assigning PF's and pm's. I was the PF and the first officer was the pm. The pm got out the QRH and began on the ground spoiler fault checklist. Once that was accomplished; we advised ATC that for operational purposes (ie; so we could accomplish the multiple EICAS messages that needed to be completed) needed to slow down to 270 KTS. Once the actions were accomplished; the autoplt was re-engaged. Since we had other EICAS messages we decided to take 1 message at a time in the QRH to see the consequences that would be imposed on us upon arrival. That took us to the point of TOD. ATC had given us a crossing restr of ZZZ2 at 250 KTS/10000 ft. Roughly at 17000 ft we entered clouds and icing conditions. The automatic a/I for both engines and wings came on. Roughly at 9000 ft and talking to approach; we came out of the icing conditions at which time we got the engine #1 and #2 valve open fail light and wing and started to work on those QRH items. We advised approach that a slower speed was required for operational purposes (ie; to complete QRH items for were operational). Landing; touchdown; rollout; were all normal and taxied to the gate. At gate arrival; we were met by 2 maintenance personnel and given the write ups in the logbook. Onboard was an FAA maintenance inspector. He also spoke to the maintenance personnel. The procedures we had in place worked; we felt like we were ahead of the airplane the whole time with the QRH. The EICAS faults and failures displayed were easy to locate in the QRH and the first officer's system knowledge and flow of the QRH supported us well. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: the aircraft remained at the destination airport for several days while it was examined by representatives from the manufacturer. The FAA maintenance inspector who was on board also became involved in discovering the reasons for the electrical problems. Although no definitive cause was found; replacing electronic C/B components eventually returned the aircraft to service. It was also reported that the aircraft was struck by lightning early in its service life; causing a diversion.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: EMB190 FLT CREW AT FL230 REPORTS NUMEROUS UNRELATED ELECTRICAL AND HYDRAULIC MALFUNCTIONS.
Narrative: APPROX 20 DME SW OF ZZZ1 VOR WE EXPERIENCED LOSS OF AUTOPLT; AT 23000 FT WITH THE ASSOCIATED EICAS MESSAGES. GND SPOILER FAULT; #1 ELECTRIC HYD FAILURE; #2 ELECTRIC HYD FAILURE; ADS3 FAIL; HYD PTU NOT ON AUTO; SLATS AT HALF RATE; AND APPROX 1 MIN LATER AUTO-PRESSURIZATION FAULT. CABIN STARTED TO CLB AT 4000 FPM AND STOPPED CLBING AT CABIN ALT OF APPROX 8900 FT. AROUND 14000 FT DURING DSCNT; APPROX 20 MI W OF ZZZ2 VOR EXPERIENCED ICING CONDITIONS. THE AUTO FEATURE ENGAGED BUT THEN FAILED TO CLOSE THE A/I VALVES; THEREFORE WE GOT ANOTHER SET OF EICAS MESSAGES. #1 ENG A/I VALVE FAIL OPEN; #2 A/I VALVE FAIL OPEN; AND WING ANTI-ICE FAIL OPEN. EXPERIENCED EXTREME HEAT AND COLD TEMPS IN THE CABIN ASSOCIATED WITH THRUST POS. ON FINAL; AS A CONDITION OF THE GND SPOILER FAULT; THE AUTO TRIM COMPENSATION DID NOT WORK. THE AUTOPLT CLICKED OFF AT 23000 FT WITH MULTIPLE EICAS MESSAGES. WE RESPONDED BY ASSIGNING PF'S AND PM'S. I WAS THE PF AND THE FO WAS THE PM. THE PM GOT OUT THE QRH AND BEGAN ON THE GND SPOILER FAULT CHKLIST. ONCE THAT WAS ACCOMPLISHED; WE ADVISED ATC THAT FOR OPERATIONAL PURPOSES (IE; SO WE COULD ACCOMPLISH THE MULTIPLE EICAS MESSAGES THAT NEEDED TO BE COMPLETED) NEEDED TO SLOW DOWN TO 270 KTS. ONCE THE ACTIONS WERE ACCOMPLISHED; THE AUTOPLT WAS RE-ENGAGED. SINCE WE HAD OTHER EICAS MESSAGES WE DECIDED TO TAKE 1 MESSAGE AT A TIME IN THE QRH TO SEE THE CONSEQUENCES THAT WOULD BE IMPOSED ON US UPON ARR. THAT TOOK US TO THE POINT OF TOD. ATC HAD GIVEN US A XING RESTR OF ZZZ2 AT 250 KTS/10000 FT. ROUGHLY AT 17000 FT WE ENTERED CLOUDS AND ICING CONDITIONS. THE AUTO A/I FOR BOTH ENGS AND WINGS CAME ON. ROUGHLY AT 9000 FT AND TALKING TO APCH; WE CAME OUT OF THE ICING CONDITIONS AT WHICH TIME WE GOT THE ENG #1 AND #2 VALVE OPEN FAIL LIGHT AND WING AND STARTED TO WORK ON THOSE QRH ITEMS. WE ADVISED APCH THAT A SLOWER SPD WAS REQUIRED FOR OPERATIONAL PURPOSES (IE; TO COMPLETE QRH ITEMS FOR WERE OPERATIONAL). LNDG; TOUCHDOWN; ROLLOUT; WERE ALL NORMAL AND TAXIED TO THE GATE. AT GATE ARR; WE WERE MET BY 2 MAINT PERSONNEL AND GIVEN THE WRITE UPS IN THE LOGBOOK. ONBOARD WAS AN FAA MAINT INSPECTOR. HE ALSO SPOKE TO THE MAINT PERSONNEL. THE PROCS WE HAD IN PLACE WORKED; WE FELT LIKE WE WERE AHEAD OF THE AIRPLANE THE WHOLE TIME WITH THE QRH. THE EICAS FAULTS AND FAILURES DISPLAYED WERE EASY TO LOCATE IN THE QRH AND THE FO'S SYS KNOWLEDGE AND FLOW OF THE QRH SUPPORTED US WELL. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: THE ACFT REMAINED AT THE DEST ARPT FOR SEVERAL DAYS WHILE IT WAS EXAMINED BY REPRESENTATIVES FROM THE MANUFACTURER. THE FAA MAINT INSPECTOR WHO WAS ON BOARD ALSO BECAME INVOLVED IN DISCOVERING THE REASONS FOR THE ELECTRICAL PROBS. ALTHOUGH NO DEFINITIVE CAUSE WAS FOUND; REPLACING ELECTRONIC C/B COMPONENTS EVENTUALLY RETURNED THE ACFT TO SVC. IT WAS ALSO RPTED THAT THE ACFT WAS STRUCK BY LIGHTNING EARLY IN ITS SVC LIFE; CAUSING A DIVERSION.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.